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Due in large part to the higher cost of doing business with high credit
risk individuals, the poor historically have paid more in consumer credit
transactions than have other classes of our society.' Over the last fifteen
years, however, low-income consumers have turned with increasing
frequency to businesses offering consumer durable goods (e.g., furniture and
home appliances) under lease-purchase or "rent-to-own" ("RTO")
agreements as an alternative to traditional credit contracts. Over this period
the RTO business has grown from a handful of companies with a negligible
share of the market for consumer durables to a $2.5 billion industry claiming
a substantial part of this market.' This expansion has led to increased
scrutiny from consumer groups and government officials who have
questioned whether this relatively new transaction is fundamentally different
from a credit sale and whether the RTO industry should be complying with
the constraints of state and federal consumer protection legislation governing
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the sale of goods? The resulting battles in the courts and legislatures have
yielded a wide variety of proposed solutions-from efforts to prohibit the
RTO transaction in some states4 to virtually no restraints on RTO dealers in
others.5
Although the RTO industry serves customers from all socio-economic
backgrounds, it has provoked strong opposition from consumer advocates and
legal services organizations because many, if not most, RTO customers are
low-income, high-credit-risk consumers.6 RTO dealers solicit low-income
patrons by emphasizing easy credit, low periodic payments, quick delivery
of household appliances, and no long term obligation to repay a debt.7 For
many consumers who cannot obtain loans from finance companies or credit
from traditional retailers, RTO may be the only way, or at least the most
accessible means, of acquiring desired household items.8 The prices paid for
these goods, however, may be more than double their retail prices by the
time the RTO transaction has concluded.9 The controversy is heightened by
the industry's insistence that it is exempt from usury limits and other
consumer protection laws-most notably, the federal Truth in Lending Act,
state retail installment sales acts, and the repossession provisions of Article
9 of the UCC-that govern the activities of most retailers and financers of
consumer goods under traditional credit arrangements. By charging high
prices and not complying with the requirements of these laws, RTO dealers
are often accused of deceiving and exploiting a particularly vulnerable class
3 See, e.g., 3. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTs AND PRACTICES 213-26
(National Consumer Law Center, 2d ed. 1988) (discussing legality of RTO transactions);
Waters, We Are the People Who do Good, RTO Network News, Jan. 1990, at 3 (industry
believes critics want RTO contracts declared illegal); Special Update, PROGRESSIVE
RENTALS, June-July 1990, at 22 (RTO dealers observe increasingly well-organized
opposition).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 102-17.
s See infra text accompanying notes 273-77, 303-06.
6 See Hawkes Television v. Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection, 462 A.2d
1167 (Me. 1983); State v. Action TV Rentals, 297 Md. 531, 535, 467 A.2d 1000, 1002
(1983); Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 53 (statement of Geraldine Azzata);
PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, June-July 1989, at 25.
7 See E. SARASON, TRUTH IN LENDING 28 (1986).
8 Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Jane Simmons); Waters,
supra note 3, at 3 ("We are the people who . . . trust [consumers] with our
merchandise-even when we know they have come to see us nine times out of ten
because no one else will trust them with enough credit.").
" See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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of consumers as the industry operates in an essentially unregulated
environment. 10
Dozens of state and federal courts have inquired into the nature of the
RTO business. Although the confrontation between consumer representatives
and RTO dealers produced mixed results in early decisions, the recent trend
in the courts has favored accepting the industry's claim that RTO leases are
not credit sales and therefore are exempt from many consumer protection
statutes.1 Over the last five years, the debate has moved to the legislatures,
where the industry often has succeeded in obtaining protective legislation
further insulating it from attack under credit laws and ensuring its continued
operation outside usury limits and under modest regulation.
1 2
This Article examines the relationship between low-income consumers
and the RTO industry, and evaluates recent attempts to regulate the industry
through the courts and legislatures. The article is arranged in four parts. Part
I describes the RTO transaction and the more common objections to the
industry voiced by consumer groups. Part II reviews judicial decisions that,
for the most part, have refused to treat RTO contracts as credit sales under
state and federal consumer credit laws and, more importantly, argues that
amending traditional credit laws to cover RTO transactions would probably
not be in the best interests of low-income RTO consumers. Part III examines
the often-litigated question of whether RTO transactions are security interests
under Article 9 of the UCC. Part III also discusses the limited value of the
UCC, including Articles 9 and 2A, to most RTO consumers. Part IV reviews
the recent efforts to enact special RTO laws directed at the particular needs
of low-income consumers and concludes that such laws, with some important
modifications, can provide the most meaningful protection for RTO
consumers.
I. RTO BACKGROUND
The concept of a "rent-to-own" contract as an alternative to a traditional
credit sale of goods was a response to the rapid growth of consumer credit
in the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting proliferation of laws regulating
credit enacted by Congress (e.g., the Truth in Lending Act) and state
10 See J. SHELDON, supra note 3, at 215; Ramp, supra note 2, at 805.
1 See infra Parts II and I1.
'2 See infra Part IV.
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legislatures (e.g., retail installment sales acts). 3 The combined effect of the
credit laws enacted in this era was to mandate standard disclosures of
pertinent information in credit transactions, to codify many of the rights and
duties of debtor and creditor, and, through state usury limits, to set interest
rate ceilings for retail credit sales in an effort to control the cost of buying
goods over time. 4 During the same period, courts began taking a more
active role as guardians of consumer interests, and judges invalidated, as
unconscionable, several commonly used pro-creditor contract provisions,
such as cross-collateral clauses and provisions for a consumer's waiver of
defenses upon default.15
These legislative and judicial developments made it more costly for
businesses to extend credit to low-income, high-credit-risk individuals.
Creditors could no longer openly charge high interest rates to reflect high
credit risk, nor could they ensure profits by taking other revenue increasing
measures, such as requiring that the debt be oversecured or that judgment
could be quickly obtained upon the debtor's default. While these
developments were hailed as benefiting consumers generally, one result was
the increased likelihood that low-income consumers would be denied credit.
For consumers who were excluded from traditional credit markets, the
available options for purchasing relatively high priced consumer goods were
to save money for retail cash purchases, to frequent local retailers who
inflated the disclosed "cash price" of goods to stay within usury limits and
still earn a profit, or to engage the services of illegal lenders (i.e., "loan
sharks"). 6
13 Although there is some evidence that the transaction originated in 1959 in Wichita,
Kansas, RTO consumer agreements did not begin to gain popularity in the United States
until the 1970s. See Fassitt v. United T.V. Rental, 297 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1974);
State v. Action TV Rentals, 297 Md. App. 531, 467 A.2d 1000, 1002 (1983); In re
Royer's Bakery, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Ramp, supra
note 2, at 797 (observing that renting home appliances has long been popular in
England).
"' E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1991) [hereinafter TILA];
7 U.L.A. Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.102 (1968) [hereinafter U.C.C.C.]. See
infra text accompanying notes 29-38.
'- See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); see
also U.C.C.C. §§ 2.404, 3.404(4).
16 V. CHAPMAN, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 18, 143-45 (1967); UNITED
STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 104-05 (1972) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT];
Nathan, Economic Analysis of Usury Laws, J. BANK. RES. 200, 201 (Winter 1980).
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Eventually, entrepreneurs noticed an apparent void in consumer credit
laws. When read literally, many statutes applied only to transactions in which
a "debt" was created and the consumer was obligated to pay for the full
value of the goods. 7 They did not cover a transaction in which the
consumer was obligated for only a week or two and then had the option of
renewing the agreement for a number of successive weeks or months in order
to complete the contract. By 1960, businesses had opened in low-income
neighborhoods offering short-term renewable leases, with no credit check,
that promised immediate possession of furniture and home appliances.
Moreover, a consumer renewing the lease long enough would obtain
ownership of those goods. The contract was thus styled not as a sale of goods
on credit but as a weekly or monthly lease that ultimately would lead to a
transfer of ownership if the customer continued leasing for a stated period,
usually twelve or eighteen months."8 A market for the RTO service was
quickly established.19
Since it is relatively costly to sell or lease goods to consumers who are
high credit risks, the prices charged under these lease-purchase agreements
are far above what is charged for similar goods sold by traditional retailers
to more creditworthy buyers.' Thus, through RTO transactions the poor
pay substantially more for many consumer goods than do those who have
ready access to other sources of credit. In return for the higher price, an
RTO customer receives (1) the use of a product he or she otherwise might
not be able to obtain, (2) the possibility of ownership in the future without
the economic burden of a long term obligation, and (3) use of a product
without the responsibility for maintenance, which the RTO dealer typically
"7 E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (definition of "credit sale");
U.C.C.C. §§ 1.301(12), (35) (definition of "consumer credit sale" and "sale of goods");
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(37) (1989) [hereinafter U.C.C.] (definition of
"security interest"). See infra text accompanying notes 40-77, 78-117, 176-213.
" See, e.g., In re Glenn, 102 Bankr. 153, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989); In re Unger,
95 Bankr. 761 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989); Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 76-78,
98-106, 138 (statement of Geraldine Azzata).
"9 See supra note 2. In 1988, two RTO companies were designated among the 500
fastest growing privately owned firms in the United States. 1989: A Time for
Advancement in RTO, RTO Network News, Jan. 1990, at 1.
'0 See, e.g., In re Unger, 95 Bankr. 761, 762 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989) (cash price of
television, $369.00; RTO price, $600.00); In re Harris, 102 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1989) (cash price of washer/dryer, $711.65; RTO price, $1,423.26); In re Hanley,
105 Bankr. 458, 460 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989) (cash price of dryer, $338.00; RTO price,
$788.06); Crumley v. Berry, 298 Ark. 112, 766 S.W.2d 7 (1989) (cash price of
refrigerator, $599.95; RTO price $930.80).
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assumes under the lease.21 Industry representatives maintain that RTO as an
alternative to traditional credit financing can have value to individuals with
little or no money and a desire for good quality consumer durables. Because
no debt is created and the goods can be returned at any time with no further
obligation, budget problems and the hardships attendant to the enforcement
of default judgments (e.g., wage garnishment or bankruptcy) are less likely
to arise. Moreover, consumers have the opportunity to return goods that
simply do not work as well as anticipated, or are no longer needed or
wanted, a benefit not available to those who purchase similar items under
traditional credit contracts.'
Opponents of the industry maintain that the problems caused by the RTO
transaction outweigh whatever benefits might be received. Critics charge that
the "rental" feature of the contract is a convenient formality not important
to most RTO customers who view the transaction as equivalent to a credit
sale, and that the transaction should therefore be governed by the same
consumer protection laws regulating other transfers of consumer goods.'
Perhaps the central issue for consumer advocates is the exorbitant pricing
structure for RTO goods. Low-income RTO customers who pay two to three
times what a creditworthy consumer would pay for the same merchandise are
charged an effective interest rate far above usury limits.24 The high prices
place a considerable strain on already tight budgets, precipitating default on
other obligations, and perhaps contributing to consumer bankruptcy.
Moreover, while RTO customers often enter into contracts knowing the
weekly or monthly rental rate, they can be unaware of the high total price
and numerous incidental charges they will pay to obtain ownership by the
21 Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 112-13 (statement of J. Samuel Choate, Jr.);
id. at 107 (statement of Jane Simmons).
' See APRO Special Report, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, June-July 1987, at 43 ("There
is a large segment of the population who cannot own a nice washing machine or other
home furnishing unless they deal with a rent-to-own company"); Senate RTO Hearing,
supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Jane Simmons) (legal services representative
acknowledging that terminable RTO contract might benefit individuals who have no cash
resources).
23 See K. BROWN & K. KEEST, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION 129
(1987); Ramp, supra note 2, at 805.
24 See id. at 130 (computing RTO effective interest rates at over 400 percent in some
instances). The RTO industry has also received a substantial amount of adverse publicity
recently in the popular press. See Hinds, Rent-to-Oivn Ripoff, Providence Journal-
Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1988, at E-1; Kraft, The High Priced Models: Are Rent-to-Owtn
Appliance Businesses Practicing Usury?, New Haven Advocate, Feb. 13, 1985; Quinn,
Harrisburg Patriot News, Sept. 15, 1985, at 1; False Alarm, RTO Network News,
November 1990, at 1 (reviewing Oct. 19, 1990, CBS News broadcast on RTO contracts).
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end of the contract. Other sources of complaints include deceptive, overly
aggressive repossession tactics, delivery of used merchandise when new
products were promised, and the imposition of late payment fees and other
charges that either were not disclosed to the consumer or are not justified
under the circumstances.' 5
Critics contend that the application of a few key consumer protection
laws to RTO transactions would make important information available to
consumers, resulting in lower prices and more rational decisionmaking.
Consumer representatives have usually challenged the legality of RTO
transactions by maintaining that the contract is covered by the federal Truth
in Lending Act, a state's retail installment sales act, or a state's version of
the UCC governing sales of goods.' Perhaps perceiving some inequities in
allowing the industry to operate unregulated, some courts have construed
these federal and state statutes to apply and have characterized RTO
transactions as disguised sales by looking beyond the "form" to the
"substance" of the transaction.' Judges in these cases have often been faced
with compelling facts in which confused consumers have paid high prices for
goods and appear to have been victimized by unscrupulous dealers.
Sympathetic jurists have looked hard for a way to remedy an apparent
injustice.
Other courts, interpreting what they perceive to be the "plain language"
of the relevant statutes, have excluded RTO agreements from their
coverage.' The statutes generally employed to provide a remedy were
drafted before the RTO transaction became popular and without the RTO
consumer in mind. The statutory language thus does not neatly fit the
transaction. Judges' efforts to "right a wrong" and yet remain true to the
words of a statute have yielded interesting theories and sometimes strained
results.
25 See J. SHELDON, supra note 3, at 215; Ramp, supra note 2, at 810 n.95.
6 The applicability of TILA and retail installment sales laws to RTO contracts is
discussed in Part II; the UCC is addressed in Part III.
27 See infra notes 48-60, 103-117, and 183 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 47, 80-102, and 184-205 and accompanying text.
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II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
AND STATE RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES LAWS
The federal Truth in Lending Act is the cornerstone of consumer
credit legislation. The statute is Congress' most comprehensive effort to
guarantee the accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer
credit and thereby to enable consumers to make informed choices in the
credit market.3' When Congress passed the law in 1968, it was the first
extensive federal consumer credit legislation in the country. TILA provides
that prior to extending consumer credit (or at least contemporaneously
therewith), a creditor must disclose information Congress deemed important
to consumers, such as the annual percentage rate of interest, the amount of
debt financed, the finance charge, the total sale price (including finance
charges), rebates for early prepayment, delinquency charges for late
payments, and the existence of any security interest retained by the
creditor."1 Extensive revision and simplification of TILA in 1980 reaffirmed
Congress' view that consumers can benefit from the protections provided in
the Act.32
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1991). TILA was enacted in 1968 as Title I of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat.
146, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 176. Subsequent titles amended to the
original act include the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Title VI), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (Title VII), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Title VIII), and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Title IX). TILA is divided into five "chapters"-general
provisions, credit transactions, credit advertising, credit billing, and consumer leases.
Chapter 5 on consumer leases is also known as the Consumer Leasing Act and is
discussed separately in text accompanying notes 278-302.
30 See Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. at
669-70; Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market
Behavior: A Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
117, 120 (1984).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637, 1638 (1991). Section 1638 contains the disclosures required for
extension of "closed-end" credit, i.e., a fixed amount of credit extended for a one-time
financing arrangement, as opposed to an "open-end" plan that contemplates multiple
extensions of credit over a period of time (e.g., revolving charge accounts). To the extent
that RTO contracts are covered by TILA, the "closed-end" disclosures of § 1638 would
apply. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (definition of "open-end credit plan"). For a list of TILA
disclosures typically missing from an RTO contract, see Lemay v. Stroman's, Inc., 510
F. Supp. 921-22 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
32 Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 94 Stat. 168 (1980).
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Prior to TILA's enactment, consumers often were confronted with
confusing disclosures or the lack of relevant credit information. Creditors
expressed finance charges and total credit sale prices in different, frequently
misleading ways. Some creditors simply disclosed the monthly dollar
payments required under the contract, making no interest rate disclosures at
all, while others disclosed a finance charge or interest rate but computed
them under a variety of different methods.33 In addition, creditors often
failed to include incidental charges, such as mandatory credit insurance,
within the disclosed finance charge, thus giving the consumer a distorted
picture of the overall credit cost. 4 Consumers found it difficult, if not
impossible, to compare charges and rates among competing creditors who
used different computational methods and varying terms to describe similar
concepts. These inconsistencies inhibited consumers from shopping for the
most favorable credit terms. 5 As the consumer credit industry rapidly
expanded during the 1960s, the need for complete and uniform disclosure of
important credit information became evident.
Every state has enacted some form of retail installment sales ("RIS") law
to supplement the TILA disclosures and to encourage uniformity in consumer
credit transactions. In general, these laws mandate certain disclosures in retail
credit contracts and impose substantive consumer protections such as interest
33 See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDrr REPORT, supra note 16, at 169-70. The report
observed that retailers and finance companies often quoted interest rates as a dollar "add-
on," and thus disclosed the finance charge in terms of a dollar amount per year based on
the initial balance. For example, the finance charge might have been stated as $7 per
$100 per year, indicating that on a three year loan of $2,000 the finance charge would
be $420 ($7 x 20 x 3 years). The effective interest rate on such a contract is actually
12.83%. Banks often quoted rates on a "discount basis," which could result in higher
effective interest rates (e.g., a charge of $7 per $100 per year for a three year loan would
be equivalent to a rate of 16.01%). Consumer credit unions and banks offering revolving
credit accounts stated monthly instead of annual rates. Still other institutions combined
computational methods to form hybrid formulae. Id. See also K. BROWN & K. KEEST,
supra note 23, at 63-108 (guides for calculating effective interest rates under various
computational methods).
See generally Sheffey, Credit Life and Disability Insurance Disclosures Under
Truth-in-Lending: The Triumph of Form over Substance, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 463
(1980).
31 Several studies confirmed consumers' lack of understanding and inability to
compare credit alternatives. See Due, Consumer Knowledge of Installment Credit
Charges, 20 J. MARKETING 162, 164 (Oct. 1955); Juster & Shay, Consumer Sensitivity
to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investigation 61, 73 (New York: National
Bureau of Econ. Res. 1964). See generally, National Consumer Credit Report, supra note
16, at 170-72.
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rate ceilings, limitations on incidental charges creditors may impose, and
restrictions on creditors' rights, as well as providing sufficient administrative
enforcement power to support remedial actions by consumer debtors against
creditors who violate the laws. 6
If an RTO transaction is characterized as a credit sale under TILA or an
RIS statute, the consequences for an RTO dealer are severe. The dealer
would have to disclose in the contract, among other things, the cash price of
the merchandise, the total RTO price, the finance charge or price paid for the
privilege of paying for the goods over time, and an interest rate computed
according to statutory guidelines based on the finance charge imposed. Most
importantly, the transaction would be subject to the state's interest rate
ceiling on consumer credit sales.37 Because RTO prices are high and many
RTO customers present too great a risk to qualify for credit under traditional
credit arrangements, the RTO dealer might find it impossible to give the
required disclosures and remain within the interest rate ceiling. The dealer's
alternatives would be either to substantially lower the total RTO price (and
probably incur losses) or to substantially inflate the stated "cash price" to
bring the disclosed finance charge and interest rate within allowable limits
(and perhaps be accused of imposing "hidden" finance charges).3" Neither
" For a thorough discussion of the scope of RIS laws in different jurisdictions, see
B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1966). While the substance
of RIS laws can differ widely among jurisdictions, several states have rewritten and
consolidated all or parts of their credit laws in a single consumer credit code. The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code is a model code that has been enacted, in one form or
another, in eleven states (Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). In other states, consumer credit
legislation is often scattered in several statutes that address particular types of credit
transactions (e.g., bank loan, automobile financing, or pawnbrokers). Most states have
a law dealing with the sale of consumer goods on credit, and in this article "RIS" is used
to designate such laws as well as the provisions of the U.C.C.C. that address credit sales.
17 See K. BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23, at 32; Tennessee v. Rentavision Corp.
of Am., No. 83-1647-I (Chancery Ct. 7th Div. 1983); Crumley v. Berry, 298 Ark. 112,
766 S.W.2d 7 (1989); Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection,
462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983); State v. Action TV Rentals, Inc., 297 Md. App. 531, 467
A.2d 1000 (1983); Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wisc.
2d 79, 365 N.W.2d 882 (1985).
38 "Hidden interest" can be loosely defined as the imposition of any charge paid in
connection with a consumer credit contract that can be classified as interest under local
law but is not designated as such in the credit agreement. See K. BROWN & K. KEEST,
supra note 23, at 109. It can take many forms, such as up front loan origination fees or
points, brokers' fees, mandatory attorneys' fees, or contract processing fees. One of the
most common means of collecting hidden interest in consumer credit sales is to inflate
the stated "cash price" of the goods. The practice has been noted by the U.S. Supreme
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alternative is attractive to the industry. Consequently, the battle over the
inclusion of RTO transactions in TILA and RIS statutes has been intense.
Because TILA and RIS laws only cover "credit" transactions, courts
faced with a consumer's allegations that an RTO dealer failed to comply with
these laws must first decide whether the statute's definition of covered credit
transactions includes terminable RTO leases. While the issue is not entirely
settled, a clear majority of courts have held that RTO transactions do not
come within the definitions set forth in TILA or state credit laws.39 The
remainder of this section examines the reasons supporting this judicial
reluctance to charactarize RTO contracts as credit sales, and concludes that
RTO consumers may ultimately benefit from the courts' inaction if the
regulatory void is filled by legislation better tailored to the problems facing
the poor.
A. TILA's Coverage Is Limited to Debt-Creating Sales
TILA's uniform disclosure requirements only apply to "creditors" as
defined in the statute and its implementing Regulation Z. TILA defines
"creditor" to include all persons who regularly allow consumers to "defer
payment of a debt" that is payable "in more than four installments or for
which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required."'"
Recognizing, however, that extensions of credit by retail sellers of goods
might require different disclosures (e.g., cash price and amount of down
payment) than loans made by cash lenders like banks and finance companies,
Congress defined a subcategory of covered creditors who engage in "credit
sales." Most importantly for those interested in the RTO industry, Congress
recognized that some leases were nothing more than disguised credit sales,
and thus defined "credit sale" to include:
Court, see Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), and can be a
violation of TILA. See Yazzie v. Reynolds, 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1980); Joseph v.
Norman's Health Club, 532 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1976). The difficulty, of course, is proving
the actual value of the goods, which can vary widely among retailers.
3 See infra notes 47 and 63.
0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1991) (disclosures must be made by the "creditor," or, in
contracts covered by the Consumer Leasing Act, by the "lessor").
41 15 U.S.C. § 1602(t) (1991). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) (1990). Persons
who do not expressly charge interest but who collect a debt in "more than four
installments" are covered because a hidden interest charge is presumed when a creditor
allows a debt to be repaid over time, even if no express interest component is stated. See
Mourning v. Family PublicationsServ., 411 U.S. 356 (1983) (upholding Federal Reserve
Board regulation applying four-installment rule).
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any contract in the form of a bailment or lease if the bailee or lessee
contracts to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to
or in excess of the aggregate value of the property and services involved and
it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will become, or for no other or a
nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the property
upon full compliance with his obligations under the contract. 42
Consumer representatives view this language as covering RTO
agreements because the typical RTO contract allows the lessee to become the
owner of the goods automatically at the end of the lease without paying any
additional consideration.'3 The RTO industry has consistently argued that
its agreements are not "credit sales" because the consumer does not "contract
to pay" for the full value of the goods, but rather agrees to pay rent for only
one week or one month and can terminate the agreement at any time."
Absent an obligation to pay for the value of the goods, the industry contends,
the question of "nominal consideration" under the statute is not even
reached.
The Federal Reserve Board, which promulgated Regulation Z and is
charged with implementing TILA, has supported the industry's view. In a
series of unofficial staff opinions beginning in 1974, the Board concluded
that because the lessee's option to terminate the rental agreement negates any
obligation to pay the full market value of the property, the lessee does not
"contract to pay" for the goods and the transaction falls outside the definition
of "credit sale" even if ownership transfers for no consideration at the end
of the lease.4' The Board's position follows from its view that it would be
difficult to calculate a finance charge or annual percentage rate on such a
42 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1988) (emphasis added). See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16) (1990)
and comment 2(a)(16) (if transaction is a credit sale, the creditor must disclose, in
addition to the general disclosures of 12 C.F.R. § 226.18, the special disclosures of 12
C.F.R. § 226.180) (e.g., "total sale price," "cash price")).
11 See E. SARASON, supra note 7, at 29.
"Id.
"' See Informal FRB Staff Opinion Letters: No. 750, Consumer Cred. Guide (CCII)
31,069 (Jan. 11, 1974); No. 761, Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 31,083 (Mar. 12,
1974); No. 783, Consumer Cred. Guide (CCI) 31,105 (Apr. 18, 1974); No. 871,
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCII) at 31,202 (Feb. 28, 1975); No. 1010, Consumer Cred.
Guide (CCII) 31,350 (Feb. 25, 1976); No. 1169, Consumer Cred. Guide (CCII)
31,566 (Mar. 28, 1977); No. 1192, Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 31,623; No. 1217,
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCII) 31,656 (July 15, 1977). See generally Note, The
Applicability of the Federal Truth in Lending Act to Rental Purchase Contracts, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 118 (1980) (discussing some early decisions applying TILA to RTO
contracts).
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lease. Whereas true sellers of property calculate finance charges by reference
to either the total amount financed or the difference between the cash price
and the deferred payment price, rental payments derive, at least in part, from
the value of using the property during each rental term and not merely from
the retail value of the goods at the beginning of the lease increased by the
time value of money.' This "use" value must be accounted for in any
calculation of interest rates but, as a practical matter, it is difficult to
quantify. Courts in fourteen cases deferred to the Board's early interpretation
and held, without further analysis, that RTO contracts were not covered by
TILA.47
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, several courts held to the contrary.
Rejecting the Board's pronouncements as too formalistic and semantic, they
either held that an RTO contract was a "credit sale" or that the question
raised factual issues making the dismissal of a TILA claim inappropriate.48
These courts criticized the Board and previous decisions for mechanically
applying the "contracts to pay" language of the statute and instead focused
on the substance of the RTO transaction. In the leading case, Clark v. Rent-It
Corp., the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a TILA claim brought
" See Truth in Lending-1967 Hearings on S.5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 663
(1987) (statement of Governor Robertson of the FRB). See also id. at 353 (statement of
Darrel M. Holt, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of America).
' In re Homeway Rentals, 64 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984); Lemay v. Stromans,
Inc., 510 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Blackshear v. S&S Television Rental, No. C-
79-490 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 23, 1981); Dodson v. Remco Enters., 504 F. Supp. 540 (E.D.
Va. 1980); Steward v. Remco Enters., 487 F. Supp. 361 (D. Nev. 1980); Smith v. ABC
Rental Sys. of New Orleans, 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978), aff'd 618 F.2d 397 (5th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Dorsey v. Curtis Mathes Sales Co., No. 4-78 Civ. 436 (D.
Minn., Mar. 26, 1979); In re Turner, No. 3-78-1135D (Bankr. D. Minn., Mar. 19,
1979); Ellis v. ABC Rental Sys. of Louisville, No. C-75-0032-L(B) (W.D. Ky., Apr.
27, 1976); Clark v. Aquarius TV Rental, No. CA-4-77-133 (N.D. Tex., Oct. 18, 1977);
Griggs v. Easy TV Rentals, No. C-75-2509A (N.D. Ga., Apr. 8, 1976); Terrell v. Mr.
T's Rental, No. C-75-2058A (N.D. Ga., June 4, 1976); Boyd v. ABC Rental Sys., No.
C-74-456-1(B) (W.D. Ky., Sept. 12, 1975); Remeo Enters. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567,
9 Kan. App. 2d 296 (1984).
48 See Clark v. Rent-It Corp., 685 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing dismissal of
TILA claim); In re Hanley, 105 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989) (refusing to dismiss
TILA claim); Davis v. Colonial Securities Corp., 541 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding RTO contract to be credit sale); Burks v. Curtis Mathes Centers, No. 4-79-429
(D. Minn. Nov. 14, 1980) (refusing to dismiss TILA claim); Jones v. Action T.V.
Rental, Inc., No. 79-1535 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1980); Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-
238 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 1979) (holding RTO contract to be a credit sale).
"9 685 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1982).
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by a consumer who had entered into a typical RTO contract. The agreement
provided that the consumer could rent a television on a week-to-week basis
and would become the owner if he renewed the agreement for seventy-eight
weeks at seventeen dollars per week. Noting that TILA was "remedial in
nature, and the substance rather than the form of credit transaction should be
examined," the court found it relevant to look at the practices of trade, the
course of dealing of the parties and their "intentions" rather than the mere
language of specific contractual provisions.' The district court therefore
erred by not considering evidence that the parties intended a sale rather than
a lease. Relevant evidence included proffered testimony that many customers
in fact became the owners of the rented property, that the dealer led the
plaintiff to believe the transaction was a sale, and that the RTO industry
targets low-income consumers who cannot obtain other forms of credit and
who look at RTO as the equivalent of a credit sale." The court was
influenced by portions of TILA's legislative history in which Congress
expressed concern that "some creditors would attempt to characterize their
transactions so as to fall one step outside whatever boundary Congress
attempted to establish."52 The intent of Congress was to include disguised
sales under TILA, and that intent is frustrated if the form of the contract is
considered to the exclusion of other evidence. 53
Several federal district courts reiterated this focus on the "practical
consequences" of the transaction rather than the form of the agreement in
holding RTO contracts subject to TILA's disclosure requirements.' These
courts supplemented the Clark analysis with discussion of another aspect of
congressional intent-the TILA definition of "credit sale" should be
consistent with the interpretation given to terms serving similar functions
under state law. Observing that the TILA definition of "credit sale" was
nearly identical to language used in the old Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
these courts looked to analogous state laws for guidance. District courts in
Waldron v. Best T V. & Stereo Rentals5 and Jones v. Action T. V Rental56
-°10d. at 248.
51 Id.
2 Id.
53 Id.
4 See supra note 48.
s 485 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1979). The Waldron court relied on a Maryland Court
of Appeals (that state's highest court) decision, United Rental Equipment Co. v. Potts &
Callahan Contracting Co., 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963), which had held that a
terminable RTO-type lease was a "security agreement" under the commercial code. The
Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently refused to follow United Rental Equipment in
a case seeking to characterize an RTO lease as a "credit sale" under the Maryland RIS
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thus relied on state court precedent holding that RTO-type renewable leases
created security interests under the state's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and since a finding of security interest implies a credit
sale rather than a true lease, RTO contracts should be treated like credit sales
under TILA. In Johnson v. McNamara,57 the district court observed that an
RTO agreement is virtually identical to a credit sale, the only practical
difference being that under an RTO agreement the consumer is not liable for
a deficiency should he return the goods and stop paying. Under a
Connecticut anti-deficiency law,58 however, and similar laws of several
other states,59 consumers are liable for neither a deficiency following default
nor repossession of the goods under retail credit sale contracts. Thus, the
asserted difference, which was critical to the Board staff opinions and courts
previously holding RTO agreements exempt from TILA, was not dispositive.
Instead, the court attempted to ascertain the intention of the parties by
looking at the overall "effect" of the agreement, and held that the transaction
statute. See State v. Action TV Rentals, 297 Md. App. 531, 467 A.2d 1000 (1983); infra
text accompanying notes 89-101. Thus, Waldron might be decided differently today.
" No. 79-1535 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1980) (relying on In re Royer's Bakery, 1 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963)).
' No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 1979). Johnson was widely circulated and cited
as one of the first decisions to look beyond FRB staff opinions to the substance of the
underlying transaction. As authority for relying on local law, the court observed that
Congress borrowed the definition of "credit sale" from the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act. Id. at 8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 1960, 1980; S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
12-13 (1967)).
5'8 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-98(f), (h) (West 1990).
59 E.g., COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 5-5-103(2) (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
516.31(3) (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 28-45-103(2) (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-
5-103(2) (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-5-103(2) (1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9A § 5-103(2) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. § 325 G.22 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
425.209(2) (West 1990). See J. SHELDON & R. SABLE, REPOSSESSIONs 250 (2d ed.
1988). In states where anti-deficiency laws have been enacted, a typical consumer credit
transaction does resemble an RTO contract because in both transactions the consumer will
owe no money if payments are stopped and the property is returned. Even in these states,
however, the transactions are not identical. Whereas failure to pay under a credit contract
results in a default, which may be so noted on the consumer's credit history, return of
property under an RTO agreement is not a contract breach. In addition, under an RTO
contract, the lessor is responsible for repair and maintenance, benefits not received by
purchasers of goods on credit unless the defect is covered under warranty or the
consumer has purchased a service contract.
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was indeed a credit sale under TILA.' None of these courts explored the
wisdom of relying on state law doctrines to determine the application of a
federal statute and the resulting possibility that the same contract could be
subject to TILA in one jurisdiction but not in another.
By 1980 the question whether an RTO contract was covered by TILA
was largely unsettled. Those courts which chose not to follow the Board staff
opinions created great uncertainty for RTO dealers and opened the door to
costly class action suits alleging TILA noncompliance.6' The divided
opinion, however, was not surprising. The statutory language requires that
there be a "contract to pay" for the value of the goods and the overall
statutory scheme contemplates a consumer entering into some type of "debt"
relationship. On the other hand, it could not be seriously disputed that for
many consumers an RTO contract was the only means of acquiring consumer
durable goods and these consumers considered the transaction a way of
purchasing on credit, and not just renting the article. If these individuals
were to understand the essential terms and costs of their deferred payment
decision, the TILA disclosures might be beneficial.
Amid all the uncertainty, it was undeniably true that the unpredictability
of the situation was inadequate for all concerned. Thus, the Board in 1982
promulgated a revised Regulation Z that attempted to settle the issue. The
revised (and current) definition of "credit sale" is nearly identical to its
predecessor except that it specifically exempts leases that are "terminable
without penalty at any time by the consumer."62 This should have resolved
the debate in favor of the RTO industry because the heart of an RTO contract
o Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-838, slip op. at 8 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 1979)
(court must "ascertain the intention of the parties by looking at the effect of the terms of
the agreement on the parties" (quoting Alban Tractor Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 219
Md. 593, 150 A.2d 456, 459 (1959))).
61 Since RTO dealers generally use form contracts, a finding that one contract is
covered by TILA may mean that all of its contracts violate the statute. Damages in a
TILA class action, while limited by statute, can be substantial. See 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(2)(B) (1991) (damages in class action are subject to court's discretion, but may
not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of creditor's "net worth").
62 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16) (1990), now provides:
Credit sale means a sale in which the seller is a creditor. The term includes a bailment
or lease (unless terminable without penalty at any time by the consumer) under which
the consumer: (i) Agrees to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent
to, or in excess of, the total value of the property and services involved; and (ii) Will
become (or has the option to become), for no additional consideration or for nominal
consideration, the owner of the property upon compliance with the agreement.
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is its provision for the consumer to return the property at any time without
further payment. Several courts have since held that the regulation does
indeed end the discussion.'
As is often the case when perceived inequities are involved, however, the
issue is still debated. One court has observed that there may in fact be a
penalty when a consumer terminates an RTO contract. 4 By making a
substantial early investment in the goods through periodic rental payments,
a consumer may be building equity in the goods. The sacrifice of this equity
upon termination of the contract could constitute a penalty and thereby render
inapplicable the TILA exemption. For example, if there is only one hundred
dollars remaining rent to be paid on a television whose depreciated value is
one hundred fifty dollars, one could say that the consumer has fifty dollars
of equity in the product. A consumer terminating such an agreement,
especially where substantial payments have already been made over several
months, could be viewed as committing "economic suicide"65 and suffering
a fifty dollar penalty.
This somewhat strained concept of penalty was rejected in one recent
decision. In In re Hanley' a bankruptcy court held that the reference to
"penalty" in Regulation Z means an "additional sum" imposed on a lessee
for the privilege of terminating the lease.67 When a consumer terminates an
RTO contract, he loses the use of the property without any refund of money
already paid, but the dealer charges no additional fee, such as the remaining
contract balance or a liquidated damages amount. The loss of lease payments
and the possible equity they created, the court concluded, is the normal
consequence of terminating any lease and cannot be the type of penalty the
Board contemplated. A lease does not impose a termination penalty unless by
ending the agreement the lessee becomes liable for some additional amount
of money.63
" See Homeway Rentals v. Martin, 64 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984); Remco
Enterprises, Inc. v. Houston, 9 Kan. App. 2d 296, 677 P.2d 567 (1984).
"In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223, 239-40 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) ("where the right
to terminate involves a forfeiture, the option on paper cannot overcome the substance of
the transaction"); see In re L.A. Thompson & Son, Inc., 665 F.2d 941, 946 n.7 (9th Cir.
1982).
65 Puckett, 60 Bankr. at 240. The notion of forfeiture and economic compulsion to
complete the transaction appears frequently in RTO cases and is often cited by RTO
critics. See, e.g., E. SARASON, supra note 7, at 30.
66 105 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
67 Id. at 462.
68 Id.
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Given the controversy over this issue, which led to the Board's
clarification, it seems unlikely that the sacrifice of lessee equity upon
termination is the type of penalty the Board had in mind. If a broader notion
of penalty were accepted, the only lease-purchase agreements that would not
be deemed credit sales would be those in which equity is never created, i.e.,
leases in which the remaining price to be paid for obtaining ownership is at
all times equal to or greater than the fair market value of the goods. As a
practical matter, such an interpretation would require that, to be exempt from
TILA, a terminable lease could not transfer ownership unless the dealer
charged a final payment approximating the product's then-fair market value.
This view is difficult to justify under the statute because it would render part
of the definition of credit sale superfluous. Both the statute and Regulation
Z provide that a lease is a credit sale only if the lessee becomes the owner
of the leased goods for nominal consideration at the end of the agreement. 61
An option purchase price approximating fair market value is generally
considered to be more than nominal,7 and all leases, even long-term
obligation leases, containing such options are generally held not to be credit
sales. 7 Thus, an RTO contract with a fair market value purchase option
would be exempt from TILA in any event, irrespective of its terminability,
and TILA's "contracts to pay" clause, as well as the Board's "penalty"
language in revised Regulation Z, would add little, if anything, to the
definition.
The court in Hanley properly dismissed the consumer debtor's
interpretation of penalty, but it created an even larger opening for finding
that an RTO contract is covered by TILA. The court concluded that
satisfying the definition of credit sale is only one way to come under TILA,
69 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1991); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16)(ii) (1990).
70 See, e.g., In re Marhoefer, 674 F.2d 1139, 1144 (7th Cir. 1982); Percival Constr.
Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1977); see also B. CLARK,
THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1.05[4] (2d ed. 1988). In the 1987 proposed amendments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, the drafters provided that "[a]dditional consideration is not nominal if ... the
[option] price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the
option is to be performed." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(x) (1987 Official Text).
71 See Agristor Leasing v. Maili, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1214-15 (D. Kan. 1987) ("this
court is convinced that an option to purchase for fair market value is not nominal"); In
re Boiling, 13 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. Tenn. 1981) (comparison of fair market value to option
price is "best" test for nominality). If the anticipated value of the goods at the end of the
lease is negligible, however, a small option payment could still be deemed nominal even
if it accurately reflected that negligible value. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987 Official
Text) (lease for economic life of goods is secured transaction).
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and that the entire definition of "creditor" must also be addressed! 2
Although the court held that the terminability feature of the lease renders an
RTO contract not a credit sale, an RTO dealer could still be a creditor under
TILA, and thereby subject to its disclosure requirements, if it regularly
imposed a finance charge on its customers. 3 It was therefore relevant to
inquire whether the RTO dealer did in fact impose a finance charge. The
court denied the dealer's motion to dismiss the TILA claim because the
regular imposition of a finance charge might be proved.
If followed by other courts, Hanley revives the debate that the 1982
version of Regulation Z was thought to have settled, and in some respects,
may create even greater uncertainty on this issue. TILA's definition of
finance charge is quite broad and includes "any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor
as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit."74 The Hanley
court presumed that, if an RTO price is substantially higher than the cash
price of the property, a finance charge of some amount is imposed whenever
a consumer rents to the point of ownership. To decide whether the dealer
was a creditor, the court only needed evidence of how many customers
completed their contracts and paid more than the cash price, i.e., whether the
dealer regularly imposed the finance charge on consumers.75 If this
approach is followed, virtually all RTO dealers will be deemed TILA
creditors.
Hanley injects unnecessary uncertainty into this issue and suffers from
an incomplete reading of the statute and Regulation Z. One cannot be a
creditor or impose a finance charge unless one extends credit, which means
the "right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment."76 "Debt" is not defined in the statute or regulation, but a
reasonable interpretation would lead to the conclusion that a terminable RTO
lease does not create a debt because the consumer can stop paying at any
time.' More importantly, Congress and the Board probably never intended
that such an inquiry be made because TILA and Regulation Z expressly
7 In re Hanley, 105 Bankr. 458, 463 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
I d. at 461. "Creditor" is defined as a person who "regularly extends consumer
credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than
four installments. . . ." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i) (1990).
74 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a); see 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988).
1 Hanley, 105 Bankr. at 463.
76 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14); see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e).
I The concept of debt is closely tied to the usury doctrine, which historically has
required an agreement to repay a sum absolutely, i.e., an obligation to repay a borrowed
amount. See 2 H. ALPERIN & R. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW § 472 (West 1986).
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equate certain leases with traditional debt-creating transactions. The definition
of "credit sale" accomplishes this by defining which leases will be deemed
debt-creating extensions of credit. With this expression on the subject, courts
need not look back to the general definition of "creditor" when a transaction
is styled as a lease. The definition of credit sale sets forth the conditions
under which a lessor extends credit. To say that a lessor can be a creditor
without the lease falling within the definition of "credit sale" is to ignore the
one definition in the statute that speaks directly to the issue.
B. The Limited Scope of State Retail Installment Sales Acts
The RIS act for each state defines which transactions are credit sales
within its scope, and not surprisingly, the definitions vary. Many RIS laws
derive their definition from the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and thus, like
TILA, cover leases only where the lessee "contracts to pay" or "agrees to
pay" a sum substantially equal to the value of the goods. 8 Courts in these
states generally have followed Regulation Z and TILA precedent by analogy,
and have held that the lack of a lessee's obligation in an RTO contract means
that the lease is not a credit sale.79
But even in states where the RIS law requires a "contract to pay" for the
value of the goods, courts have struggled with the issue. In Hawkes
Television v. Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection,' a state agency sought
reimbursements and other relief from an RTO dealer on behalf of RTO
customers who were charged allegedly usurious rates in violation of the
Maine RIS act. One RTO contract at issue provided for the payment of
$1,768 for a television having an alleged retail cash price of about $900, thus
levying an effective interest rate of over seventy percent., The evidence
78 E.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19-1(4) (1990) (definition of "credit sale"); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.852(g) (West 1990) (definition of "retail installment contract"); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 97.105 (1989) (definition of "retail installment contract"); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 17:16C-1(b) (1990) (definition of "retail installment contract"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 56-1-1(H) (1978) (definition of "retail installment contract"); N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAWS § 401(6) (Consol. 1991) (definition of "retail installment contract").
71 See Givens v. Rent-A-Center, 720 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D. Ala. 1988), aff'd, 885
F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1989); Hawkes Television v. Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection,
462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983); Williams v. Bill Coleman T.V., No. 82-38523-CZ (Mich.
Cir. Ct., July 2, 1985); Tennessee v. Rentavision Corp., No. 83-1647-I (Tenn. Chancery
Ct., 1983); cf. Crumley v. Berry, 298 Ark. 112, 117, 766 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1989) (RTO
contract not sale subject to Arkansas usury laws).
80 462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983).
81 Id. at 1168.
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further showed that the dealer had two adjacent showrooms-one for sales
and the other for rentals-but had made less than five outright credit sales
per year, and the dealer's advertisements clearly linked the denial of
traditional credit to the RTO alternative.' The trial court found that the
dealer thus had led customers to believe that RTO was indeed a purchasing
alternative for persons who could not obtain ordinary credit.' Refusing to
let the form of the transaction control over its substance, the trial court held
that the Maine RIS act applied despite a statutory requirement that the lessee
must agree to pay for the value of the goods.' The court cited the RIS
definition of "agreement," which included not only the written contract but
the bargain of the parties found "by implication from other
circumstances." 85 This allowed the court to distinguish contrary precedent
under TILA, which has no parallel language. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Maine reversed, but it sympathized with the RTO customer who "pays
dearly for the privilege of renting his television set."86 The court conceded
that the situation does resemble usury, yet in a notable display of judicial
restraint, the court held that the extension of credit under the law requires
that the buyer incur a debt, and an RTO transaction creates no debtor-
creditor relationship.' To hold otherwise, in the court's view, would do
violence to the statutory language.88
RTO contracts have also been excluded from coverage under RIS statutes
in states with more expansive definitions of credit sales. In State v. Action
T. V Rentals,9 the Maryland Attorney General sought injunctive relief and
$20,000 in civil penalties against an RTO dealer for violations of the state's
RIS law. Like TILA, the Maryland statute covered leases where the lessee
contracts to pay for the value of the goods, but it also covered transactions
that create purchase money security agreements.' ° Regarding the "contracts
' Hawkes Television v. Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection, No. CV 82-686, slip
op. at 2 (Maine Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 1982).
8 Id.
Id., slip op. at 10.
ssId., slip op. at 5.
8 Hawkes Television v. Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection, 462 A.2d 1167, 1171
(Me. 1985).
8 Id.
88 Id.
89 297 Md. 531, 467 A.2d 1000 (1983).
90 See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-601(1) (1990) (definition of "installment sale
agreement").
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to pay" part of the definition,91 the court relied on other aspects of the
overall statutory scheme which demonstrated a legislative intent to cover
leases only where the lessee is obligated to pay for the goods. The court first
observed that several of the required RIS disclosures, such as the "principal
balance owed" and the "time balance owed by the buyer to the seller,"
presumed that a person is obligated to pay off a debt.' The statute also
contemplated a creditor's right to sell repossessed goods, the proceeds of
which would be applied, after the payment of repossession costs, to the
"unpaid balance owing under the agreement at the time the goods are
repossessed."' If there is no resale, then "all obligations of the buyer under
the agreement shall be discharged."' Since, in the court's view, these
provisions make little sense when the lessee owes nothing upon repossession,
the legislature must not have intended to include lease transactions unless the
lessee "makes an enforceable promise to pay" for the goods.95
Although the court in Action T.V. found evidence of legislative intent to
support its holding under the "contracts to pay" part of the RIS definition,
the court was less convincing in holding that RTO contracts are not
"purchase money security agreements," a distinct class of covered
transactions under the Maryland law. 96 In a previous case applying
Pennsylvania law, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a terminable
9' MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-601(l)(2)(iii) (1990) ("installment sale
agreement" includes... (iii) [a] contract for the bailment or leasing of consumer goods
under which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum that is
substantially equal to or is more than the value of the goods").
92 297 Md. at 542, 467 A.2d at 1006; see MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-
606(b)(8), (b)(10) (1990).
93 MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-626(e)(2)(iii) (1990).
9 4 M D. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-627 (1990).
95 State v. Action T.V. Rentals, 297 Md. 531,549, 467 A.2d 1000, 1010 (1983). The
court analogized to the legislature's treatment of layaway plans, which are expressly
exempt from the RLS law under Maryland Commercial Law Code §§ 14-1101 to 14-1110.
Under Maryland law, if a layaway plan does not obligate the consumer to continue
making payments, the consumer is entitled to a full refund (less a nominal service charge)
upon cancellation. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1106 (1990). The court viewed this
as reflecting the legislature's intent to exclude "no obligation" agreements from the RIS
law. Of course, a significant difference between a layaway plan and an RTO contract is
that the RTO customer does not receive a refund upon termination of the agreement. On
the other hand, a layaway customer does not receive use of the property until the full
purchase price is paid.
96 MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-601(l)(2)(ii) (1990) ("installment sale agreement
includes ... (i) [a] purchase money security agreement").
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lease similar to an RTO contract did create a security interest.' Since the
Pennsylvania and Maryland definitions of security interest were virtually
identical,98 the court in Action T.V. could have brought RTO transactions
under the RIS by simply following this precedent. In choosing not to do so,
the court reasoned that in the one part of the RIS statute which specifically
mentions leases, the definition requires a contract to pay for the value of the
goods. Having decided to honor the part of the statute that addresses the
issue directly, the court disregarded precedent supporting a contrary
result. 9 The difficulty with the court's reasoning is that the definition of
security agreements in another part of the commercial code also deals
specifically with leases," 0 so the court really was faced with two
comparatively specific, yet conflicting, legislative pronouncements on the
issue. Since the issue seemed to have already been decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, the precedent probably should have either been followed
or distinguished more persuasively. The decision creates the anomalous
situation of an RTO contract being treated as a security agreement under one
state statute but not under nearly identical language of another.10'
While RTO dealers in Maine and Maryland were narrowly escaping
adverse judicial action, dealers in Wisconsin found greater cause for concern.
The Wisconsin RIS act defines consumer credit sales to include leases where
the "lessee pays or agrees to pay" for the value of the goods and can become
the owner of those goods by paying a nominal consideration at the end of the
contract. 10 2 Under this definition, the terminability feature of an RTO
contract does not insulate the agreement from RIS coverage if the lessee in
I United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 231 Md. 552, 191
A.2d 570 (Md. 1963). In United Rental, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
commercial equipment lease was a security agreement under Pennsylvania law despite a
provision in the lease allowing the lessee to terminate the contract at will.
11 Both Maryland and Pennsylvania had adopted the definition of "security interest"
set forth in section 1-201(37) of the U.C.C. See infra text accompanying notes 176-205.
99 297 Md. at 553-54, 467 A.2d at 1011-12.
100 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) is quoted infra at text accompanying note 178.
101 A similar pattern was followed in Connecticut. A Connecticut Superior Court in
Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979),
held that an RTO contract was a disguised sale and security agreement under
Connecticut's version of § 1-201(37), and that the agreement was an unconscionable
violation of the state's unfair trade practices law. Seven years later another Superior
Court judge held that RTO contracts were not retail installment sales under Connecticut's
RIS law, even though the statute defined retail installment contract to include any security
agreement. Allen v. Rent-A-Center, No. 207044 (Conn. Super. Ct. New Haven, Apr.
9, 1986); see CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-83(3)(e) (1990).
102 WISC. STAT. § 421.301(9) (1989-90) (definition of "consumer credit sale").
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fact pays an amount equal to the original value of the goods over the life of
the contract. The Wisconsin Supreme Court so held in Palacios v. ABC T V.
& Stereo Rental,"7 where the lessee actually paid $1,652 over sixteen
months to lease a television/stereo unit with an estimated retail value of only
$800.4 The court distinguished the TILA line of cases because, unlike
TILA, the Wisconsin law expressly covers agreements where the lessee pays
for the value of the property even if there was no contractual obligation to
do so. This conclusion follows from a straightforward reading of the statute,
and seems correct as a matter of statutory construction."°5 Palacios created
an awkward condition, however, because a terminable RTO lease might not
be considered a credit sale at the inception of the contract but would become
one at some point down the road if the lessee eventually paid rent exceeding
the property's original value. Since by then it would be too late for the dealer
to comply with the RIS disclosures, 1°6 a prudent RTO dealer attempting to
comply with the statute would have to assume at the outset that the law (and
usury limits) will govern the transaction and disclose the required
information. This could have been disastrous for RTO dealers, but the law
provided a means of escape. The Wisconsin statute, like TILA, allows a
lessor to avoid coverage by providing in the agreement that ownership will
transfer to the lessee at the end of the contract only if the lessee pays an
additional sum of money deemed to be more than a nominal amount." 7
Thus, by requiring a balloon payment at the end of the contract, RTO dealers
in Wisconsin can insulate themselves from the act's coverage. The practical
result is that consumers in Wisconsin do not receive the RIS protections and
103 123 Wise. 2d 79, 365 N.W.2d 882 (1985).
104 Id. at 80, 365 N.W.2d at 884.
10I While there is no recorded evidence that the Wisconsin legislature sought to create
a definition substantially different from TILA's definition of credit sale, the adopted
language unmistakenly supports the court's conclusion that TILA precedent, as well as
state law cases like Hawkes Television and Action T. V., is not persuasive in construing
the Wisconsin act. See id. at 80, 365 N.W.2d at 886.
106 Under the Wisconsin RIS act, all required disclosures must be made "before the
transaction is consummated." WIsC. STAT. § 422.302(2) (1989-90); cf 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.17(b) (1990) (same for TILA disclosures).
107 Wisc. STAT. § 421.301(9) (1989-90) provides that a lease is a credit sale only if
the lessee "pays or agrees to pay" for the value of the goods and "it is agreed that the
. . . lessee will become, or for no other or a nominal consideration has the option to
become, the owner of the goods or real property upon full compliance with the terms of
the agreement." The latter language parallels TILA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1991), and
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16) (1990). For definitions of "nominal
consideration," see supra text accompanying note 71; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-
2(b)(1) (1990) (not nominal if more than 10% of cash price).
[Vol. 52:751
RENTTO-OWN CONTRACTS
must pay an additional amount to purchase the property at the end of the
rental term.
The RTO industry has encountered its most effective opposition in
Pennsylvania. Before 1982, the Pennsylvania RIS act paralleled TILA and
covered only leases in which the lessee contracted to pay for the value of the
goods." 8 Following public hearings and widespread media coverage of
alleged abuses in the RTO industry, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the
RIS law in 1982 to include terminable leases if the lessor has the obligation
to transfer ownership to the lessee, after a succession of even optional
renewals, for nominal consideration at the end of the agreement." ° The
amendment failed to meet its objective because RTO dealers in Pennsylvania,
like those in Wisconsin, simply revised their agreements to transfer
ownership only upon the payment of an additional purchase option price after
the lessee had made a stated number of optional renewals.110
Following unsuccessful challenges in the courts by consumers who
alleged that the purchase option prices being charged by some RTO dealers
10 69 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1201(6) (1989) (definition of "retail installment contract"
similar to TILA definition of "credit sale").
19 The 1982 amendment provided that a lease was a retail installment contract if:
the ... lessee has the option to renew the contract by making the payments specified
in the contract, the contract obligates the . . . lessor to transfer ownership of the
property to the ... lessee for no other or a nominal consideration upon full compliance
by the . . . lessee with his obligations under the contract, including any obligation
incurred with respect to the exercise of an option by the . . . lessee to renew the
contract, and the payments contracted for by the.., lessee, including those payments
pursuant to the exercise of an option by the . . . lessee to renew the contract, are
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the property and
services involved ....
69 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1201(6) (1989) (emphasis added). The revision obviously was
drafted to cover RTO transactions as they existed in Pennsylvania at the time, i.e., a
terminable lease that automatically transferred ownership to the lessee for no additional
consideration at the end of the lease term.
1 See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 122 (statement of J. Samuel Choate);
Chandler v. Riverview Leasing, Inc., No. 1984-CE-2736, (Pa. Com. PI., May 14,
1986), vacated, order dated Nov. 29, 1988. The RTO defendant in Chandler transferred
ownership to lessees only upon the payment of $100, 15% of the original value of the
goods, or a price equal to the fair market value of the goods at the time the option was
exercised. Id. at 5, 6 n.2.
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were indeed "nominal,"'11 in 1988 the Pennsylvania legislature again
attempted to bring RTO transactions under the RIS law by amending the
statute to close the nominal consideration loophole. The amended RIS act
covered all consumer leases, even if terminable by the lessee, so long as the
lessee eventually could become the owner of the property regardless of how
much consideration was paid at the end of the lease.' The RTO industry
successfully challenged the 1988 amendment on grounds that it had been
hurriedly passed in violation of procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania
Constitution,"' but the amendment passed again in 1989 without procedural
improprieties." 4 Pennsylvania is thus the only state expressly to include
terminable RTO agreements under an RIS statute." 5 The practical effect of
the law, however, is unclear. Assuming that RTO prices cannot be
substantially reduced without incurring losses, RTO dealers who wish to
remain operating in Pennsylvania have two choices. They can either offer no
ownership option (i.e., the lessee rents indefinitely) and thereby remain
unregulated by the RIS, or they can facially comply with the RIS by stating
a cash price high enough to permit computation of interest charges within the
The most notablewas Chandler v. Riverview Leasing, Inc., No. 1984-CE-2736 (Pa.
Com. P1., May 14, 1986), in which several consumers sought class action relief on
grounds that Riverview's purchase option prices in three different contracts (a $100
purchase option, a fair market value purchase option, and an option of 15% of the
original value) were "nominal," thereby rendering the RTO leases subject to
Pennsylvania's RIS act. The plaintiffs obtained summary judgment in their favor, but the
decision was later vacated by a successor judge in the case, who ruled that material issues
of fact remained to be resolved, particularly whether the option prices approximated the
estimated value of the goods at the end of the lease.
112 Act of Feb. 26, 1988, Act No. 1988-15, P.L. No. 78 (nullified as unconstitutional
by Pennsylvania Ass'n of Rental Dealers v. Commonwealth, 123 Pa. Commw. 533, 554
A.2d 998 (1989)).
13 Pennsylvania Ass'n of Rental Dealers v. Commonwealth, 123 Pa. Commw. 533,
554 A.2d 998 (1989) (statute enacted in violation of PA. CONST. art. Ill, see. 1, 2
and 4).
14 Installment Sales Act, Act No. 1989-57, P.L. No. 573 (1989).
"s The North Carolina legislature also attempted to bring RTO leases within its RIS
law by expressly including renewable, no-obligation leases in the definition of "sale," but
the statute excludes all such leases when the purchase option price is at least 10% of the
cash price. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-2(b) (1990). The law thus allows RTO dealers to
operate outside the RIS act if the contract includes a 10% balloon payment at the end of
the lease term.
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allowable rate. 6 The former course may result in the loss of customers
who value ownership options, but the latter exposes the dealer to charges of
collecting hidden interest by artificially inflating the disclosed cash price. 117
Neither results in low-income consumers receiving lower prices, more
accurate disclosures, or any other protections intended by the legislature.
C. The Limited Benefit of TILA and RIS Laws for Low-Income
Consumers
The failure of the courts to provide a satisfactory forum for resolving
these issues can be viewed, depending on one's perspective, as either a
justifiably restrained construction of statutory language or an unfortunate lack
of judicial resolve to remedy an injustice. RTO dealers maintain that their
leases are fundamentally different from traditional credit transactions.
Dissatisfied consumer representatives blame inartful drafting of legislation
and clever lawyering for the inability of most judges to expose RTO as
nothing more than a thinly disguised credit sale. More is involved, however,
than a semantic battle over the correct interpretation of contract language and
defined statutory terms. Statutes can be amended to fill loopholes, as was
done in Pennsylvania. The important issues are whether traditional consumer
credit laws are likely to benefit low-income RTO customers, or whether
other regulatory schemes might better perform the task.
TILA and RIS acts provide a consumer with valuable rights and
information so that the consumer is better equipped to deal with a more
economically powerful and commercially sophisticated seller,"8 but the acts
serve this function best for a particular type of consumer. Although
obviously drafted broadly enough to include consumers of all socio-economic
backgrounds, the statutory protections presuppose a consumer who (1)
116 One industry representative has indicated that RTO dealers would likely drop the
ownership option rather than comply with the restrictions imposed by an RIS law. See
Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 124 (statement of J. Samuel Choate, Jr.). For a
description of some practical problems occurring when an RTO agreement is
characterized a sale under an RIS law, see id. at 128-32 (letter to Sen. Hawkins).
17 For a discussion of the practice of hiding interest by inflating sale prices, see K.
BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23, at 124-26.
1i" Betty Furness, former Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs to President Johnson,
aptly summarized consumerism as: "An effort to put the buyer on an equal footing with
the seller. . . . Consumers do not want to be manipulated, hornswoggled or lied to.
They want truth, not just in lending, labeling and packaging, but in everything in the
whole vast, bewildering marketplace." What Is Consumerism? Context, No. 1, 1983,
quoted in L. FELDMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 4 (1976).
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desires to buy a commodity that may involve financing, (2) has a choice
whether to pay cash or to finance, or at least has a choice among financing
alternatives, and (3) is aware of his rights, or is at least capable of becoming
aware, and has the ability and motivation to assert those rights when
necessary.119
For this type of consumer, the credit laws serve valuable functions. They
allow comparative shopping for the most attractive credit terms available.
They can influence a consumer's decision whether to enter into a credit
transaction at all, or whether to avoid debt by using liquid assets for cash
purchases or by deferring consumption and saving for a cash purchase in the
future. Armed with this battery of knowledge, the consumer can, in theory,
enter the credit marketplace with an improved chance of understanding and
accepting satisfactory credit terms. If enough consumers use their knowledge
by shopping for the best terms and by insisting that their rights be honored,
credit markets will operate efficiently, and overpriced or unscrupulous
creditors will either lose money or change their ways. Everyone will
benefit.1"
"I See Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer Credit Problems, 8
B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REV. 409 (1967); Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance
Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1285, 1295 (1966); Whitford, The Functions
of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wisc. L. REV. 400, 405, 417
(1973); Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1967);
National Consumer Credit Report, supra note 16, at 172.
1 2 See authorities cited in supra note 119. Most consumer credit legislation presumes
that if consumers are provided with information necessary for making intelligent buying
decisions, they will in fact use the information in their decisionmaking process. See
Whitford, supra note 119, at 423; Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 1203, 1227 (1966) ("Knowledge is the key to the consumer problem"); National
Consumer Credit Report, supra note 16, at 172. While there is some evidence that credit
disclosure legislation is effective in improving consumer awareness of important credit
terms, see Whitford, supra note 119, at 412, studies have shown that most consumers
tend to focus on product, price, and product options, and that credit shopping, at least
in the retail sale environment, is seldom pursued. See A. DAY & W. BRANDT, A STUDY
OF CONSUMER CREDIT DEcIsIoNs, IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE
LEGISLATION, pt. III at 31-35; pt. V at 7-8 (1972), discussed in Whitford, supra note
119, at 417-18; Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 1299-1304; Kofele-Kale, The
Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market Behavior: A Critique of the
Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CrrY U.L. Rav. 117, 118, 134-37 (1984);
Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-13
(1969); Landus & Chandler, The Truth-in-Lending Act, Variable Rate Mortgages and
Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. Bus. REs. J. 35 nn.63-65. The effects of disclosure can
nevertheless be far reaching if an economically significant minority of the market shops
for credit because creditors will compete for that market share, thereby reducing credit
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The model outlined above does not describe the condition of many low-
income consumers. Individuals who have incomes at or near poverty levels,
and who may be burdened further with uncertain employment experience,
inferior education opportunities, unstable family circumstances, and
substandard housing, are seldom serviced by traditional lenders.121
Commercial banks and personal finance companies exclude these families
from their markets. Department stores and suburban discount dealers seldom
include these individuals among their regular customers." The lack of
transportation alternatives,"z particularly outside urban areas, and
consumers' general unwillingness to enter unfamiliar retailing environments,
perhaps out of fear of credit rejection, tend to render lower income
consumers captive to local merchants." They may shop wherever credit
is available with affordable down payments, small periodic payment
schedules, and long periods in which to repay the debt."z The patronage
costs for all, even those who ignore credit disclosures. See Kofele-Kale, supra, at 135
("efficient market thesis"); Marriman and Schellie, Truth in Lending Simplification, 37
Bus. LAW. 1297, 1315 (1981); R. PULLEN, THE IMPACT OF TIL LEGISLATION: THE
MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE 5-6 (Res. Rep. No. 43 to Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Oct. 1968), cited in Whitford, supra note 119, at 405.
"2 C. BELL, supra note 1, at 144-45; NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra
note 16, at 156, citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE Low
INCOME POPULATION 1970, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60 No. 81 (Nov.
1971). For a good discussion of the problems facing low-income consumers, see L.
FELDMAN, supra note 1 at 200-07. Poor education and a lack of technical knowledge
concerning product value and credit terms may contribute to the purchasing problems of
the poor. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 14, 189; Note, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 PA. L. REV. 395, 448
n.447, 449 n.449 (1966); 110 CONG. REc. 1960 (1964).
11 See C. BELL, supra note 1, at 145.
11 See L. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 236.
124 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(welfare recipient making credit purchases from same merchant over five years); D.
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 20; L. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 230-42; R. KERIN & R.
PETERSON, STRATEGIC MARKETING: CASES AND COMMENTS 270 (1978); Kofele-Kale,
supra note 120, at 143. Many low-income consumers feel that they cannot obtain credit
outside their community and thus do not regard an attempt to find alternative credit
sources as worthwhile. See Comment, supra note 119, at 752-53, 759.
125 NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 178. One study showed
that while only one-third of higher income buyers considered down payment and monthly
payments important factors in making credit decisions, two-thirds of low-income buyers
did. These consumers often shop by seeking the lowest monthly payment and the longest
maturity term. See id., citing A. DAY & W. BRANDT, A STUDY OF CONSUMER CREDIT
DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION (1972); see also
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of inefficient, high-priced neighborhood stores, including RTO
establishments, appears to be the norm and may be the only realistic way in
which the poor perceive they can acquire relatively expensive items like
furniture, appliances, and other products that can be highly desired
possessions regardless of household income."
Consequently, even when shopping at non-RTO retail stores, low-income
buyers historically have paid higher prices for furniture and appliances than
more affluent consumers shopping elsewhere." Several studies have shown
that retailers in low-income neighborhoods tend to increase cash prices to
accommodate open credit arrangements for high risk individuals. 28 To
ensure adequate profit, retailers may also offer lower quality merchandise
and pursue default judgments or garnishment remedies with vigor against
nonpaying debtors. 29 Yet in spite of higher prices, evidence suggests that
these retailers have not realized higher rates of return on investment than
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOM X 192 (1964); White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to
Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 1207 (1971); Whitford, supra note 119, at 422; Comment, supra note 119, at 750
n.28.
126 See L. FELDMAN, supra note 1. Purchases of appliances and furniture may have a
greater impact on low-income buyers than on other households because a higher
proportion of their income tends to be devoted to household furnishings. See C. BELL,
supra note 1, at 143; Comment, supra note 119, at 760 (poor are at least as active buyers
of appliances as middle income individuals).
127 See L. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 16-17, 49-57, 80-93; C. BELL, supra note 1,
at 145; Hearings on S. 2755 Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong.
2d Sess. 101 (1960); Comment, supra note 119, at 756-57; ECONOMIC REPORT OF
INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RETAILERS 48-49 (1968) (hereinafter FTC Study) (televisions 50% cheaper outside low
income neighborhoods). Even today, the poor still pay more for consumer goods. See In
re Stewart, 93 Bankr. 878, 880 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (cash price of television more
than twice estimated value); New York Times, July 28, 1990, § 1, at 46, col. 3 (retail
prices in urban area for a particular model of stereo speakers ranged between $49 and
$299).
128 See L. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 203; W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note
1, at 32-41, 75-76, 118-20 (1960); FTC Study, supra note 127, at 48-49; Hearings,
Consumer Credit and the Poor, Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1968); Sterling & Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has
the System Failed?, 67 DEN. U.L. REv. 357, 381 (1990) (cash price of television and
bunk beds inflated more than 50%).
129 See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 19, 160-65, 189; Comment, supra note 119,
at 757.
[Vol. 52:751
RENT-TO-OWN CONTRACTS
their counterparts in more affluent areas."a The cost of doing business in
poor communities is high; the reason for which is principally due to greater
risks involved, such as theft, late payments, higher default rates, and bad
debt losses. 31 As a result, even before the RTO transaction became
popular, the poor paid more to satisfy their consumer needs and desires.
Consumers theoretically benefit from TILA and RIS acts in two ways.
First, if they are aware of the cost of credit, consumers can shop for the best
terms available.13 Second, if creditors adhere to the usury limits,
consumers are assured of reasonable finance charges above the cash
price.133 TILA and RIS acts thus can assist the vast majority of consumers
who engage in credit shopping and have opportunities to obtain credit at or
below the maximum allowable rate. For the minority who do not have such
credit opportunities, the benefits are illusory.M There is little incentive to
10 In the most widely cited study on this issue, the FrC found that, despite charging
substantially higher prices, retailers in low-income markets had a below-average rate of
return on investment. FTC Study, supra note 127, at 16, 21; see also NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 181; L. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 205;
Nathan, Economic Analysis of Usury Laws, J. BANK. RES. 200, 208 (Winter 1980)
(usury rates do not affect creditor profitability).
131 Kofele-Kale, supra note 120, at 142. One study found bad debt ratios among low-
income retailers in the District to be 23 times higher than ratios for dealers in more
affluent areas. See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 157.
3 The "shopping function" is the most often cited rationale for credit term disclosure.
See Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 1299-1300; NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT
REPORT, supra note 16, at 175. There is conflicting evidence, however, on whether
disclosure does, in fact, increase awareness of credit alternatives and facilitate credit
shopping. Compare id. at 175 (a significant marginal group of consumers benefits from
disclosure) with Whitford, supra note 119, at 418 (disclosures have at best a "modest"
effect on credit shopping) (citing Day & Brandt, supra note 125, at 31-35, pt. V at 7,
8 & 18).
133 One of the most popular justifications for usury limits is that they guarantee a "fair"
rate of interest. See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 95;
Nathan, supra note 130, at 201. The "fair" rates are available, however, only to debtors
who qualify for credit. To the extent that rate limits exclude high-risk individuals from
obtaining credit, usury laws can actually hurt the poorer segments of the population. See
id. at 203; J. CHAPMAN, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 143 (1967); NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 104-05; Shay, The Impact of State Legal
Rate Ceilings Upon the Availability and Price of Consumer Installment Credit, THE
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES, Vol. 4, p. 387-418
(Dec. 1972).
,14 The benefits of credit disclosure regulation almost entirely are received by those
who may least need protection-middle and upper income consumers. NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 174-78, 182; Davis, Protecting
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search for the lowest credit terms if those terms are not likely to be available
to a high-risk buyer. These consumers will regard a disclosed interest rate
and finance charge as essentially meaningless figures. 3 ' If the product is
desired and someone is willing to provide it at affordable periodic payments,
the transaction will be made.
Notwithstanding that credit information may be of little use to low-
income consumers, TILA and RIS disclosure laws arguably should still apply
to RTO transactions if the only risk is in disclosing some information that
may be irrelevant or ignored. So long as the information is accurate,
superfluous disclosure does relatively little harm. In credit transactions with
high-risk customers, however, the likelihood of misleading disclosures is
substantial because credit costs, in terms of a stated interest rate and finance
charge, can be minimized by inflating the cash price. When part of the credit
cost is incorporated into the cash price of the goods, the disclosed interest
rate and finance charge become arbitrary figures misleading to all consumers,
even those who may be interested in credit shopping.'36 The principal
Consumers from Over Disclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the
Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841, 842 (1977); Jordan
& Warren, supra note 119 at 1300, 1303-04; Whitford, supra note 119, at 404, 409-11
(citing Federal Reserve Board surveys) and 418; S. REP. No. 392, Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency 8-9 (1967). Explanations for the limited impact of disclosure
regulation on low-income individuals include (1) the lack of credit alternatives, thereby
reducing the incentive for consumers to shop for the best terms, (2) a lack of mobility,
which restricts shopping to neighborhood businesses, (3) the practice of "burying"
finance charges in cash prices, which reduces the reliability of disclosed information, and
(4) substandard education. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1 at 12-20; NATIONAL CONSUMER
CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 176-78, 180; Kofele-Kale, supra note 30, at 132;
Whitford, supra note 119, at 420-21 and n.81. As a result, many consumers in high-risk
markets emphasize shopping for the good rather than the credit terms. NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 182.
"' Of course, not all information disclosed to low-income buyers is meaningless. RIS
statutes often require disclosure of terms that might be beneficial to all consumers
regardless of income (e.g., a description of warranties or rights upon default, or a grace
period for late payments). The principal focus of TILA and RIS statutes, however, is on
disclosure of the cost of credit transactions. If disclosure of credit costs does nct benefit
low income consumers, and may indeed mislead them, then useful disclosure regulation
for this marginal group should come in another form. See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT
REPORT, supra note 16, at 177 (TILA disclosure ineffective for low-income individuals;
"rifle shot" approach recommended); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 24 Bus. LAw. 199, 207 (Nov. 1968).
16 See In re Stewart, 93 Bankr. 878, 884 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (finance charges
likely to be buried in installment contract with high-risk individual). One report observed
that burying finance charges in the cash price is "definitely encouraged by the
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constraint on the arbitrary increase of cash prices is the loss of potential cash
customers, which can be a powerful constraint on businesses competing in
a market for cash sales. In low-income areas, where cash customers for
furniture and appliances are likely to be few, the potential loss in cash sales
resulting from increased cash prices will probably be minimal.' 37 For RTO
dealers, who rarely even offer items for cash, there is virtually no limit,
short of the doctrine of unconscionability,135 on the level of stated cash
prices. These merchants can offer goods at zero percent interest, bury the
entire cost of credit in the cash price, and lose little or no business.1 39
requirement of an annual rate. [Merchants] sell cheap merchandise at a high price with
as big a down payment as they can squeeze, and advertise terms of 24-36 months,
sometimes with no finance charge. The people buying from them are from the lowest
income level ... [and] cannot buy anywhere else." National Consumer Credit Report,
supra note 16, at 181 (quoting R. PULLEN, THE IMPACT OF TIL LEGISLATION: THE
MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE (Res. Rep. No. 43 to Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Oct. 1968)); see also id. at 182; Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 1301-02;
Comment, supra note 119, at 762. Burying finance charges in the cash price is unlawful
under TILA and RIS laws and may also constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice.
In re Tashof, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 18,606 at 20,941 (1968), aff'd in part, 437 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whitford, supra note 119, at 420-21 n.81. Enforcement is
difficult, however, in part because it is not always easy to distinguish the cash price from
the finance charge, and also because the practice is widespread in low-income areas. See
J. CHAPMAN, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY-ITS COST AND REGULATION 145
(1967).
137 See Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 1301.
'3 With the ultimate sale prices of RTO products more than twice the normal retail
cash price, one would expect unconscionability analysis to be a fertile ground for
attacking the transaction. While some have forecast success in attacking RTO contracts
under this theory, see Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article
2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 957, 966 n.48 (1988), the argument has not been well received in
the courts. See Remco Enters. v. Houston, 9 Kan. App. 2d 296, 677 P.2d 567 (1984)
(RTO contract price, twice retail value, held not unconscionable because consumer
receives service agreement, option to cancel, and use of property she otherwise might not
obtain); cf. Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. 1979) (RTO contract
may be unconscionable). The Federal Reserve Board has taken the position that
comparison between retail prices and RTO prices may not be meaningful because the
transactions have important differences. See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 47-48
(Statement of Nancy H. Teeters, Governor of FRB). Claims of unconscionability may
become more frequent with the passage of Article 2A of the UCC, which allows a court
to award damages and attorneys fees when an unconscionability claim succeeds. See
U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) and infra text accompanying notes 255-65.
139 Representatives of the RTO industry acknowledge that the level of cash prices has
little effect on business because RTO dealers are not in the retail sale business and do not
compete with traditional retail sellers. See 6 PROGRESSIVE RENTALS 22 (Feb. 1986).
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Proponents of applying TILA and RIS laws to RTO transactions maintain
that even if the disclosed information is unreliable, an RTO exemption is still
unwarranted because, absent some form of regulation, consumers in low-
income areas have no way of comparing costs among RTO dealers or
between RTO dealers and non-RTO retailers. 1" Application of the same
disclosure laws to all vendors would at least place similarly situated
businesses on the same playing field. Moreover, with all of the TILA-type
restrictions on retail sales applicable to the RTO industry, there would be less
incentive to operate under the cover of a leasing plan, and more merchandise
might be offered to the public by retailers giving the same required
disclosures. While this uniformity might occur, it does not follow that
consumer welfare would be enhanced by the change. Removing the RTO
transaction from the market will not extinguish the demand of high-risk
consumers for RTO-type products, nor will it reduce the cost of doing
business with high-risk individuals. High prices will remain for those who
desire the product. They will find it available at local retailers who, while
ostensibly complying with all credit laws, can make a profit by charging
inflated cash prices and disclosing credit terms within allowable limits.
Unless local officials strictly enforce the credit laws to expose hidden finance
charges, which historically has been a formidable endeavor," the form of
contract may change and most consumers would still not be better
served.142
Critics may contend that allowing RTO dealers to charge high prices for
their goods, while escaping coverage under traditional consumer credit laws
is tantamount to granting an exception to the usury laws for RTO
" See E. SARASON, supra note 7, at 29.
141 The difficulty of exposing hidden interest charges is demonstrated by the fact that
inflating cash prices is so openly practiced. See K. BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23,
at 122-28; Langley, Cut-Rate Loans on Some Cars Are No Bargain, Wall St. J., Aug.
20, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (§ 2, at 7). The main problem is proving the "actual" cash price.
This is especially problematic in RTO contracts because the price includes a mixture of
goods and services. See supra text accompanying note 21.
142 The "shock value" of disclosing high interest rates on cash prices might discourage
immediate purchases by some low-income consumers. See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT
REPORT, supra note 16, at 173. If, however, RTO transactions have grown in popularity
in large part because consumers tend to prefer immediate acquisition to delayed
consumption, the overall effect of such disclosures would be minimal. RTO-type
contracts will still be made, and consumers will continue to be misinformed. Moreover,
even assuming that some consumption would be discouraged by "shocking" disclosures,
the view seems indefensible if the shock results from misleading figures. See Jordan &
Warren, supra note 119, at 1317.
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transactions.' 43 The characterization is fair, but the exception may be justi-
fied.' The principal modern justification for interest rate ceilings is to
protect consumers who unwittingly, or under desperate circumstances, agree
to pay high finance charges, thereby incurring excessive debts that must be
repaid.'45 Overburdened with debt, such individuals are more likely to
default on their loans and experience the resulting hardships. Even if they are
able to keep up with their payments, these debt-ridden consumers may find
it difficult to extricate themselves from their predicament as they devote too
much of their incomes to paying off finance charges. 4 ' For these
individuals, the RTO contract may actually offer some relief. In a transaction
where the consumer can return the property with no further obligation, the
hardships attendant to default are minimized and the consumer can shift
143 See K. BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23, at 129.
144 Statutory exceptions to usury laws have long been recognized. Small loan statutes,
which may authorize interest rates as high as 36 %, are the most notable examples. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-622 (1990) (up to 3% per month); CAL. FIN. CODE § 22451
(Deering 1991) (up to 21/2% per month); IOWA CODE § 536.13 (1989) (up to 36% per
year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173 (1990) (same). The exceptions become necessary when
economic realities demonstrate a need to provide legal sources of credit to those who
cannot obtain credit at the legal rate. See NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra
note 16, at 158, 160. Common law usury exceptions were also recognized. For many
years courts held that sellers could avoid usury limits by offering goods for sale at two
prices-a credit price and a cash price. The difference, often referred to as the time-price
differential, was not considered "interest" because the buyer was not deemed to be a
borrower of money. The emergence of this "time-price doctrine" led to the enactment
of RIS laws that cap installment credit rates, but usually at levels exceeding the general
usury limit. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 1289. For an early history of small
loan regulation, see J. CHAPMAN, supra note 136, at 12-13.
145 See In re Russell, 72 Bankr. 855, 867-68 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 95, 99-100, 174; Nathan, supra note 130,
at 200-01. Scholars have debated whether usury laws serve any useful function in an era
when competition in credit markets is commonplace. Several studies have shown that
usury limits serve only to exclude high-risk individuals from obtaining credit from legal
sources. See id. at 99, 1031; J. CHAPMAN, supra note 136, at 143; FTC Study, supra
note 127, at 387-418; Nathan, supra note 130, at 203 (citing several studies); cf. K.
BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23, at 36-38 (questioning whether rate ceilings actually
limit credit availability).
146 See Campen & Lazonick, Regulation of Small Loan Interest Rates, 1 N.E. J. Bus.
& ECON. 30, 42-43 (1980) ("Consumer can remain indebted year after year. . . thus
hampering him from meeting the basic necessities for himself and his family.").
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income to more pressing obligations with greater economic freedom. 47
This does not mean that RTO transactions are bargains, or that they should
not be regulated in some manner, but if the goal is to ease the hardship on
low-income consumers, the better approach may be to accept higher prices
as an unavoidable consequence of unfortunate economic circumstances,' 48
and require meaningful disclosure and limitations on the truly misleading
aspects of the RTO transaction.149 As the discussion in Part IV of this
article suggests, TILA and RIS acts would not accomplish this as effectively
as legislation targeted at the particular problems of the low-income
consumer.150
117 RTO critics maintain that RTO customers are often reluctant to stop paying on their
contracts after they have paid substantial sums because the "equity" created in the goods
will be lost. This, in effect, leads RTO consumers to treat the contract as if it created an
obligation, thereby putting the same strain on family budgets as would an outright credit
sale. Even if this perception is accurate, however, the appropriate solution is not to treat
RTO contracts like credit sales (which would not relieve the strain), but to enact laws that
allow the consumer to stop paying on the contract temporarily when money is tight and
reinstate the agreement at a later time. RTO laws enacted to date provide for such
reinstatement rights, see infra text accompanying notes 340-42, whereas RIS acts and
TILA do not.
148 Developments over the past few decades demonstrate that when legislatures ignore
market realities, entrepreneurs find and exploit loopholes in the law. Legislatures attempt
to close the loopholes, but the market usually stays a step or two ahead. This cyclical
adjustment can be wasteful and seldom fulfills the governmental objective. See Nathan,
supra note 130, at 201. The experience of the Pennsylvania legislature's attempt to
regulate RTO contracts, see supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text, exemplifies the
frustration, and ultimate futility, of ignoring economic conditions. Full access to
traditional credit markets by the poor will effectively arise only by improving their
incomes, lowering the credit risk, and educating them to exercise their rights. See C.
BELL, supra note 1, at 146; NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at
160, 179. Until the causes of poverty are addressed, the symptoms of poverty (such as
the RTO industry in one form or another) will persist.
491 It has been suggested that the problems of low-income consumers are best addressed
by "rifle shot" legislation aimed at particular abuses rather than the "shotgun" of general
TILA-like regulations which are directed at the average consumer. See NATIONAL
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 16, at 101, 102, 177; Jordan & Warren, supra
note 119, at 1321-22 (most fruitful approach to the credit problems of the poor is to take
away some of the creditor's weapons, such as repossession without process, garnishment,
deficiency judgments, and collection abuses); McLean, supra note 135, at 207.
" See infra discussion in Part IV.
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Ill. COVERAGE OF RTO TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLES 9
AND 2A OF THE UCC
The UCC was drafted during a time when consumer law was just
beginning to develop. Even in 1966, when most states had adopted versions
of the UCC,'5 ' Congress was still debating the first major effort to expand
consumer protection at the federal level through its enactment of TILA.' 52
The rules set forth in the UCC were largely fashioned for commercial
transactions, and it is therefore not surprising that the UCC expressly
recognizes little consumer law.153 This is particularly true with respect to
leases of consumer goods, the popularity of which accelerated after
1970. 54
Despite its focus on commercial transactions, the UCC offers some
protection to consumers. Recognized examples of consumer law include the
unconscionability provisions,155 the limitations on disclaiming implied
warranties, 56 the abrogation of privity requirements when a family member
or house guest is injured, 157 and the limitation on disclaiming liability for
consequential damages." 8 In addition, and most relevant for RTO
151 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
REPORT No. 3 (Dec. 15, 1966), 1 U.L.A. p. XXXIII (1976) (all but three states had
enacted the UCC by 1966).
112 See Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
11 See Miller, supra note 138, at 959.
154 The popularity of consumer leases eventually led to the enactment of the federal
Consumer Leasing Act in 1977. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667(e) (1990).
155 U.C.C. § 2-302. Although not expressly limited to consumer transactions, most
courts effectively limit the application of § 2-302 to consumer sales. See I. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-2 (3d ed. 1988); cf. A & M Produce Co.
v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982) (§ 2-302 applies to
commercial transactions).
156 U.C.C. § 2-316. This provision protects commercial as well as consumer
purchasers of goods, although it was designed principally with the unsophisticated
consumer in mind. See Miller, supra note 138, at 960 n.22.
,17 U.C.C. § 2-318 (alternative A). Section 2-318 addresses the issue of "horizontal
privity," and expands the universe of individuals who can sue a seller for breach of
warranty. The section does not address the doctrine of "vertical privity," which may
preclude a warranty action against anyone other than the actual seller of the product (i.e.,
the retailer but not the manufacturer). See Greenberg, Vertical Privity and Damages for
Breach of Implied Warranty Under the U. C.C.: It's Time for Indiana to Abandon the
Citadel, 21 IND. L. Rv. 23 (1988).
158 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (declaring any limitation of consequential damages for personal
injuries prima facie unconscionable when goods are consumer goods).
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consumers, the provisions of Article 9 relating to repossessions of secured
collateral and the recently promulgated Article 2A governing leases include
some consumer protections that could benefit RTO customers.159
A. Lease vs. Security Interest: An Open Issue
Perhaps the most often litigated RTO issue is whether the RTO contract
should be characterized as a true lease or as a security agreement. The
distinction has important ramifications for the consumer and lessor because,
upon termination of the contract, the rights of a consumer in goods deemed
subject to a security interest will be governed by Article 9 and generally are
greater than those of a lessee."6° The issue typically is raised when an RTO
dealer has repossessed the leased goods for failure of the lessee to make
rental payments or when the lessee files a bankruptcy petition and the RTO
dealer seeks to reclaim the goods from the bankruptcy estate.
The repossession practices of RTO firms have long been the subject of
consumer complaints. Judicial decisions reveal allegations of forced entry
into customer residences, 161 harassing communications with consumers
whose payments are late, 62 deceptive collection efforts, and other conduct
ranging from the unfair to the criminal. 3 Consumer advocates also
complain of dissatisfied consumers who have defaulted and returned goods
after having paid substantial sums under RTO agreements, only to discover
that their periodic payments have created no equity in the repossessed goods
and that they have no statutory or contractual right to cure default or
reinstate the agreement. 64
Breaches of the peace and unfair or deceptive collection efforts of RTO
dealers are prohibited under local law in every jurisdiction, whether or not
159 The applicability of Articles 9 and 2A to RTO contracts is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 160-221 and 222-72, respectively.
" See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 166-75; B. CLARK, THE LAw OF
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1.05[8] (2d ed.
1988).
161 See Kimble v. Universal TV Rental, 65 Ohio Misc. 17, 417 N.E.2d 597 (1980)
(RTO dealer entered home by "turning lock" when customer was not home).
162 See State v. Action TV Rentals, 297 Md. 531, 534, 467 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1983)
(pressures exerted on RTO customers range from "stupid to outrageous to criminal").
163 See Taylor v. Action Household Rentals, 351 So. 2d 865 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(threats and kicking down door to repossess leased refrigerator); Fassitt v. United TV
Rentals, 297 So. 2d 283, 287 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (contract provision authorizing home
entry held unenforceable as against public policy).
164 See J. Sheldon, supra note 3, at 220-22.
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the lease is characterized as a security interest." Characterization becomes
important, however, when the consumer or his creditors wish to claim a
continuing interest in the goods after they have been repossessed. If the
agreement is deemed to have created a security interest, the state's version
of Article 9 will impose several restraints on the repossessing firm that do
not apply to lessors. For instance, after a dealer lawfully repossesses, the
consumer has a right under section 9-506 to cure the default by tendering the
amount secured by the obligation.1" If default is not cured and the dealer
decides to retain the collateral (instead of selling it or re-renting it to another
customer), section 9-505 requires the dealer to give written notice of the
proposed retention to the consumer, and if the consumer does not object, the
dealer may keep the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt and the
consumer would not owe any additional amount. 67 Retention is not
permitted, however, where the consumer has paid 60% of the original
purchase price; the dealer must then sell or lease the goods within ninety
days unless the consumer signs a waiver of this right.161 Most importantly,
under section 9-504 if the dealer sells or leases the repossessed property, it
must notify the consumer before the disposition and account to the consumer
165 Section 9-503 of the UCC authorizes self-help repossession of secured collateral
only if the act can be accomplished without "breach of the peace." For all types of
consumer agreements, even those not deemed to create a security interest, breaches of
the peace and unfair collection efforts are often prohibited in a state's unfair trade
practices statute. See generally J. SHELDON & R. SABLE, REPOSSESSIONS § 2.4.3.1
(National Consumer Law Center, 2d ed. 1988).
16 This "right of redemption" requires the debtor to tender the full obligation secured
by the collateral (i.e., the entire unpaid balance of the debt) plus the reasonable expenses
incurred by the creditor repossessing the collateral and, perhaps, the creditor's attorneys'
fees. U.C.C. § 9-506. The limited value of these Article 9 rights to RTO consumers is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 214-21.
167 U.C.C. § 9-505(2). The process of "strict foreclosure" is particularly attractive to
the creditor when the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the debt, or where the
likelihood of collecting a deficiency from the debtor is slight and the inconvenience of
disposing of the collateral under the § 9-504 procedures is substantial. The rule
recognizes the possibility that the parties often are better off without a forced resale of
the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-505, Official Comment 1.
168 U.C.C. § 9-505(1). The effect of this provision is that a consumer debtor's silence
will not be deemed a waiver of his right to insist that the creditor dispose of the collateral
pursuant to § 9-504. Only an affirmative, written waiver following repossession will
permit a creditor to retain the goods in full satisfaction of the debt where a consumer has
paid at least 60% of the cash price.
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for any surplus realized from the sale or lease above the amount owed."6
Because the percentage of RTO contracts that result in repossessions is
relatively high,170 the notice and accounting requirements of Article 9
would impose a substantial administrative burden on RTO operations.
Noncompliance would subject the dealer to a statutory damages formula
which, particularly in a class action alleging a pattern of noncompliance,
could be substantial.
In a bankruptcy proceeding the consequences of characterizing an RTO
transaction as a security interest are not as potentially harmful to an RTO
dealer but are important nonetheless. The automatic stay provision in section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code protects the property from immediate
repossession regardless of the characterization,"r but the dealer's chances
of ultimately recovering the property are enhanced if the transaction is
deemed a true lease. 7 The debtor may retain possession of leased goods
only if the trustee "accepts" the lease, cures default (by paying any past due
rent), assures future payments under the agreement and, in general,
compensates the lessor for any pecuniary loss. 74 Because this means that
the debtor must essentially affirm the contract, RTO consumers will usually
not agree to the conditions and will "reject" the lease, thereby allowing the
lessor to repossess. If the transaction is deemed a security agreement, the
debtor or trustee may attack the validity of the security interest (e.g., claim
169 Before returning any surplus to the debtor, the secured party is allowed to deduct
its reasonable expenses of repossessing and selling the goods, as well as legal expenses
unless prohibited by law. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a). The likelihood of any surplus
reaching the consumer following a resale of relatively low-priced used merchandise is
therefore remote. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 214-16.
170 Experience shows that at least 80% of all RTO agreements end in a consumer's
default. See Progressive Rentals, Dec. 1988-Jan. 1989, at 34; St. Paul Pioneer Press
Dispatch, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1B; cf Ramp, supra note 2, at 798 ("keep-rate" of 20% is
misleading figure because eventually all RTO merchandise is re-rented until sold;
acknowledges, however, that most RTO customers suffer at least one repossession).
171 See U.C.C. § 9-507 (consumer debtor's damages for creditor's failure to comply
with Article 9 are the greater of (1) actual damages or (2) the total finance charge
contemplated by the contract plus 10% of the cash price).
172 11 U.S.C. § 362(3) prohibits "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate
." See B. CLARK, supra note 160 at 1.05[8], and 6.08.
173 See id. at 1.05[8].
174 11 U.S.C. § 365; see In re Mitchell, 108 Bankr. 166 (S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Loop
Hosp. Partnership, 35 Bankr. 929 (N.D. Ill., 1983). In Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the
decision to "accept" or "reject" the lease must be made within 60 days under §
365(d)(1). See A. COHEN & M. MILLER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 3.08[4],
[5] (1985).
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that it is unperfected), pay the creditor only the "value" of the used goods,
which will usually be much less than the anticipated rent, or adversely
modify the rights of the secured party in other ways.175
Regardless of whether the issue arises in an action for damages for
noncompliance with Article 9 or in a bankruptcy proceeding, characterization
of the agreement depends upon the definition of security interest in the state's
version of section 1-201(37) of the UCC.'" In the vast majority of states
that have not yet adopted the 1987 amendments to the UCC approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 7 7 a
"security interest" is defined as:
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation .... Whether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of
an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for
security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the
175 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 722, 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5); A. COHEN & M. MILLER, supra
note 174, at 1 12.04[2], 12.05[1]. The trustee must provide adequate assurance to the
secured creditor that the value of the collateral will not be impaired during the
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (authorizing relief from the stay if "adequate
protection" is not afforded); B. CLARK, supra note 160, at 1.0516]; In re Huffman, 63
Bankr. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1986). In many instances, classification of an RTO contract as a
security interest instead of a lease would not significantly impair the dealer's status in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The transaction would probably be deemed a "purchase money
security interest" under § 9-107 of the UCC and therefore would be automatically
perfected under § 9-302(1)(d). The dealer could petition for possession of the goods
under Bankruptcy Code § 363(d), but must establish that the debtor has no equity in the
goods and the property is not necessary to a reorganization. In a Chapter 7 liquidation,
the secured RTO dealer thus may obtain possession of the property regardless of the
classification. In a Chapter 13 reorganization, the property might not be as easily
repossessed. See A. COHEN & M. MILLER, supra note 174, at 12.05[1].
376 The Bankruptcy Code defines "security interest" as a "lien created by an
agreement." 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). "Lien" is defined as a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. §
101(37). The legislative history reveals that Congress intended for state law to control
the issue whether a transaction was a lease or security interest. See S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787,
5812-13; H.R. REP. No. 585, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 314, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6271.
" The 1987 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code revised the definition of
"security interest" substantially. As of January 1, 1991, eight states had adopted the
revision. (California, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas).
See U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), State CorrelationTables (March 1991 Variations and
Options sections). See also infra text accompanying note 206.
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lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the
property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does
make the lease one intended for security. 7
Much has been written by judges and commentators interpreting this
definition.'79 At least sixteen different factors, in various combinations
depending on the factual circumstances under scrutiny, have been cited as
relevant to the inquiry."8 A common theme is that the intent of the parties
governs, but the intent should be gleaned circumstantially from the contents
of the written contract and the factual setting of the transaction.' Citing
178 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978) (emphasis added).
179 The distinction between leases and security interests is one of the most often
litigated issues under the U.C.C. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 155, at §
23-3. For a thoughtful analysis of the distinction, see Ayer, On tile Vacuity of the
Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IowA L. REV. 667 (1983); Jones, Lease or Secured
Transaction - The Saga Continues Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1985 COM. L.J. 281
(June/July); see also In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223, 234 n. 26 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (listing
several judicial decisions discussing lease/security interest issue).
1"0 One bankruptcy court listed these factors as follows:
(1) whether there was an option to purchase for a nominal sum, (2) whether there was
a provision in the lease granting the lessee an equity or property interest in the
equipment, (3) whether the nature of the lessor's business was to act as a financing
agency, (4) whether the lessee paid a sales tax incident to acquisition of the equipment,
(5) whether the lessee paid all other taxes incident to ownership of the equipment, (6)
whether the lessee was responsible for comprehensive insurance on the equipment, (7)
whether the lessee was required to pay any and all license fees for operation of the
equipment, and to maintain the equipment at his expense, (8) whether the agreement
placed the entire risk of loss upon the lessee, (9) whether the agreement included a
clause permitting the lessor to accelerate the payment of rent upon default of the lessee
and granted remedies similar to those of a mortgagee, (10) whether the equipment
subject to the agreement was selected by the lessee and purchased by the lessor for this
specific lessee, (11) whether the lessee was required to pay a substantial security deposit
in order to obtain the equipment, (12) whether the agreement required the lessee to join
the lessor, or permit the lessor by himself, to execute a UCC financing statement, (13)
whether there was a default provision in the lease inordinately favorable to the lessor,
(14) whether there was a provision in the lease for liquidated damages, (15) whether
there was a provision disclaiming warranties of fitness and/or merchantability on the
part of the lessor, (16) whether the aggregate rentals approximate the value or purchase
price of the equipment.
In re Brookside Drug Store, 3 Bankr. 120, 122-23 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
"8 See Sight & Sound of Ohio v. Wright, 36 Bankr. 885, 889-90 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1983); Yankee Leasing Co. v. Mountain Carpet, Inc., 11 Bankr. 729, 731 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1979); In re Witkowski, 38 Bankr. 352, 353 (N.D. 1984); In re Alpha Creamery
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clause (b) near the end of the definition, however, many courts have given
determinative weight to a single factor and have held that where a lease
grants the lessee an option to become the owner of the property for no
additional or nominal consideration at the end of the lease, the transaction is
not a true lease but should be treated as a disguised sale with the retention
of a security interest."8 The reasoning is straightforward: where the lessee
automatically becomes the absolute owner of the property at the end of the
lease, periodic lease payments are indistinguishable from payments under an
installment sales contract, and the lessee has in fact been purchasing the
goods over the contract term. Several courts have pointed to this feature in
RTO contracts as the determinative factor in holding that RTO agreements
create security interests. 1 3
Other courts have disagreed. Relying on the first sentence of section 1-
201(37), which provides that a security interest "secures payment or
performance of an obligation," several courts have held that, despite the
possible transfer of ownership for no additional consideration at the end of
the lease, an RTO contract does not create a security interest because the
Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794, 797 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1967).
"s See, e.g., Sight & Sound of Ohio, 36 Bankr. at 890 (broad inquiry "cut short"
where lease transfers ownership for nominal consideration); In re l.A. Thompson & Son,
665 F.2d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 1982); In re National Welding of Mich., 17 Bankr. 624,
625-26 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982). This view is supported by the last clause of the
definition, which declares that a nominal consideration provision "does make the lease
one intended for security." Id. at 626.
"' See Sight & Sound of Ohio, 36 Bankr. at 885; In re Aguilar, 101 Bankr. 481
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Bailey, 103 Bankr. 886 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re
Rose, 94 Bankr. 103 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Fogelsong, 88 Bankr. 194 (Bankr.
C.D. 111. 1988); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); In re Elliott, 18
Bankr. 602 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416
A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); In re Graham, No. CV 86-H-1055-W (Bankr. N.D.
Ala., Sept. 11, 1986); In re Holder, No. B78-00527C (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1979); Tackett
v. Mid-Continent Refrig. Co., 579 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Other courts
have held leases to be security agreements under facts similar to the typical consumer
RTO lease. See In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (terminable lease
drafted by finance company requiring large non-refundable deposit and transferring
ownership for no consideration); United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan
Contracting Co., 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963) (terminable commercial equipment
lease); In re Royer's Bakery, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(same).
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consumer undertakes no obligation to repay a debt." The lessor does
retain an interest in the property, but that interest does not secure an
"obligation" of the lessee.185 The RTO cases in this line followed the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit's often-cited decision in In re Marhoefer
Packing Co.," 6 which did not involve an RTO lease but a commercial
lease of equipment. The lease provided for monthly payments of $665.00
over a term of four years. At the end of four years, Marhoefer had the
option of returning the equipment, purchasing it for $9,968.00 or renewing
the lease for another four years, at which time Marhoefer could purchase the
equipment for one dollar. Marhoefer never exercised any of the options
because approximately one year after delivery, it ceased all payments under
the lease and filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. A dispute between the
trustee and the lessor over possession of the equipment ensued. Claiming that
the lease was intended as security and that the lessor had failed to perfect the
security interest, the trustee sought permission to sell the equipment free of
"
54 See In re Glenn, 102 Bankr. 153 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989); In re Unger, 95 Bankr.
761 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989); In re Armstrong, 84 Bankr. 84 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988);
In re Martin, 64 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984); In re Huffman, 63 Bankr. 737
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In re Shangri-La Nursing Center, 31 Bankr. 367 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1983) (dictum); In re Pledger Roy Wood, 7 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980);
In re Parker, No. 89-40167-13 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); In re Howard, No. 87-00240
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1987) (dictum); In re Jones, No. A86-04145-WID (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1986); In re Ramage, No. 86-50956 (Bankr. M.D. Ga., Dec. 4, 1986); In re Jackson,
No. 85-51674 (Bankr. M.D. Ga., June 17, 1986); In re Brown, No. 585-1016 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio, Dec. 20, 1985); In re Martin, No. 183-00568 (Bankr. S.D. Ga., Mar. 15,
1984); Valas Stores, Inc. v. I-ieks, No. 83-G-0081 (Bankr. D. Colo., July 11, 1983);
In re Turner, No. 3-78-1135(D) (Bankr. D. Minn., Mar. 19, 1979); Crumley v. Berry,
298 Ark. 112, 766 S.W.2d 7 (1989); Elcan Investments v. Kirk, 187 Ga. App. 676, 371
S.E.2d 146 (1988); State v. Action TV Rentals, 297 Md. 531, 467 A.2d 1000 (1983);
Allen v. Rent-A-Center, No. 207044 (Sup. Ct. Conn., Apr. 9, 1986).
185 A leading commentator on the UCC stated this view perhaps most strongly:
mhe pre-Code authorities are decidedly correct when they state that if the facts of a
transaction include the presence of the usual right of a consignee to return consigned
goods, or if a lease contains an option in the lessee to terminate, then there is no
obligation to pay an amount substantially equal to the purchase price and thus no
conditional sale under pre-Code law as well as no security interest under the UCC.
Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An
Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DuKE L.J. 909, 916; see also
Note, Crumley v. Barry: Conditional Sale Contracts, True Leases, and the Lessee's Right
to Terminate, 43 ARK. L. REv. 899 (1990).
186 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
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all liens. The lessor alleged that the agreement was a true lease, Marhoefer
was in default, and if the lease was not accepted, its equipment should be
returned. The district court held that the one dollar purchase option created
a conclusive presumption under clause (b) of section 1-201(37) that the lease
was intended as security. 87 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that
the presumption in clause (b) applies only where the lessee is contractually
bound to pay rent over a set period at the conclusion of which he
automatically becomes the owner of the goods. Only then is the transaction
in substance an installment sale. Because Marhoefer could terminate the lease
after four years and was under no obligation to continue renting until the
time when the one dollar ownership option would arise, the district court's
reliance on clause (b) was erroneous.188
Marhoefer was the first appellate decision to support the position of the
RTO industry that its contracts did not create security interests, and its
authority stemmed the tide of decisions ruling otherwise. Courts applying
Marhoefer to RTO contracts thus reduced the test for defining "security
interest" to an analysis similar to that for defining "credit sale" under TILA:
the lessee must be obligated to pay an amount equivalent to the value of the
goods, and the lessee must have an option to become the owner for nominal
additional consideration at the end of the lease.'89 Since the first inquiry is
not satisfied, the courts held for the RTO dealer.
The rule of Marhoefer finds support among commentators on Article 9.
Grant Gilmore, a principal draftsman of Article 9, regarded the first sentence
of section 1-201(37) as the "basic definition" of security interest and the
remainder, including the reference to nominal consideration, as refinement
of the basic concept." For Gilmore, a lease that gives the lessee the "right
to terminate the lease at any time during the term should no doubt lead to the
conclusion that the lease was a true lease." 9' Decisions under state laws
8M Id. at 1141.
188 Id. at 1143.
18 See, e.g., In re Huffinan, 63 Bankr. 737, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (no security
interest unless (1) agreement to pay a set amount, (2) the amount must be equivalent to
the original value of the goods and (3) ownership must transfer for nominal consideration
at the end of the lease) (citing In re Pledger Roy Wood, 7 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1980)).
190 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, vol. 1, p. 334 (1965)
("It is clear that there must be some sort of 'obligation' which underlies or supports the
interest; this will normally be a money debt but could conceivably be something else.
.") see also C6ogan, supra note 185.
191 G. GILMORE, supra note 190, at 339.
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preceding Article 9 and on which the principles of Article 9 were based
apparently concurred."
The issue is far from settled, however. Perhaps because section 1-201(37)
provides that the lease/security interest question "depends on the facts of
each case," courts have been reluctant to allow any single factor to be
determinative. Eschewing both the conclusive presumption of clause (b) and
the determinative effect of a "no obligation" contract, some post-Marhoefer
courts have looked to other circumstances of the transaction to decide
whether an RTO contract creates a security interest. Several courts, for
instance, have attempted to determine whether "equity" is created in an RTO
contract. 97 Since the creation of buyer equity has historically been held to
be more consistent with an installment sale than a true lease,1" an RTO
contract that allows the lessee to build equity during the course of the
agreement can be a security interest. Others have observed that where RTO
contracts charge the lessee sales tax195 or impose the risk of loss by theft
or destruction on the lessee, 97 the transaction resembles an installment sale
more than a lease. Still others have rejected any "laundry list" of criteria and
have held that where the parties subjectively intended a sale from the
beginning, they should be held to that intent despite the contract form. 97
Indicative of the uncertainty surrounding this issue, a bankruptcy judge
recently ruled in one case that an RTO contract did not create a security
interest because the lease was terminable and, in a virtually identical case a
"V G. GILMORE, supra note 190, at 77 n.3, 339; see Da Rocha v. MaComber, 330
Mass. 611, 116 N.E.2d 139 (1953).
113 See, e.g., In re Rose, 94 Bankr. 103 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Puckett, 60
Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Elliott, 18 Bankr. 602 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); In
re Royer's Bakery, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963).
194 Perhaps the most notable early case identifying the creation of equity with a sale
rather than a true lease is In re Alpha Creamery, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1967).
19- See, e.g., In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); In re Sight &
Sound of Ohio, 36 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
196 See, e.g., In re Sight & Sound of Ohio, 36 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983);
In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987).
197 See, e.g., In re Fogelsong, 88 Bankr. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988); In re Bailey,
103 Bankr. 886, 887 (1988) ("It is an assessment of the parties' intent, taken as a whole,
which controls"); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. N.D. Tenn. 1986).
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year later, held that the lease did create a security interest. 198 The court
was persuaded in the interim that the "economic incentives" for completing
an RTO lease were so strong that, as a practical matter, a lessee would not
surrender the equipment for any reason other than his inability to make the
payments.' 99 In the court's view, while the contract imposed no obligation
on the lessee to continue renting, at some point a de facto obligation arose
because termination would forfeit a sizable investment.?
The root of continued confusion on this issue is the language of section
1-201(37). While the "basic definition" of security interest may include the
requirement of an obligation, the definition also states that the issue depends
on the intent of the parties and the "facts of each case," thereby inviting
inquiry into all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The process
of choosing which circumstances are the most relevant and evaluating their
effect can become an unpredictable judicial exercise. The imposition of a
sales tax, for example, may reflect an intent to sell the property, but it might
be imposed simply because local tax laws require lessors to charge such a tax
when leasing goods. Similarly, placing liability on the lessee for theft or
198 Compare In re Armstrong, 84 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. W.D. Wise. 1988) (RTO lease
not security agreement) with In re Aguillar, 101 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(RTO lease is security agreement).
19I "[E]conomic incentives... are so complete that, as a practical matter, a debtor
would not surrender the equipment in question for any reason whatsoever other than his
or her inability to make the payments." Aguilar, 101 Bankr. at 482. The focus on the
"economic realities" facing an RTO customer is a frequent theme in judicial opinions
characterizing RTO leases as security agreements. See, e.g., Bailey, 103 Bankr. at 888
(if agreement is renewed many times, at some point the lessee's "only feasible option is
to continue to renew the lease . . ."); Fogelson, 88 Bankr. at 196 ("Who in his right
mind would invest nearly $150 per week in household furnishings, knowing they will
automatically be his after a set number of weeks, without intending to keep paying to
accomplish that result?"); Puckett, 60 Bankr. at 240; Sight & Sound of Ohio, 36 Bankr.
at 891 (after paying $1,400, lessee had "no plausible alternative" except to finish the
contract). The economic imperative is much weaker, or even nonexistent, in the early
stages of the contract, when the terminability feature may have substantial value to the
lessee.
o Marhoefer itself does not foreclose consideration of any of these types of factors.
The Seventh Circuit did not end its inquiry by observing that the lessee could terminate
the lease before ownership passed. In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1144
(7th Cir. 1982). The terminability feature only meant that the conclusive presumption of
clause (b) did not apply. The court then considered some of the other factors found by
courts to be relevant in making the determination, including whether the lessee acquired
any equity in the property and whether the lessee paid taxes, insurance, or other charges
normally incident to the purchase of property under an installment credit sale. Id. at
1146.
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destruction of the goods may indicate an intent to treat the lessee as owner,
but it also may reflect a practical decision that the lessee is in the best
position to protect against such a risk through insurance or the exercise of
caution, whereas the lessor is in a better position to guard against other risks,
such as mechanical malfunctions, which are typically borne by the RTO
dealer who agrees to keep the property in good working order. Relying on
these elements of the transaction to determine the intent of the parties can
often yield a conclusion that the parties "intended" different things. 1
The "equity" factor relied upon by some courts is particularly troubling
because, in essence, it is a restatement of the nominal consideration factor in
clause (b) of section 1-201(37). A lessee has equity in property whenever the
remaining cost of ownership is less than the value of the goods at a given
time. Equity will therefore exist at some point in any lease in which the
lessee can acquire ownership for less than the fair market value of the goods.
In such circumstances the "economic incentives" of the transaction may urge
a rational lessee to complete the contract, even if the contract says the lessee
can terminate. If the creation of "equity" is the touchstone of section 1-
201(37) analysis, then the lessee's lack of contractual obligation becomes
irrelevant, and the pertinent inquiry is whether ownership can pass for a sum
that is substantially less than the value of the goods, i.e. for nominal
consideration. In all such cases an "economic obligation" will be found and
a security interest would exist. The reference to "obligation" in the definition
of security interest may as well be deleted.
Unlike the controversies concerning the treatment of RTO contracts under
TILA and state RIS acts, which have largely been settled in favor of the RTO
industry,' the lease/security interest debate continues. Since the issues are
in many ways similar, i.e., whether the transaction is essentially a sale or a
lease and whether the lack of a lessee's obligation should be the
determinative factor, one wonders why only this issue still generates
substantial litigation and controversy. One explanation may be that unlike
section 1-201(37), the relevant defined terms in the other statutes do not
invite courts to undertake the relatively unguided task of examining the "facts
of each case" to divine the "intention" of the parties.0 3 Another
201 Cf. G. GILMORE, supra note 190, at 338 (the reference to "intent" in § 1-201(37)
has nothing to do with the subjective intent of the parties to sell or lease the goods).
202 See supra notes 61-63, 79 and accompanying text.
203 The definition of "credit sale" in T]LA and definitions of similar terms in RIS laws
generally cover leases where the lessee agrees or is contractually bound to pay for the
value of the goods during the lease term and can become the owner upon payment of
nominal consideration at the conclusion of the agreement, without any reference to the
parties' intent or other factors to be considered. See supra notes 42, 78 and
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explanation may be that many of the lease/security interest cases arise in
bankruptcy courts, which are charged with overseeing the debtor's estate and
preserving property for distribution among the debtor's creditors.
Conditioned by the "fresh start" promise of the bankruptcy code, bankruptcy
courts may be inclined to presume RTO merchandise as part of the debtor's
estate and not merely as goods on loan, especially where the debtor has
devoted a substantial part of his recent income to RTO lease payments and
has few other possessions.0 In contrast, the object of TILA and other
disclosure laws is principally to provide consumers with relevant cost
information at the outset of the transaction. Courts may find it less
compelling to mandate disclosures that presume a commitment to repay a
stated sum over a period of time when the transaction by its terms creates no
such commitment, and the consumer may only rent for a short period. 5
The inconsistent decisions on the lease/security interest issue may be
short lived. The revised definition of security interest proposed in the 1987
amendments to the UCC20 6 should tip the scales in favor of the RTO
industry. The new section 1-201(37) begins with the same basic definition
that a security interest is an interest in personal property which "secures
payment or performance of an obligation," but the section then provides
more extensive elaboration on the lease/security interest question. Most
important for RTO purposes, the revised section states that a transaction
creates a security interest if the lease payments constitute "an obligation for
the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee" and if one of
four additional criteria (which expand upon the nominal consideration
concept) are satisfied. 0 7 RTO dealers can be expected to make the
accompanying text.
204 One judge has openly acknowledged that bankruptcy court may be a friendly forum
for consumers. See Scholl, Bankruptcy Court: The Ultimate Consumer Law Forum? 44
BUS. LAW. 935 (1989). Judge Scholl, a former legal services lawyer, represented low
income individuals in litigation against RTO companies. See Not All Judges Ruling
Against RTO, RTO NETWORK NEWS, Feb. 1990, at 1.
205 The "no obligation" feature of an RTO agreement may have more meaning to a
consumer at the outset of the transaction, when TILA-type disclosures must be made,
than to a consumer who has already paid a substantial sum under an RTO agreement and
finds himself in bankruptcy court. The equitable considerations flowing from this
temporal distinction may explain the divergence of doctrine in this area.
206 The revision has been enacted in at least eight states. See supra note 177.
207 Revised § 1-201(37) provides, in pertinent part:
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of
each case; however, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the
lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:751
converse argument implicit in the revision, i.e., a lease does not create a
security interest if the lessee is not obligated for the full term. Revised
section 1-201(37) might be viewed as an effort toward clarifying this issue
parallel to the 1982 revision of Regulation Z by the Federal Reserve
Board." s
The revised definition also omits reference to the "intention" of the
parties, which according to the Official Comments led to "unfortunate
results" in the past, and instead purports to focus on the economics of the
transaction.' The economic principal invoked is that a lease is a disguised
sale only if the lessee, by completing his obligations under the contract, will
for all practical purposes own the property free of any residual interest of the
lessor at the contract's conclusion. This emphasis on the residual interest
retained by the lessor is reinforced by statutory language providing that a
transaction does not create a security interest merely because it allocates
certain costs, such as taxes, insurance, and maintenance, to the lessee.21
obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or
nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement.
208 The Official Comment to revised § 1-201(37) concedes that the previous version is
"vague and outmoded," and that the definition was revised "to resolve an issue that has
created considerable confusion in the courts: what is a lease?" U.C.C. § 1-201, Official
Comment 37. The Comment expressly disapproves of one case (In re Royer's Bakery,
1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963)) holding that a terminable
lease was a security agreement. Id.
209 See U.C.C. § 1-201, Official Comment 37 ("All of these tests [see supra note 207]
focus on economics, not the intent of the parties.").
210 See § 1-201(37), providing in part:
A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay
the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is
substantially equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the
goods at the time the lease is entered into,
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The revision properly views these cost allocations as consistent with both
leases and secured sales, and they do not affect the basic economic
inquiry."' The revision thus appears to reject those decisions which relied
upon such facts as support for finding that the parties to an RTO contract
intended to create a security interest.
In the states where revised section 1-201(37) is enacted, RTO dealers will
likely contend that the issue has been resolved in their favor. The Official
Comments lend support to this view by disapproving of one widely cited
decision that characterized a short term "no obligation" equipment lease as
a security interest."' Consumer advocates, however, need not concede the
cause. They can still center their arguments on the statute's continued
direction that the issue be "determined by the facts of each case." Moreover,
while the Official Comments discourage inquiry into the intent of the parties,
section 9-102 still provides that Article 9 applies to "any transaction
(regardless of form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay
taxes, insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service
or maintenance costs with respect to the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner
of the goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is
equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent
for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the
option is to be performed, or
(e) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a
fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably
predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is
to be performed.
2. See U.C.C. § 1-201, Official Comment 37 ("Most of these criteria .. are as
applicable to true leases as to security interests.").
22 See U.C.C. § 1-201, Official Comment 37:
The second paragraph further provides that a transaction creates a security interest if
the lessee has an obligation to continue paying consideration for the term of the lease,
if the obligation is not terminable by the lessee (thus correcting early statutory gloss,
e.g., In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1963)) and if one of four additional tests is met.
See also R. HILLMAN, J. McDONALD & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW & EQUITY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18.0513][a] (1990 Cum. Supp.) ("[T]he new
definition rejects the cases finding that a lease is intended as security even though the
lessee has a free right to terminate the arrangement."); Crumley v. Berry, 298 Ark. 112,
116, 766 S.W.2d 7, 10 (1989).
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property . . 213 The statute may leave room for contending that the
absence of a contractual obligation only negates the presumption of security
interest arising from a nominal purchase option. Other facts surrounding the
transaction must then be considered. This argument, however, will be
difficult to sustain because certain facts seem to have been eliminated as no
longer relevant and others have been given greater weight. The revision
highlights the non-terminability of a lease as a threshold fact to be
considered, and it counsels reduced reliance on other facts that supported
findings of a security interest in past RTO cases. Revised section 1-201(37)
thus appears to make it much more difficult for consumers to allege facts that
could tip the balance in their favor.
B. The Inadequacies of Article 9for RTO Consumers
In jurisdictions where RTO transactions are deemed security interests, the
default protections of Article 9 promise some assistance to RTO consumers.
Article 9 gives defaulting buyers in secured transactions rights against
repossessing creditors. The three most significant of these are the debtor's
right under sections 9-504 and 9-505 to realize any equity that may have
been created by periodic payments, the debtor's opportunity under section 9-
506 to recover the property after repossession by tendering the outstanding
balance, and the preferential treatment afforded buyers (as opposed to
lessees) under bankruptcy laws. These rights, however, would have limited
value to most RTO customers.
Sections 9-504 and 9-505 allow consumers to insist that the creditor
dispose of repossessed property through sale or lease to a third party 14 and
remit any surplus from the disposition to the consumer, after deducting the
213 U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (emphasis added). See also U.C.C. § 9-102(2) ("This Article
applies to security interests created by contract including . . . lease or consignment
intended as security."). Despite the apparent goal of "delet[ing] all reference to the
parties' intent" (see U.C.C. § 1-201, Official Comment 37), the drafters did not amend
section 9-102.
214 Under § 9-505, the resale must take place if the consumer has paid "sixty percent
of the cash price" and has not signed a waiver of resale rights after default. U.C.C. §
9-505(1). If the consumer has paid less than 60%, the seller can propose, in writing, to
keep the goods in full satisfaction of the debt, and can do so if the consumer does not
object within 21 days. U.C.C. § 9-505(2). The effect of these provisions is that a
consumer's silence can harm him only if he has paid less than 60% of the original cash
price before default.
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outstanding debt and repossession costs 15 In theory, this permits the
consumer to recoup any equity created by his periodic payments over the
contract term. RTO customers who rent for a relatively short time, however,
would realize no benefit from this provision because the price received upon
disposition of the used goods would seldom exceed the amount of remaining
RTO payments. Longer term renters who have paid more than the initial cash
value of the property and who are near the end of the RTO contract would
have a better hope of receiving a surplus, but even for these consumers the
chances are slim. Heavily used consumer goods are not likely to bring high
prices in a secondary market," 6 and any amount realized on such a
disposition would first be reduced by the costs of repossession and sale. In
short, except in extraordinary circumstances, the possibility of an RTO
consumer receiving a surplus under section 9-505 is remote.
The right of redemption provided in Article 9 also would have limited
value to an RTO customer. Section 9-506 provides that the debtor can
reacquire the property after repossession, but only by tendering to the
creditor all "obligations" secured by the collateral plus any reasonable
expenses incurred in repossession 17 In the typical credit transaction, this
means that the consumer can get the collateral back only by paying off the
total outstanding debt in full. For the RTO customer, this provision creates
a problem of interpretation and could operate in either of two ways. Since
the contract only requires weekly or monthly obligations and no long term
commitment, the provision could be construed as giving the RTO customer
a right to redeem the goods by tendering only the overdue periodic
payments, which would ordinarily be a relatively small amount compared to
the total rent called for under the agreement." Presumably the customer
would then resume making periodic rental payments. Alternatively, the
provision could be construed to require the customer to tender all past due
rental payments plus all remaining payments under the lease. The consumer
would clearly prefer the first construction, but the latter is more consistent
with operation of the provision under traditional credit contracts. For
215 U.C.C. § 9-504(1),(2). For a good discussion of the rights of debtor and creditor
following repossession, see B. CLARK, supra note 160, ch. 4.
216 This criticism of Article 9 remedies applies equally to non-RTO credit transactions,
when the consumer's statutory right to a surplus is also largely illusory. See J. SHELDON
& R. SABLE, supra note 59, at 246 (surplus uncommon when consumer goods sold).
217 U.C.C. § 9-506. The debtor must also pay for reasonable expenses incurred by the
secured party in holding the collateral, arranging for the resale, plus attorneys' fees to
the extent permitted by law. Id.
219 See J. SHELDON & R. SABLE, supra note 59, at 49 ("[i]t is unclear whether the
[RTO] consumer must tender just past due payments, or also future payments as well.").
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traditional credit arrangements, the statute does not require the seller, after
the buyer has defaulted, to reinstate the contract and give the buyer another
opportunity to make timely installment payments. The seller is entitled to
demand the full contract balance and, unless satisfied, it can dispose of the
property by sale to others.219 If the redemption provision were construed
in this way, most RTO consumers would gain little from section 9-506
because they would seldom have the cash to pay the lump sum amount
required to redeem the collateral. If the customer did offer the cash, the RTO
dealer would likely accept the payment even in the absence of a statutory
directive.
Characterizing an RTO agreement as a secured transaction may have its
greatest potential for consumer benefit in a bankruptcy proceeding. If the
property is treated as secured collateral and not as leased goods, the
merchandise becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, and the RTO dealer is
less likely to be awarded immediate possession.' Moreover, the security
interest may be deemed unperfected, in which case the RTO dealer would be
forced to stand in line as an unsecured creditor to share equally with other
creditors in the assets of the consumer. Even under these circumstances,
however, the extent of consumer benefit is likely to be small. Relatively few
RTO customers seek protection under bankruptcy laws, and in many of those
cases the leased merchandise will merely increase the value of the estate for
distribution to the consumer's other creditors."
219 Since an RTO contract will be deemed a security agreement only if the contract is
construed to create an "obligation" of the lessee to pay for the goods, it would seem
inconsistent to allow redemption without the lessee tendering the full amount of
outstanding rental payments. The "obligations" referred to in § 9-506 should be
construed in the same way as "obligation" in § 1-201(37).
22 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
221 U.C.C. § 9-301, together with § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
544(a), provide that a trustee has superior rights to collateral that is subject to an
unperfected security interest. Generally speaking, the creditor must file a financing
statement to perfect a security interest in goods, see U.C.C. § 9-302, but RTO dealers
might claim automatic perfection without filing pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d), which
abrogates the filing requirement for creditors who retain a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (definition of purchase money security
interest). If the security interest -is deemed perfected, the RTO dealer could petition the
court for permission to recover the collateral if the consumer has no "equity" in the
goods and the goods are not necessary to a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(d)(2) (relief from automatic stay).
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C. Article 2A and RTO Consumers
After five years of study and drafting, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute in
1987 approved UCC Article 2A governing leases of personal property.'
Recognizing the increased popularity of leasing transactions over the last few
decades,223 Article 2A applies a uniform set of rules to all leases of
personal property, including RTO transactions. The new code thus expands
the scope of the UCC which, under Article 2, previously covered only sales
of goods and leases deemed to be disguised sales. State legislatures are now
in the process of considering and enacting this uniform law.'
RTO transactions fall within the general definition of "lease"' and the
subcategory of "consumer lease"' in Article 2A. Yet the article is not a
consumer protection statute, and its rules offer only limited assistance to
RTO customers. The major impetus for the statute was dissatisfaction among
commercial lessors with inconsistent and unpredictable court decisions on
product warranties and remedies for breach of a true lease. 7 The statute
222 See Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A - Leases, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 615, 616-17 (1988). For a good discussion of the drafting history of Article 2A,
see Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39
ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988).
223 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EQUIPMENT LEASING, in INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK
5101 (1991). In 1989, approximately 20% of capital investment in the United States was
related to equipment leasing. Boss, supra note 222, at 576-77.
" As of September 1990, nine states (California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah) had enacted Article 2A. See
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) State Correlation Tables, supra note 177, at xiii.
I "Lease" is broadly defined as "a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods
for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale
or return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease." U.C.C. § 2A-
103(1)0). As the definition indicates, an RTO contract would not be a lease, and
therefore would fall outside Article 2A, if the contract is deemed to create a security
interest. The provisions of either Article 9 or 2A could thus apply to RTO contracts, but
not both.
" "Consumer" lease is defined as "a lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the
business of leasing or selling makes to a lessee, except an organization, who takes under
the lease primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose, if the total payments to
be made under the lease contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do
not exceed $25,000." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(e).
' See Huddleson, supra note 222, at 641. To the extent that courts ruled somewhat
consistently on issues affecting the leasing industry, it resulted from applying the
provisions of Article 2 by analogy. See Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga.
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primarily deals with these issues and provides only isolated instances of
consumer protection on other topics.' Nevertheless, RTO consumers may
see some benefit from Article 2A.
1. Warranties
The warranty provisions of Article 2A reflect common law developments
that had recognized implied warranties of minimum standards of
merchantability.' z The statute codifies and standardizes the emerging law
of lease warranties by essentially tracking the provisions of Article 2 on the
creation of implied warranties of merchantability 30 and fitness for a
particular purpose.2 31 The new Article also repeats the sales Article's
requirements for conspicuous disclaimer of the implied warranties. 2
In the world of RTO, however, the implied warranty provisions of
Article 2A do not serve a significant purpose because RTO leases typically
provide expressly that defective goods will either be repaired or replaced by
the RTO dealer at any time during the lease term. More importantly, unlike
a sale of goods under Article 2 or a long term lease, if an RTO dealer does
App. 381, 389, 215 S.E.2d 10, 16 (1975) (implied warranties); Dillman & Assoc. v.
Capitol Leasing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 335, 342, 442 N.E.2d 311, 316 (1982)
(unconscionability);Willamette-Western Corp. v. Lowry, 279 Or. 525,529-30,568 P.2d
1339, 1341 (1977) (battle of the forms); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella Co.,
8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 184, 185-86 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (risk of loss); Asco
Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 293, 295-96
(Pa. Com. P1. 1965) (modifications); see generally Hawkland, The Impact ofthe Uniform
Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 ILL. L. REv. 446. Murray, Under the
Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L. REV.
447 (1971).
2
,
8 See Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA.
L. Rnv. 957, 958-59 (1988). Moreover, the principal commentators during the drafting
of Article 2A predominately represented business interests. See Boss, supra note 222, at
591-92.
11 Several courts had applied Article 2 warranties to lease transactions, either directly
or by analogy. See, e.g., Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galez Constr., 97 Idaho 216, 222,
541 P.2d 1184, 1190 (1975); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998,
354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975).
230 Compare U.C.C. § 2A-212 with § 2-314.
z' Compare U.C.C. § 2A-213 with § 2-315.
232 Compare U.C.C. § 2A-214 with § 2-316. Section 2A-214 differs slightly from §
2-316. With respect to the warranty of merchantability, for instance, § 2A-214(2)
requires the disclaimer to be in writing, whereas § 2-316(2) does not.
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not promptly replace defective goods or if the RTO consumer is not satisfied
with an attempted repair, the consumer can simply terminate the agreement
without further obligation. Indeed, an RTO customer can terminate the
agreement even if the goods are perfectly satisfactory. Thus, even without a
contractual or statutory directive to remedy defective products, RTO lessors
have every incentive to provide acceptable remedies or risk termination and
loss of income. The RTO lease and business necessity will likely provide
more consumer protection than the statutory warranty provisions mandate.
2. Remedies
Article 2A contains elaborate statutory remedy provisions that become
effective upon default by either the lessor or the lessee. This minimum
"safety net" of remedies governs the rights of the parties, however, only if
the lease is silent on remedy issues. 3 Within conscionable limits, the
parties are free to contract for their own set of rights and remedies in the
lease agreement.' Any remedial benefit to consumers provided by Article
2A thus largely can be eliminated by a lessor carefully drafting the lease to
address the rights of the parties upon the other's default. In the absence of
an enforceable lease provision on a particular remedies issue, Article 2A can
provide the RTO consumer with some rights he might not have had at
common law.
a. Lessee's Remedies for Lessor's Breach
The statutory remedies available to lessees for default by the lessor
include the right to cancel the lease,235 the right to recover rent and
21 See generally Huddleson, supra note 222, at 641-57. Section 2A-503(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the lease agreement may include
rights and remedies for default in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this Article.
U.C.C. § 2A-503(1) (emphasis added). The Official Comment makes clear that the
Article "implies no restriction on freedom to contract." U.C.C. § 2A-503, Official
Comment.
" If a contractual remedy is deemed unconscionable, it is void and the gap will be
filled by the remedies set forth in the Code. U.C.C. § 2A-503(2).
235 U.C.C. § 2A-508(1)(a).
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security deposits paid to the lessor,"6 the right to sell the leased goods
under certain conditions,m 7 and the right to obtain substitute goods from
another source. 8 The lessee's basic rights to cancel the RTO agreement
and recover any security deposit following default by the dealer usually will
be stated expressly in the lease and, if not, would be recognized under
common law. 39 Similarly, to the extent that the RTO lessee paid rent
during a period in which a product was either not delivered or was not
serviceable, recovery of paid-in rent would also be permitted under non-Code
law.'- The latter two statutory lessee's remedies, however, either clarify
or extend existing law in a way that could benefit RTO consumers.
Under section 2A-508(5), a lessee who rightfully rejects goods or revokes
acceptance following the lessor's nonperformance can, after holding the
goods for a reasonable time to allow the lessor to reclaim them, dispose of
the property in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner and can
retain the proceeds of the disposition as reimbursement for rent paid and any
unrefunded security deposit.24' This right may extend current law by
recognizing that a lessee, who unlike a buyer has no ownership rights in the
goods, 2 nevertheless has a limited interest in the goods supporting a right
236 U.C.C. § 2A-508(1)(b).
237 U.C.C. § 2A-508(5). Under § 2A-527(5), a lessee who disposes of leased goods
after the lessor's default must pay the lessor any money received above that owing to the
lessee. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
238 U.C.C. § 2A-518(1). See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 241, 242 (1981) (material
breach discharges non-breaching party's obligations); id. § 373 (when one contracting
party breaches, injured party is entitled to return of benefits conferred on breaching
party). See also A. Reisman & C. Mooney, Jr., Drafting, Negotiating, and Construing
the Equipment Lease-An Overview, EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 1, 93
(1988).
240 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1981).
241 Under § 2A-511(4), a purchaser from a lessee in good faith takes free of the
breaching lessor's interest in the goods, so long as the goods were rightfully rejected and
were properly disposed of under § 2A-512. Section 2A-512(1)(a) provides that the lessee
must hold the goods for a reasonable time after the lessor has been notified of the
rejection.
242 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 234, 252-54 (1965) (lessee's sale may
constitute conversion); Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702, 707-11 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(goods cannot be sold to satisfy possessory lien); Metropolitan Vacuum Cleaner Co. v.
Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., 208 F. Supp. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(conversion liability for wrongful disposition).
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to sell them and retain money owed by the defaulting lessor.4 3 This means,
for example, that if an RTO dealer does not repair or replace defective
merchandise and does not pick up the goods within a reasonable time after
receiving notice of the lessee's rejection, the RTO consumer could sell the
goods and retain some of the sale proceeds to offset any security deposit or
rent paid for the period during which the goods were not working.4 The
dealer, of course, can protect against this problem by promptly reclaiming
leased property when the lessee makes it available, but those who delay
unreasonably risk a lessee taking matters into his own hands and disposing
of the goods to recover his damages.
Section 2A-518 provides a second new remedy for a dissatisfied RTO
consumer. The section states that upon a lessor's default the lessee may, in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, "cover" by leasing
substitute goods under a lease agreement "substantially similar to the original
lease ... 2 "5 The lessee then can recover as damages the actual out-of-
pocket costs and any consequential damages resulting from the cover.'
Thus, if the original RTO lease of a television called for monthly payments
of twenty dollars for eighteen months, and following the lessor's default the
lessee enters into an eighteen month lease of a similar television from another
dealer for twenty-five dollars per month, section 2A-518 may permit
recovery of ninety dollars (five dollars per month for eighteen months) plus
any consequential damages. RTO dealers may contend that any recovery
under a terminable lease should be much less because the actual term was
only one month, and the lessee could have simply terminated the lease and
entered into a new agreement with the lessor for a similar television at the
twenty-dollar rate. In the language of section 2A-518,4 a lessee running
243 Section 2A-508(5) is a revised version of § 2-711(3), which gives a purchaser rights
to dispose of rightfully rejected goods in a reasonablemanner. U.C.C. § 2A-508, Official
Comment.
244 The lessee can dispose of the goods, of course, only if they have been rightfully
rejected under § 2A-509 or if the lessee has properly revoked acceptance under § 2A-
517.
245 U.C.C. § 2A-518(1), (2).
246 U.C.C. § 2A-518(2). Damages would be "the difference between the total rent for
the term of the new lease" and the "total rent for the remaining lease term of the original
lease," plus any incidental or consequential damages. Id.
247 The RTO dealer's argument would find some support in the literal language of §
2A-518(2), which computes damages as the difference between the value of rent under
the new lease for the remaining term of the old lease minus the value of the remaining
term under the old lease. Since the lease term in the hypothetical is only one month, the
damages would be $5. Such a formula should be rejected, however, if the lessee actually
leases for the full eighteen months under the substitute lease. Otherwise, the lessee is not
1991)
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immediately to another dealer, without giving the original lessor an
opportunity to provide another product, may not be acting in a commercially
reasonable manner. But if the original lessor refused or failed to repair the
defective television, the lessee may be justified in seeking merchandise from
another dealer regardless of the original lessor's lower rate. If that substitute
lease ends up costing ninety dollars more over eighteen months, the lessee
did not receive the full benefit of the original bargain and should be allowed
to recover the additional expense from the defaulting lessor.
b. Lessor's Remedies for Lessee's Breach
When an RTO lessee breaches the lease by refusing to make periodic
rental payments or by failing to return the property, the dealer is concerned
with only two remedies, each of which will ordinarily be set forth in the
lease agreement. The lessor wants the right to repossess the property without
legal process and to assert a claim for unpaid rent for the period when the
lessee had possession of the goods. Article 2A confirms the right to
repossession and to damages for unpaid rent, even where the lease is
silent. 48 The lessor's repossession remedy contrasts with the corollary
Article 9 remedy for secured creditors, which may require disposition of
repossessed goods after notice to the debtor. 9 Except in circumstances not
relevant to RTO contracts, Article 2A does not require the lessor to dispose
of the goods or account to the debtor for any "surplus" after repossession.
Most of the other Article 2A provisions regarding lessor remedies
concern the lessor's duty to mitigate damages when seeking to accelerate
future rent as damages under a long term lease.' Since RTO contracts
expressly provide that the lessee is only liable for rent during periods of the
lessee's possession, these provisions will be superseded by the RTO
agreement. Article 2A does have relevance, however, in one additional
circumstance of lessee default. RTO contracts often provide that the lessee
made whole.
248 U.C.C. § 2A-525(2). The lessor may repossess without legal process if it can be
done without a breach of the peace. U.C.C. § 2A-525(3); cf. U.C.C. § 9-503 (similar
right for secured creditors). The lessor's action for unpaid rent is authorized in § 2A-529.
249 See U.C.C. § 9-504, which recognizes that a debtor may have equity in repossessed
collateral and may therefore be entitled to any surplus realized upon the resale, after the
secured party has deducted the outstanding debt and reasonable costs incurred by the
repossession and disposition. P
0 See U.C.C. § 2A-528 (action for present value of unpaid rent); § 2A-527 (right to
dispose of the goods and seek deficiency from lessee; lessor not accountable to lessee for
any profit made upon disposition); 2A-526 (right to stop delivery).
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is liable for the value of the property if it is lost, stolen or damaged while in
the lessee's possession. The contract may stipulate an original value of the
property and provide a depreciation formula to determine the value at
subsequent dates, or it may simply state that the lessee is liable for the fair
market value of the used property, which will be determined at the time of
the loss. 1 Section 2A-504 may assist the lessor by approving liquidated
damage formulas that meet a reasonableness test. The section provides that
a lease may include an amount or formula stipulating the damages of a
defaulting party, so long as it is "reasonable in light of the then anticipated
harm caused by the default or other act or omission."" Section 2A-504
also eliminates some of the limitations on liquidated damage clauses that
appear in section 2-718 governing sales agreements. Section 2A-504(1) does
not require, for example, that actual damages be difficult to quantify or that
it is somehow inconvenient to obtain an adequate remedy before the lessor
can invoke a damages formula in a lease.' This clarification grants lessors
latitude in crafting such clauses and furthers one purpose of the statute,
which is to "invite parties to liquidate damages." ' The "reasonableness"
of the provision will still be an issue for courts to decide, but RTO dealers
who in good faith seek to estimate the lost value of stolen or damaged
merchandise should see their formulas upheld.
3. Specific Consumer Protection Provisions
In addition to the limited consumer benefits provided by the general
provisions of Article 2A, the statute contains a handful of provisions that
apply only to consumer leases. The most important of these is the
2s See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2 at 77 (Appendix (C) to Statement of
Geraldine Azzata); id. at 135-37 (statement of J. Samuel Choate).
212 U.C.C. § 2A-504(1). The formula could conceivably include estimated lost profits
caused by the loss or destruction of the leased goods. See Atlas Truck Leasing, v. First
N.H. Banks, 808 F.2d 902, 904-05 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding damage award including
lessor's lost profits arising from breach of truck lease).
" With respect to the sale of goods, U.C.C. § 2-718 provides: "Damages for breach
by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is
reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy .... "
2-4 See U.C.C. § 2A-504, Official Comment.
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unconscionability provision of section 2A-108. 5 The section is modeled
after section 2-302 of the sales Article,"5 6 but goes further by creating two
special rules for consumer leases that may benefit RTO consumers. The first
allows a court to grant "appropriate relief' when a lessor has engaged in
unconscionable conduct inducing a consumer to enter into a lease or has
committed unconscionable acts in collection of a claim arising from a
consumer lease. 1 7 Unlike section 2-302, which consumers generally can
employ only defensively to render unconscionable contract terms
unenforceable,258 section 2A-108 leaves room for affirmative damage
awards for unconscionable inducement or collection activities. Unconsciona-
ble inducement might include a situation in which a lessor makes oral
promises to a lessee and then relies on an integration clause and the parol
evidence rule to avoid liability for those promises." The prohibition of
unconscionable collection activities can be even more important to RTO
consumers because it provides a remedy in an area where abuses have
occurred in the past.' ° While defining unconscionable collection tactics is
a difficult task,2"' courts can be expected to find guidance in the federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act' 2 and similar state laws' that often
I U.C.C. § 2A-108 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the lease contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease
contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct
or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from
a lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
256 Section 2A-108(1) is virtually identical to § 2-302(1). Likewise, § 2A-108(3) is
nearly the same as § 2-302(2). The remainder of § 2A-108, however, constitutes an
expansion of the Code's unconscionability doctrine.
U.C.C. § 2A-108(2), quoted supra note 255.
25 See Cowin Equip. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d 1581 (11th Cir. 1984);
Givens v. Rent-A-Center, 720 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
11 See Miller, supra note 228 at 966-67; U.C.C. §§ 2A-202, 2A-108, Official
Comment.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
261 U.C.C. § 2A-108, Official Comment, gives nonexclusive examples of using or
threatening to use force or violence in the collection of payments.
262 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f) (1982).
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enumerate certain activities deemed to be per se unlawful. Section 2A-108
thus gives consumers a potent weapon to obtain compensation for
unreasonable lessor conduct.
The second consumer benefit from section 2A-108, and for practical
purposes perhaps more vital to low-income consumers, is a provision
authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees when a consumer lessee prevails
on an unconscionability claim.26 This provision has no counterpart in
Article 2 and will be useful to representatives of RTO customers. The section
conforms with the trend in modern consumer protection legislation, which
recognizes that consumer rights often will not be asserted when the recovery
is small compared to the prospect of paying large legal bills. Potential for
abuse is high, however, so section 2A-108 provides that the lessor can
recover attorney's fees when a consumer's claim of unconscionability is not
successful, but only where the consumer "knew" the claim to be
groundless.6
The only other provision of Article 2A that might benefit RTO consumers
is section 2A-106, which limits the validity of contract provisions attempting
to choose the law or forum governing the transaction.26 6 Perceiving a
263 See, e.g., U.C.C.C. § 5.108(5) (1974); MINN. STAT. § 8.31 (1990) (attorney
general shall investigate unfair practices).
26 U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) provides:
(4) In an action in which the lessee claims unconscionability with respect to a
consumer lease:
(a) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the
court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the lessee.
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee claiming
unconscionability has brought or maintained an action he [or she]
knew to be groundless, the court shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to the party against whom the claim is made.
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of the recovery on
behalf of the claimant under subsections (1) and (2) is not
controlling.
265 "Knowledge" in the UCC means "actual knowledge." U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
266 U.C.C. § 2A-106 provides:
(1) If the law chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is that of a jurisdiction other
than a jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement
becomes enforceable or within 30 days thereafter or in which the goods are to be
used, the choice is not enforceable.
(2) If the judicial forum chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is a forum that
would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee, the choice is not
enforceable.
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danger that a lessor might induce a lessee to agree that the applicable law
will be a jurisdiction with little effective consumer protection, 6 7 the
drafters limited valid choice of law provisions to the jurisdiction where the
consumer lessee resides at the time the lease becomes enforceable, the
jurisdiction where the lessee will reside within thirty days thereafter, or the
law of the jurisdiction where the goods will be used. While this provision can
benefit consumer lessees, it may conflict with other laws. For example, the
Pennsylvania RIS act states that it applies to all RTO agreements made within
the Commonwealth,268 yet section 2A-106 would validate a contract
provision asserting that New Jersey law applies so long as the lessee is a
resident of New Jersey, or will be a resident of New Jersey within thirty
days thereafter. Section 2A-104 resolves this conflict by giving preference
to the consumer protection statute of the jurisdiction over the provisions of
Article 2A.9
Article 2A refers to consumer leases in a few other contexts, but the
provisions have little relevance to RTO lessees. Three of the provisions
address issues arising when a lessor seeks to accelerate future rent upon the
lessee's breach.27 They therefore will not affect the rights of the parties to
a terminable lease in which the lessee is only obligated to pay rent for
periods of property use. Two other provisions similarly concern potential
problems arising in a long term lease that have little significance to short
term rentals. They address the lessee's rights not to pay for the original value
of goods when they are damaged before delivery,2 ' or when the lessor
unreasonably delays in delivering a portion of the goods subject to the
contract.2' Neither of these problems is likely to arise in RTO transactions
because the lessee will seldom be liable to pay anything until conforming
goods are delivered. The RTO lessee has adequate remedies under the
267 U.C.C. § 2A-106, Official Comment. See Paragon Homes of Midwest v. Crace,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); U.C.C.C. § 1.201(8) (1974).
268 See 69 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (1989).
269 U.C.C. 2A-104(2): "In case of conflict between this Article... and a [consumer
protection statute of this State or final consumer protection decision of a court of this
State], the statute or decision controls."
270 See U.C.C. § 2A-109 (options to accelerate at will); § 2A-407(1) (special damages
rule for "finance leases" that are not consumer leases); § 2A-504(3) (limitation on
lessor's damages for unpaid rent when lessee defaults or becomes insolvent before
delivery of goods).
271 U.C.C. § 2A-221.
272 U.C.C. § 2A-406.
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contract-the lessee can demand conforming goods and need not make any
future payments until conforming goods are delivered.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS SPECIFICALLY
REGULATING RTO TRANSACTIONS
Allowing the RTO industry to continue operating under no meaningful
regulation, or with only the limited protections of Article 2A, as is the case
in most states,27 is not defensible. In some respects, this is a classic case
for government intervention. A long history of consumer confusion and
abuse is testimony to the inefficient operation of this unregulated market.
Evidence in reported decisions alone shows that consumers often have
entered into RTO contracts fundamentally unaware of the nature of the
transaction and their rights or obligations under it.2 74 The unique
vulnerability of this class of consumers, due perhaps to educational
deficiencies and substandard economic conditions, further justifies some
government protection. If ever there was a need to protect the average
consumer through the enactment of TILA and complementary state statutes,
surely a need is present here.
The trend in legislatures over the past few years has been to enact special
legislation directed at the RTO industry rather than to amend existing laws
to cover the transaction. Most of the legislation has been at the state level,
with occasional activity in Congress. The federal proposals, none of which
has resulted in an enactment, have sought to amend the Consumer Leasing
Act ("CLA")275 to mandate minimum disclosures in RTO contracts without
providing many substantive limits on the transaction in areas consumer
representatives deem most abusive.276 At the state level, the efforts have
been more productive. Twenty-three states have enacted laws regulating the
industry,277 insulating it from attack under other consumer credit laws,
effectively removing the transaction from usury limits, and providing varying
degrees of consumer protection. This section reviews the federal and state
efforts.
11 See infra note 303.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
275 15 U.S.C. § 1667 (1991).
276 See infra text accompanying note 300.
277 See infra note 303.
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A. The Limited Protection of the Federal CLA
Following recommendations of the Federal Reserve Board, the CLA was
enacted in 1976 to ensure adequate disclosure in consumer leases of personal
property. 78 Added to TILA as a new Chapter 5, the CLA responded to the
development of leasing as an alternative to purchasing consumer goods on
credit.2 79 The CLA covers many of the leases that do not fall within
TILA's definition of "credit sale," most importantly leases in which there is
no ownership option and those in which ownership vests upon the lessee's
payment of consideration deemed to be more than nominal.' Automobiles
are probably the most common type of leased property subject to the
CLA,28 but the act can also cover leases of home furnishings and
consumer appliances. Like TILA, the CLA is primarily a disclosure statute,
but rather than focusing on disclosure of finance charges and the applicable
interest rate, the CLA and its implementing Regulation M require lessors
to disclose basic information peculiar to leasing arrangements, such as the
total payment due at the inception of the lease, the term of the lease, the
monthly (or other periodic) rent, the total of payments, any penalties for
early termination of the lease, and the amount, or method of calculating, the
purchase option price if a purchase option is offered.'
The disclosures under the current CLA are not inappropriate for an RTO
transaction. In fact, the Board's suggested disclosure form for a furniture
lease is readily adaptable to an RTO contract.' Because the CLA imposes
278 Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 29 (statement of Nancy H. Teeters, FRB).
279 Id.
2 8 TILA covers leases in which the lessee "contracts to pay" for the value of the goods
and has an option to become the owner of the goods at the end of the lease upon the
payment of a nominal consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1991); 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(16) (1990); see supra text accompanying note 42.
28I See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 29, 30 (statement of Nancy H. Teeters,
FRB) (expectations of significant growth in automobile leasing industry).
282 12 C.F.R. § 213 (1990). The provisions of Regulation M were formerly part of
Regulation Z, but were segregated in 1980 and reissued under the current designation as
part of the effort to simplify TILA. See 46 Fed. Reg. 20, 949 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 80,
648, 80, 689 (1980). See generally, Cooluris & Wian, Consumer Leasing Developments,
39 Bus. LAw. 1163, 1167 (1984).
283 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(g) (1990). Regulation M enumerates 15 specific contract
disclosures. Id. § 213.4(g)(1)-(15) (1990).
284 See 12 C.F.R. § 213 (1990) (Appendix C-3, Model Furniture Lease Disclosures).
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civil penalties for noncompliance285 and contains some restrictions on
advertising, 6 however, the RTO industry has consistently maintained that
its leases are not covered by the act.' The industry's position has largely
succeeded because the CLA only covers contracts "in the form of a lease or
bailment for the use of personal property by a natural personfor a period of
time exceeding four months, and for a total contractual obligation not
exceeding $25,000."" The industry, of course, maintains that because its
leases do not create an obligation beyond one week or one month, they are
not agreements "for a period of time exceeding four months." Shortly after
the enactment of the CLA, unofficial staff opinions of the Board agreed,
stating that such a lease does not come within the act, even though it might
be renewed to extend beyond four months. 9 Early court decisions for the
most part concurred, upholding the "plain language" of the definition and not
challenging the staff interpretations.2 9 Two courts voiced dissent.29 1
Noting language in one unofficial staff opinion that the renewable lease
exemption did not apply if "employed by the lessor for the purpose of
circumvention or evasion of the statutory . . . requirements," 92 and
employing the maxim that as remedial legislation the CLA should be broadly
construed, these courts refused to dismiss CLA claims against RTO dealers
285 For breach of the lease disclosure requiriments, § 1667(d) imposes the same civil
liabilities as those imposed under the rest of TILA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982)
(actual damages or statutory damages).
286 15 U.S.C. § 1667c (1991); 12 C.F.R. § 213.5 (1990). Damages for failure to
comply with the advertising disclosure requirements, however, are limited to the lessee's
actual injury. 15 U.S.C. § 1667d(b) (1991).
287 See infra decisions cited in notes 290, 291 and 297.
288 15 U.S.C. § 1667(1) (1991).
289 See FRB Letter No. 1169, Cons. Cred. Guide (CCI-) 31,556 (March 28, 1977).
21 See Lemay v. Stroman's, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Dodson
v. Remco Enters., 504 F. Supp. 540, 542 (E.D. Va. 1980); Stewart v. Remco Enters.,
487 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D. Neb. 1980); Smith v. ABC Rental Sys., 491 F. Supp. 127,
129 (E.D. La. 1978), aff'd, 618 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Blackshear v.
S&S Television Rental, No. C-79-490 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 23, 1981); In re Turner, No.
3-78-1135D (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979).
291 Jones v. Action TV Rental, No. 79-1535 (E.D. Pa., June 30, 1980); Hooker v.
Sight & Sound of Mich., No. 79-10120 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 15, 1980).
292 FRB Letter No. 1169, Cons. Cred. Guide (CCII) 31,556 (March 28, 1977).
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and allowed plaintiffs to conduct discovery on whether the dealer actually
intended a sale and was attempting to circumvent the statute.29
The Board subsequently removed any uncertainty on the scope of the
CLA in 1982 when it issued official staff commentary to Regulation M to
replace the unofficial staff opinions. The official commentary reiterated the
Board's view that short term, renewable leases are not "consumer leases"
under the CLA and omitted any reference to circumvention.' Although
the language of the act is broad enough to justify a contrary finding,295 the
Board's resolution of the issue is a defensible interpretation. Congress
determined that the disclosure provisions and other protections of the CLA
are most important in relatively long-term leases.296 The Board could
reasonably conclude that when a lessee commits to a term of only one week
or one month at the outset of the agreement, there is a reduced likelihood of
the lease continuing for a long duration. Imposing the restrictions of the CLA
on every short term lease simply because the agreement might continue for
293 The quoted language from the staff opinion letter was subject to criticism. If a
statute defines the covered transaction in a way that permits avoidance by drafting the
contract in a certain manner, such "evasions" are arguably permitted, perhaps even
invited, by the law. No business can fairly be criticized for electing not to be governed
by a statute and drafting its agreements accordingly. The practice is not uncommon. See
Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 141 (statement of Robert McGregor, Furniture
Rental Ass'n of America) (35% of FRAA members have no leases of more than four
months, making a "conscious decision.., not to be covered" by the CLA).
294 See 12 C.F.R. § 213 (1990), FRB Official Staff Commentary, Comment 2(a)(6)-2:
To be a consumer lease, the initial term-of the lease must be more than 4 months. Thus,
a lease of personal property for 4 months, 3 months or on a month-to-month or week-
to-week basis (even though the lease actually extends beyond 4 months) is not a
consumer lease and is not subject to the disclosure requirements of the regulation. A
lease with a penalty for canceling during the first 4 months is considered to have a term
of more than 4 months. A month-to-month or week-to-week extension of a lease that
was originally for 4 months or less is not a consumer lease, even if the extension
actually lasts for more than 4 months. For example, a 3-month lease extended on a
month-to-month basis and terminated after I year does not require consumer lease
disclosures.
29 The statutory phrase, "for a period of time exceeding four months," can reasonably
be interpreted to encompass agreements that exceed four months following renewals. The
statute does not expressly state that the original term must be longer than four months,
only that the "lease" exist for that duration. 15 U.S.C. § 1667(1) (1982).
296 See S. Rep. No. 94-590, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 4, reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
ADMIN. NEWS 431, 434 (1976) ("Nor would [the CLA] apply to a shorter term
convenience-type lease arrangement where the lessee is not obligated at the outset to a
term of more than four months") (emphasis added).
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a longer period could prove unnecessary and wasteful in those circumstances
where the lessee terminates after a few weeks. Following the Board's
pronouncement, courts have held uniformly that RTO leases are not within
the CLA.?
Because the CLA deals exclusively with consumer leases, its existing
disclosure provisions are relevant to RTO customers, but the minimal
disclosures mandated by the act would not assist consumers with the most
troublesome aspects of an RTO transaction. 298 One exception is the
required advertising disclosure, which provides that any advertisement stating
the amount of any rental payment must also disclose the number, due dates
and total of rental payments under the lease, and a description of the option
price the lessee must pay to acquire ownership. 9 This would prevent an
RTO dealer, for example, from advertising a television for "five dollars first
week" without also conspicuously disclosing that to acquire ownership the
lessee must make subsequent weekly payments of twenty dollars per week for
seventy-two weeks totalling $1,440. The statute thus discourages the use of
"teaser" rates that lure customers to a store without revealing other important
features of the contract. Application of these restrictions to RTO contracts
surely would benefit consumers.
297 See In re Hanley, 105 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); Givens v. Rent-A-
Center, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 161, 162, (S.D. Ala. 1988); cf. In re Rent-a-Color, Inc.,
FTC Order No. 9163, Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 96,516 (Apr. 16, 1984) (where lease
obligated consumer to rent for 12 months, CLA applied).
298 See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 78 (Appendix D to testimony of
Geraldine Assata) (example of RTO lease giving CLA contract disclosures). The CLA
was enacted primarily to address problems arising from the growing popularity of
automobile leases, not leases of household items by low income consumers. See
CONSUMER FIANCIAL SERVICES POLICY SESSION 76 (FTC 1979). A comparison of the
disclosures mandated in 12 C.F.R. § 213.4 (1990) with the provisions discussed infra at
notes 307-63 demonstrates the value of regulation directed specifically at RTO
transactions.
299 15 U.S.C. § 1667c (1991); 12 C.F.R. § 213.5 (1990). The statements triggering
additional disclosure are: (1) the amount of any payment, (2) the number of required
payments, or (3) a statement that no down payment is required at the outset of the lease.
If any of these representations appear in an advertisement, then all of the following must
also be disclosed: (1) a statement that the transaction is a lease, (2) the amount of any
additional payment (such as a security deposit) due at the inception of the lease, (3) the
number, amounts, due dates, and total of payments under the lease, (4) a statement of
any purchase option, and the time and method of computing the option price, and (5) a
statement of the amount or method of computing any lessee liability at termination of the
lease. Id.
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Apart from the advertising disclosures, however, the current CLA does
not offer protection where the low income RTO consumer needs it most. It
does not address, for example, issues such as the high prices of RTO
contracts, limitations on extra fees charged by RTO dealers (e.g., charges for
late payments) that can substantially increase the cost of an RTO contract,
reinstatement rights for defaulting customers, or the timing of required
disclosures to increase their effectiveness. Moreover, proposed amendments
to the CLA, including one drafted by the Federal Reserve Board," would
have done little more than apply the current CLA disclosures and advertising
limitations to an RTO transaction, with relatively minor modifications to
tailor the disclosures to the legal relationship created by an RTO lease."'
State legislatures have been more responsive to the concerns of RTO
customers, and given the accelerating trend to enact RTO legislation in the
I The Consumer Lease and Rental Purchase Agreement Act, S. 1152, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. Rnc. S5402 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983). See also S.2181, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. RaC. S17031 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (similar to S.1152). The
bills would have comprehensively amended the entire CLA and would have added
separate RTO regulation. The effort was a culmination of FRB efforts to simplify the
CLA after Congress neglected the leasing provisions in the 1980 simplification of TILA.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 80, 648, 80, 689 (1980); Cooluris & Winn, supra note 282, at 1167.
The House subsequently introduced RTO legislation, H.R. 2537, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 28, 1987).
301 S.1152 would have required disclosure of the following information in RTO
contracts: (1) the number, timing amounts, and total of rental payments necessary to
acquire ownership, (2) a statement that the consumer will not own the property until the
end of the lease, (3) a statement that the total payment does not include late fees, pick-up
fees, or other charges, and that the consumer should read the contract to understand these
charges, (4) a statement that the consumer is responsible for the fair market value of the
property if it is lost, stolen, or damaged, and (5) a statement whether the property is new
or used. S.1152, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 114; see Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2,
at 14-15. H.R. 2537 would have imposed the same Senate disclosures plus disclosure of
(1) service and maintenance responsibilities of the parties, (2) a statement summarizing
terms of the consumer's option to purchase, (3) any applicable manufacturer's warranty,
(4) cash price of the goods, (5) a description of any security interest retained by the
lessor, (6) a statement that the consumers may terminate at any time without penalty, and
(7) a description of any insurance provided by the lessor and its cost. H.R. 2537, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 114, 116(b)(2) (May 28, 1987). The bill also contained price tag
disclosures, id. § 115, and required disclosure of a consumer's reinstatement rights, id.
§ 116(b)(3). See also H.R. 5636, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 114, 115, 116 (Oct. 2, 1986)
(similar to H.R. 2537).
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states, the likelihood of effective federal legislation being enacted seems
remote.'
B. State Legislation as a Regulatory Solution
RTO legislation enacted in twenty-nine states3 over the past five years
has followed an atypical pattern. In a reversal of their customary roles,
industry has been pressing for regulatory legislation, and consumer
representatives have been opposing."' The resulting compromise
31 The RTO industry continues to press for a federal bill to preclude a "patchwork"
of state regulation and inconsistent court decisions in various jurisdictions. See Senate
RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 116 (statement of J. Samuel Choate, Jr.); RTO Network
News, Vol. 2, No. 6, p. 1 (June 1990) (House had scheduled hearing on RTO legislation
set for June 26, 1990; hearing postponed).
303 ALA. CODE §§ 8-25-1 to 8-25-6 (1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-92-101 to 4-92-107
(1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-10-101 to 5-10-1001 (1990); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162
(Reg. Sess.) §§ 1 to 18; DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 6, §§ 7601 to 7616 (1991); FLA. STAT.
§§ 559.9231-559.9241 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-680 to 10-1-689 (1991); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1211/, paras. 1801-1805 (1989); IND. CODE §§ 24-7-1-1 to 24-7-9-7
(1990); IOWA CODE §§ 537.3601 to .3624 (1989); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336 §§ 1-12;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.976 to .985 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); 1991 La. Acts
204, §§ 3351-3362; MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 12-1101 to 12-1112 (1990); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 90-94 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. §§
445.951-445.970 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. §§ 325 F.84 to 325 F.98 (1991); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 407.660 to .665 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-2101 to 69-2115 (1989); 1991
Nev. Stat. 196, §§ 1-12; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §§ 500-507 (McKinney 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1351.01-1351.09 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 1950-
1957 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 6-44-1 to 6-44-10 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-
701 to 37-2-714 (Law. Co-op 1991); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. §§ 54-6A-1 to 54-6A-
10; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-601 to 47-18-614 (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 35.71-35.74 (Vernon 1991); and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.17 to 59.1-
207.27 (1991).
304 Historically, the typical pattern for enacting consumer legislation has been first,
public disclosure of circumstances considered harmful to consumers; second, proposed
legislation to remedy the perceived abuses; third, opposition by business interests. See
Feldman, supra note 1, at 16. Business interests often prevail in these confrontations, in
large part because industry trade organizations generally have greater financial resources,
better organized political action groups, and more powerful lobbyists. Id. at 30. This has
been particularly true in RTO legislative efforts. See Winn, State Rent-To-Own Statutes
Revisited, PRoGREssivE RENTALS, June/July 1987, at 30, 37 (through mid-1987, RTO
industry spent over $350,000 promoting federal legislation; state legislative efforts cost
between $25,000 and $40,000 each, not including campaign contributions by individual
dealers to legislators running for office).
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enactments generally insulate RTO transactions from attack under usury
laws' 5 and other credit-related statutes but contain a variety of substantive
limits on the RTO transaction and some combination of over thirty required
contract disclosures. Overall, the laws are a positive development for
consumers' because they purport to address the issues most likely to be
important to RTO customers, but the laws contain serious flaws. This section
examines the more significant aspects of these statutes.
1. Price Controls
Perhaps the most pressing issue facing legislatures is whether the high
price of RTO contracts should be limited. Consumer advocates who see low-
income families spending a large part of their monthly budgets on RTO
products urge price controls as a substitute for usury limits, but have
succeeded in only four states. 7 Those successes are largely illusory,
however, because in each state the law limits the total RTO price to
approximately twice the disclosed "cash price." 8 If there were a limit on
cash prices, this approach might be effective. But the statutes do not control
305 RTO dealers believe that the most important aspect of RTO legislation is the
statutory recognition of RTO contracts as transactions distinct from credit sales. Dealers
have, for the most part, adjusted to any substantive restrictions imposed by the laws and
view the "safe harbor" of regulation as a key factor in the industry's growth. See Winn,
supra note 304, at 44; Winn, Rent-To-Own Statutes: A Comparison and Analysis,
PROGREsSIvE RENTALS, Feb. 1986, at 20.
101 Many consumer representatives would disagree. They view RTO legislation as
merely legitimizing an industry that exploits the poor. See Winn, Rent-To-Own Statutes:
16 States and Counting, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, June/July 1988, at 28.
1o 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 9; IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3608 (West
1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.954 (West 1989); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 503
(McKinney 1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.06 (Anderson 1990). The Minnesota
RTO law does not regulate prices directly but authorizes the Commissioner of Commerce
to adopt rules imposing price limits. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 325 F.91(2) (West 1991).
308 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 9(b) (50% of total lease payments cannot
exceed cash price); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3608(2) (West 1991) (50% of total lease
payments cannot exceed cash price); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.954(2) (West
1989) (if 45% of payments made equals the cash price, the lessee owns property); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 503 (McKinney 1991) (50% of total payments cannot exceed cash
price; if 50% of the payments exceed the cash price, the consumer owns goods); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.06 (Anderson 1990) (as soon as 50% of lease payments equals
the cash price, the lessee owns property).
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cash prices,' and because RTO dealers generally target lower-income
consumers and seldom compete in the market for cash sales, there are no
effective market controls. An RTO dealer can disclose a cash price at
virtually whatever level it chooses, subject only to the generous limits of
unconscionability-10
Assuming that price limitations are desirable in theory,31' effective
controls would be difficult to achieve in practice because the RTO industry
leases a wide variety of differentiated products. With fungible products like
corn, heating oil, and gasoline, the government could conceivably set and
monitor price controls by fixing a uniform retail or wholesale price per
bushel, barrel, or gallon. In contrast, it would be virtually impossible to set
a price for every type of television, stereo, washer, dryer, or item of
furniture available to an RTO dealer. One alternative to specific product
controls would be to limit the dealer mark-up from a benchmark amount such
as dealer cost or manufacturer's suggested retail price (e.g., limit total RTO
prices to twice dealer cost). Such benchmarks are less manipulative than cash
prices and thus could be more effective, but they create other problems.
Purchasers of new automobiles realize that a dealer's "cost" for a product is
not easily determined or verified. Discounts, rebates, and buy-back
arrangements offered by manufacturers can obscure the true cost of an item
to the retailer.312 The problem is compounded by the difficulty of tracing
a dealer's cost for a shipment of goods to a particular item offered for rent
to the public. Once the goods are warehoused or displayed, matching prices
of specific products with purchase order prices would be a cumbersome task.
Manufacturer's suggested retail price might be a more easily verified
benchmark for a particular product, but manufacturers do not suggest selling
prices for all products, and when prices are suggested they can be rather
arbitrary and do not necessarily reflect market conditions." In addition,
while not directly manipulative by RTO dealers, rates could be indirectly
"I The laws typically define cash price as "the price at which a lessor in the ordinary
course of business would offer the property that is the subject of a lease-purchase
agreement to the lessee for cash on the date of the lease-purchaseagreement .... " OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.01(B) (Anderson 1990).
3 0 See supra note 138.
311 See generally Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1090 (1971).
3'2 This practice is most common in the sale of automobiles, where dealers often cite
their "cost" during negotiations on a final sale price. See L. SACHS, HOW TO BuY YOUR
NEW CAR FOR A RocK-BoTToM PRICE 101-02 (1987). If "cost" became statutorily
related to price in RTO contracts, similar practices could be expected.
313 Id. at 103.
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controlled by dealers preferring to do business with manufacturers offering
the most generous suggested prices. Since the manufacturer's suggested retail
price has no necessary relationship to the wholesale price, manufacturers
would have little economic incentive to suggest low retail prices.
Even if a suitable benchmark could be found, a more fundamental
question is whether price limits are advisable. While RTO prices are
unquestionably high, there is no evidence that profits are unreasonable or that
monopoly power (or collusion) inhibits price competition among RTO
dealers.314 Prices presumably are high because the cost of providing
merchandise under an RTO plan to this class of consumers is also high"
Effective price controls would probably serve, like interest rate ceilings in
general, only to exclude some super-high risk consumers from the RTO
market. If a legislature is already prepared to find, however, that RTO
leasing is a tolerable alternative for high risk consumers, it would seem
inconsistent to impose a pricing restriction that excludes some consumers.
Moreover, even if base rental prices are effectively limited, their benefit can
be undermined by a dealer adding extra fees for incidental services to
increase overall income. For those concerned with the high price of RTO
products, a better approach may be to permit the market to set base prices,
impose rules that ensure timely and adequate disclosure of those prices, and
then limit some of the more common add-on charges, discussed below, that
can substantially increase the ultimate cost of an RTO contract well beyond
the price indicated by the base rate.
2. Limits on Other Charges
RTO contracts often authorize the dealer to assess miscellaneous charges
that can significantly increase the cost to the consumer. These include fees
for contract processing, late payments, reinstatement of the contract after
default, home collection of payments, delivery of the goods, termination of
the contract, security deposits, and personal property insurance. In some
instances these charges can be the most offensive aspects of RTO contracts
because even an astute customer who has read the contract may find it
difficult to predict their cumulative effect. In unregulated states, and even in
314 RTO dealers maintain that profits average only five to eight percent of revenues.
See Senate RTO Hearing, supra note 2, at 133; PROGRESSiVE RENTALs, June/July 1987,
at 43.
31s See supra note 1.
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some states where RTO bills recently have been enacted, these charges can
add over a hundred dollars to the total price.316
While add-on fees are purportedly imposed to recover costs otherwise
borne by the dealer, separate assessments for several types of fees, even if
conspicuously disclosed in the contract, may not be warranted. Fees added
to the base price can be justified only if they serve to recoup costs resulting
from some action or request by a customer beyond what is contemplated by
the basic transaction. The traditional justification for allowing a fee for late
payments, for example, is that delays in payment increase the creditor's cost
of doing business and the increased cost should be borne by those who cause
it, rather than shared by all customers (including punctual payors) through
a general increase in the base price. Conversely, allowing additional fees for
costs common to all or nearly all transactions can only surprise and mislead
customers about the true price of the transaction.
Processing fees. Processing fees, which are permitted under at least
twenty-eight RTO statutes,317 are nothing more than extra charges assessed
316 For example, in South Carolina, where the RTO statute authorizes specific levels
of several types of fees, an RTO customer who leases a television under a 78-week
contract, and who makes 15 late payments, could easily end up paying $106 more than
the total rent called for in the contract: $30 in late payment fees ($2 per late payment);
$56 in home collection fees (assuming only 8 home collections-18 is the maximum
allowed); $5 processing fee; and $15 delivery charge. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-705, -
706 (Law. Co-op 1991). This would not include any reinstatement fees or redelivery fees
that could be assessed if the consumer defaulted and later reinstated the contract, see id.
§ 37-2-714, nor would it include any property insurance required by the lessor as a
condition to consummating the transaction.
317 ALA. CODE § 8-25-2(d)(3) (1990) (must explain other charges for which lessee may
be liable; does not expressly forbid processing fees); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b)(4)
(1989) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601 (1990) (no more than $10 per contract but
not in addition to a delivery charge); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) (cannot
exceed $10); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 7603(a)(6)(1991) (must disclose total of initial
payments; also does not expressly forbid processing fees); FLA. STAT. §
559.9233(4)(d),(f) (1990) (must disclose any initial payment including any advance
payment, delivery charge, or any trade-in allowance to be paid by the lessee at or before
completion of the agreement; must disclose all other charges not included in rental
payments); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-682(a)(2),(4) (1991) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 h, para. 1802(g)(4), (e)(1) (1989) (must disclose amount and purpose of any fee or
charge not included in periodic payment; a charge in addition to periodic payments must
reasonably relate to the service performed); IND. CODE §§ 24-7-5-1, 24-7-5-3(B) (1990)
($10 charge both processing and delivery fee); IOWA CODE § 537.3612(2) (1989) (cannot
exceed $10; if delivery charges are applied, then no processing fee is allowed); 1991
Kan. Sess. Laws 336 § 5(7) (must disclose total initial payments); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 367.977 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (must disclose initial payments required to be
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for entering into the RTO transaction. While there are costs involved in
processing customer orders, the costs are more or less uniform among
customers and should be incorporated into the RTO pricing structure and not
tacked on at the inception of the contract. Customers who rely upon
advertised monthly payments or price tag disclosures in making purchasing
decisions can be surprised to find a processing fee added to their bill.
Late fees. All twenty-three RTO statutes allow the collection of fees for
late periodic payments. Most states place limits on the amount of such fees,
typically four or five dollars per late payment. 18 The fees can accumulate
paid before consummation of the agreement; must disclose the total of all initial and
periodic payments and other charges to acquire ownership; does not forbid processing
fees); 1991 La. Acts 204 § 3355(b) (must disclose all payments required at or before
consummation or agreement); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1104(a)(5) (1990)
(disclosure of initial payments required to be made); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, §
91(b),(d) (Law. Co-op 1991) (must disclose the amount of any payment required by
lessee at or, before the execution of the lease); MINN. STAT. § 325F.86(d) (1990)
(disclosure of any initial or advance payment); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.662(6) (1990)
(must disclose amount and purpose of any payment, charge, or fee in addition to the
regular periodic payments; does not expressly forbid processing fees); 1991 Nev. Stat.
196 § 4(g) (must disclose total payments required to be paid before consummation of
agreement); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(5)(1), (7)(e) (McKinney 1991) (must disclose
amount and purpose of any fee or charge not included in periodic payment; a charge in
addition to periodic payments must be reasonably related to the service performed); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 69-2110(1), (2) (1989) (no more than $10; if contract has delivery charge,
cannot have initial fee); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(c)(8) (1990) (initial fee cannot
exceed $10); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-3(b) (1990) (must disclose the amount of any
payment required by lessee at or before the execution of the lease); S.C. CODE ANN. §
37-2-706(1) (Law. Co-op 1990) (initial fee not to exceed $5); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 54-6A-5(7) (must disclose total payments required before consummation of agreement);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-601(a)(9) (1990) (must disclose initial payments required to
be paid before consummation of the agreement or delivery of the property, whichever is
later); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(g)(4) (Vernon 1991) (must disclose
amount and purpose of any fee or charge not included in periodic payment; does not
forbid processing fee); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.21(A)(7) (1991) (must disclose total
of initial payments required to be paid before consummation of the agreement or delivery
of the property, whichever is later).
Only Michigan expressly prohibits processing fees. See MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.957(d) (West 1989).
"I ALA. CODE § 8-25-4 (1990) (does not specifically mention or limit); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 4-92-106(b) (1990) (does not limit); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601(4)(a) (1990)
(if monthly payment, $5 maximum; if weekly or bi-weekly payment, $3); 1991 Conn.
Acts 91-162 (Reg Sess.) § 4(3) (5% of payment or $5; $1 minimum); DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 6, § 7608(4) (10% of payment or $3). FLA. STAT. § 559.9237 (1990) (cannot exceed
$5); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-685(e) (no express fee allowed but does allow reinstatement
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to large sums, however, over a contract calling for seventy-eight weekly
payments by a person with uncertain income. 19 Late fees are justified
because late payments cost dealers money and, if the fees are not allowed,
all customers would pay higher prices, which would be unfair to those who
timely make their payments. Late fees are only justified, however, to the
extent that they cover the added cost created by the delay in receiving
payment.' The cost has two components. The first is the opportunity cost
fee); ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 1211h, § 1802(c)(5) (1989) (cannot exceed $5); IND. CODE §
24-7-5-5(a)(1) (1990) (if monthly payment, cannot exceed $5; weekly payment, $3);
IOWA CODE § 537.3612(3)(4)(a) (1989) (not more than $5; home collection charge in lieu
of delinquency charge); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336 § 7(3) (allows late fee upon payment);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.977(1)(e) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (must disclose the
amount and purpose of any payment, charge, or fee in addition to the regular periodic
payments; does not expressly forbid late fee); 1991 La. Acts 204 § 3357(A)(3) (allows
for fee upon reinstatement); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 91(j) (Law. Co-op 1991) (must
disclose amount and method for determining); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-
1104(a)(13) (1990) (must disclose any other charges; does not expressly forbid late fees);
cf.; MINN. STAT. § 325 F.91(1)(4) (1990) (charge shall not exceed the greater of 5% of
payment or $3); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.662(2)(5) (1991) (cannot exceed $5 per default);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-2110(3)(a), (b) (1989) ($5 monthly payments; $3 weekly); 1991
Nev. Stat. 196 § 8(1)(c) (allows late fee upon reinstatement); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §
501(3)(e) (McKinney 1991) (not more than the greater of 10% of the payment or $5
monthly, $3 weekly); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.02(A)(6) (Anderson 1990) (must
disclose late fees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(c)(5) (1990) (cannot charge late fee in
excess of $5 when added to the reinstatement fee; $3 if weekly payments); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-44-5(b) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN., § 54-6A-7(3)(1991) (allows late
fee upon reinstatement); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-18-607(a)(2)(A) (1990) (allows late fee
upon reinstatement); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(c)(5) (Vernon 1990) (fee
cannot exceed 5% of payment or $5, and not less than $2); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
207.21(A)(8) (1990) (allows late fees); cf MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.970,
445.953(1)(d), 445.958 (West 1989) (must disclose the amount of all other charges,
individually itemized which are not included in periodic payment; § 445.970 sample form
indicates late fees not allowed; reinstatement fee may be charged in lieu of late fee).
319 Cf 16 C.F.R. § 444.4 (1991) (FTC Rule prohibiting "pyramiding" of late charges
when subsequent delinquencies are attributable to an unpaid late fee on earlier
installment).
320 Late fees have historically been upheld by courts as penalties designed to encourage
prompt payment, rather than hidden interest charges. See Comilla Cotton Oil Co. v.
Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 257 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1958); Bunn v. Weyerhauser Co., 268
Ark. 445, 598 S.W.2d 54 (1980); Barbour v. Handlos Real Estate & Bldg. Corp., 393
N.W.2d 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). With low income consumers, however, late
payment may not be a voluntary decision, or matter of neglect, as much as an economic
necessity. See Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Mass. 1980). Caution should
therefore be exercised in regulating late fees in RTO contracts; the likelihood of late
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of money that should be in the dealer's pocket but is delayed. Over a long
term or for large amounts, the loss can be high, but the cost to the dealer of
a twenty dollar payment being a few days late, in terms of perhaps lost
interest in a bank account, is negligible. The other, and more substantial
component, is the added collection expenses that may result from late
payments. Phone calls, visits to residences and legal recourse all take
time and money, and only those who cause them should be expected to pay.
But these expenses are not likely to be incurred until payment is at least a
few days late. An RTO statute thus could reasonably allow collection of late
fees but only if a grace period, roughly equivalent to the time when
significant collection efforts begin, is mandated. The imposition of late fees
without any grace period, which more than half of the RTO statutes permit,
can generate a windfall for the dealer.'m
Reinstatement fees. Reinstatement is a concept perhaps unique to RTO
transactions. An RTO lessee can terminate the contract at any time, but he
may, at a later time when disposable income allows, wish to begin renting
the same or similar property again and receive "credit" for prior rentals
toward ownership. Both lessee and lessor benefit from this opportunity
because the lessee can more easily obtain ownership upon resuming payments
and the lessor is less likely to lose the customer to another dealer.
Consequently, even before RTO statutes began mandating reinstatement
rights for RTO customers, many dealers offered them but charged a fee for
reinstating the agreement. 23 All RTO statutes mandate reinstatement
payment is high over a long weekly or bi-weekly contract.
321 See K. BROWN & K. KEEST, supra note 23, at § 5.2.4.2.
" Grace periods for late payments are required in COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601(4)(a)
(1990) (5 days on monthly contracts; 3 days, weekly); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg.
Sess.) § 4(3) (5 days on monthly contracts; 3 days weekly); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, §
7608(4) (1991) (2 business days); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211h, para. 1802(c)(5) (1990)
(3 days); IND. CODE § 24-7-5-5(a)(1) (1990) (5 days, monthly; 3 days, weekly); IOWA
CODE § 537.3612(4)(a), (b) (1991) (5 days, monthly; 3 days, weekly); MINN. STAT. §
325F.91(1)(4) (1990) (3 days, monthly; 2 days, weekly); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-
2110(3)(a), (b) (1989) (5 days monthly, 3 days weekly); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §
501(3)(e) (McKinney 1991) (3 days, weekly; seven days, monthly); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1351.05(D) (Anderson 1990) (2 days, weekly; 5 days, monthly); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-2-705 (Law. Co-op 1991) (5 days, monthly; 3 days, weekly); S.D. CODIFMD
LAWS ANN., § 54-6A-7(3) (1991) (5 days monthly; 3 days weekly); TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(c)(5) (Vernon 1991) (7 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
207.23 (1990) (5 days, monthly; 2 days, if more frequent).
" See Hawkes Television v. Bureau of Consumer Protection, No. CV 82-686, slip op.
at 4 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983).
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rights,324 but only nine allow imposition of a separate reinstatement
fee.' z The majority view is the more defensible. A reinstatement fee is
similar to an initial processing fee in that it is intended to cover the cost of
starting (or restarting) the transaction. It differs from a processing fee,
however, because the expense is not caused by all customers but only those
who first terminate an agreement and later renew. Nevertheless, a
reinstatement fee is difficult to justify in most circumstances. Processing the
reinstatement order is not likely to involve substantial additional work
because the customer's application, original order, and account will be a
matter of record, perhaps on a computer, and the process may require little
more than a new entry and redelivery of the property. If a redelivery fee is
allowed, as is the case in most states, 326 a separate fee for reinstatement
largely duplicates reimbursement for any added expense to the dealer. More
importantly, the likelihood of reinstatement for low-income RTO customers,
whose income and expenses may be unpredictable over a seventy-eight week
contract, is rather high. Since reinstatement is generally good for all
concerned, sound policy would recommend removing barriers to the process.
Imposing a fee may discourage reinstatement, penalize the customer for
taking an action that benefits not only himself but also the dealer, and may
increase the dealer's income beyond any additional costs.
Home collection fees. Although RTO contracts typically require
payments to be made at the dealer's store weekly or monthly in advance of
the next rental period, irregular streams of income and lack of transportation
contribute to a high rate of delinquency. Not surprisingly, a common practice
among RTO dealers to encourage prompt payments is to collect overdue rent
at the customer's home and charge a fee for each trip. No RTO statute
... See infra note 341.
11 In many RTO statutes, reinstatement fees are treated as equivalent to late fees
because each time a payment is late the agreement is deemed "terminated" and late
payments serve to "reinstate" the terminated agreement. See statutes cited supra note
318. In nine states a separate charge for reinstatement appears to be authorized even if
late fees have already been assessed. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-10-602 (1990) ($5
limit); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 7(b) ($5 limit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 7607(b) ($5 limit); IoWA CODE ANN. § 537.3613 (West 1991) ($5 limit); IND. CODE
§ 24-7-5-6 (1990) ($5 limit); MiNN. STAT. § 325 F.90(2) (1990) ($5 limit); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1351.05(B) (Anderson 1990) ($5 limit); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 6-44-5(b)
(1990) ($5 limit).
326 See infra note 329. Of the seven states permitting separate reinstatement fees, only
Colorado appears to prohibit redelivery charges. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601(2) (1990)
(authorizing initial delivery fee; silent on redelivery fees).
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prohibits collection of such fees. 3' Like late payment fees, home collection
fees can be viewed as an expense that should be paid by those who cause the
problem. Several factors, however, may counsel against allowing the charge.
First, since a trip to a customer's residence is part of the collection process
for late payments, and indeed may be the principal expense resulting from
a late payment, the expense should probably be subsumed in the late fee
3Z7 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601(3) (1990) ($10 maximum in lieu of late fees;
may not be assessed more than three times in a six-month period if monthly payments;
six times in six months if weekly or bi-weekly); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.)
§ 4(2) (cannot charge unless express agreement; cannot exceed $5; may not be assessed
more than three times in six months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7603(a)(1) (1991) (must
disclose all changes in contract; statute doe not prohibit fee); FLA. STAT. § 559.9234(6)
(1990) (cannot chargeunless express agreementand disclosure); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
685(c) (1991) (prohibits fee unless expressly agreed to and amount disclosed); IND. CODE
§ 24-7-5-4 (1990) ($10 or as adjusted under § 24-7-7-4); IoWA CODE § 537.3612(3)
(1989) ($7 maximum; home collection charge in lieu of delinquency charge); 1991 Kan.
Sess. Laws 336, § 5(a)(1) (must disclose all charges; fee not prohibited); MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1111 (1990) (form agreement 5 appears to authorize fee; statute
otherwise silent); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.957(e) (West 1989) (prohibits fee
unless express agreement and disclosure); MINN. STAT. § 325F.91(3) (1990) (for
payments more frequent than monthly, fee may be assessed no more than three times in
three-month period; if at least monthly, no more than three times in six months; charge
cannot exceed $7; in lieu of late charge for the period); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2104(e)
(1989) (required disclosure of all charges in contract; statute does not prohibit the fee);
1991 Nev. Stat. 196 § 4(1) (must disclose all fees; fee not prohibited); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1351.04(E) (Anderson 1990) (cannot charge unless disclosed and expressly
agreed); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(c)(9) (1990) (cannot exceed $10; no more than
three charges in six months if monthly; or six in six months if more often); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-2-706(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (no more than $7; may not be assessed more
than three times in six-month period if payments are monthly or less frequent; six times
in six months if more frequent than monthly); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-604(a)(5)
(1990) (must include statement that the total payments does not include other charges;
does not prohibit home collection fee); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.21(A)(8) (1990)
(same). Eleven states have laws similar to Tennessee's. See also ALA. CODE § 8-25-
2(d)(3) (1990) (same as Tenn.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b)(4) (1990); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1211h, para. 1802(g)(4) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.977(2)(1)(e)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991);1991 La. Acts 204, § 3355(7); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93,
§ 91(d) (Law. Co-op 1991) (same); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.662(3)(6) (1990); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(7)(e) (McKinney 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-3(d) (1990);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-6A-5(8) (1991); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
35.72(g)(4) (Vernon 1991).
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charge. 2 Second, allowing a separate home collection fee (up to ten
dollars per trip in some states) can substantially increase the RTO cost
largely at the discretion of the dealer. When a payment is late, the dealer has
several available collection options. Some customer's homes may be visited
(perhaps those which are conveniently located), while others will merely
receive phone calls or letters. Third, and perhaps most importantly, allowing
the fee may encourage personal contact between collectors and consumers,
which can lead to confrontation and perhaps intimidation. Legislators should
strive to minimize these opportunities, or at least not provide an incentive.
Delivery/redelivery fees. Every RTO statute allows a charge for
delivering the leased property to the customer's home. 29 The justification
328 Several statutes do provide that either late fees or home collection fees can be
assessed, but not both. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-10-601(3) (1990); IoWA CODE §
537.3612(3) (1989); MINN. STAT. § 325F.91(3) (1990).
... In several states, a delivery fee or initial processing fee may be charged, but not
both. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-10-601(2) (1990) (not to exceed $15 for five or fewer
items or $45 if more than five; delivery fee in lieu of initial processing fee); 1991 Conn.
Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 2(a)(3) (must disclose all initial payments, including delivery
fees); DE. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7603(a)(6) (1991) (must disclose all payments due at
delivery or consummation of contract); FLA. STAT. § 559.9233(4)() (1990) (must
disclose all other charges not included in the rental payments; does not prohibit delivery
fees); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-686 (1991); IND. CODE § 24-7-5-3(a), (b) (1990) (allows
reasonable fee; in lieu of processing charge); IOWA CODE § 537.3612(2) (1989) (delivery
charge not to exceed $10; $25 for more than five items; in lieu of initial charge); 1991
Kan. Sess. Laws 336, § 5(a)(7) (must disclose all payments due at delivery or
consummation of contract); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.977(1)(e) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1991) (must disclose all initial payments to be paid before delivery or
consummation whichever is later; must disclose other charges not included in the rental
payments); 1991 La. Acts 204, § 3355(6), (7) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
445.958(2) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. § 325F.90(2) (1990) (may not charge delivery
charge greater than $15 for five items or less; $30 for more than five items); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 407.662(3)(6) (1990) (must disclose amount and purpose of other charges for
which lessee may be liable; does not prohibit delivery fees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-
2110(2) (1989) (not more than $10; $25 for more than five items; in lieu of initial fee);
1991 Nev. Stat. 196 § 4(1)(G) (must disclose all payments due at delivery or
consummation of contract); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.02(2) (Anderson 1990) (must
disclose any initial payment including any delivery charge); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §
1954(C)(6) (1990) (cannot exceed $15 within 15 miles or $30 if more than 15 miles; if
more than five items, cannot exceed $45 regardless of distance); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
2-706(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (not to exceed $15 or $45 for more than 5 items; in lieu
of initial charge); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-607(a)(2)(A) (1990); see also ALA. CODE
§ 8-25-2(d)(3) (1990) (must disclose other charges for which lessee may be liable); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b)(4) (1990) (same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, para.
1804(g)(4) (1989) (same); MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 12-1104(a)(5),(13) (1990)
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for allowing delivery charges depends, to a large extent, on whether delivery
is a real option that can be readily declined by the consumer. If the contract
or business practice requires delivery or if, due to the size of the product or
the complexity of installation, nearly all RTO customers receive delivery
rather than take the product home from the store, the cost of the initial
delivery is virtually indistinguishable from other general business expenses
and should be incorporated into the base price."2 If consumers have a real
option to decline delivery, and that option is adequately disclosed, a
reasonable charge to cover the additional expense should be allowed. The
justification for redelivery fees on reinstated contracts is slightly stronger.
Redelivery expenses are not common to all customers and should not be
shared by all through increased rental prices. Customers who reinstate
agreements cause multiple deliveries and cost the dealer more than those who
continue leasing uninterrupted. Unless a separate reinstatement fee is also
being assessed, these consumers should pay a reasonable fee to cover this
added expense.331
(must disclose any initial payments to be made at or before consummation, and any other
charges not included in rental payments; § 12-111 example form shows delivery charge);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 91(b), (d) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (must disclose any payment
required at or before the execution of the lease; must disclose the amount of other
charges not included in the payment); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 501(7)(e) (McKinney
1991) (must disclose amount and purpose of other charges for which lessee may be
liable); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-3(d) (1990) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-
6A-5(7) (must disclose all payments due at delivery or consummation of contract); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(g)(4) (Vernon 1991) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
207.21(A)(7), (8) (1990) (same).
330 Dealers, of course, would like to collect the delivery fee at the outset of the contract
(when the costs are incurred) rather than spreading the fee out among installment
payments and collecting it over time. So long as the delivery fee is included in the
disclosed total RTO price, the dealer should be permitted to collect a larger initial
payment to cover the delivery expense. The problem to be remedied here is one of
surprise, e.g., when the RTO price tag says $500 at $25 per month, but the consumer
later learns that the price is really $530, with $55 due at the outset to cover the first
month rental plus delivery charges.
331' Redelivery fees appear to be allowed in all states except, perhaps, Colorado and
Oklahoma. See 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 7(b) (allows redelivery charge
upon reinstatement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7607(b) (1991) (reasonable redelivery
fees permitted); FLA. STAT. § 559.9235(2) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-686 (1991)
(allows redelivery charges not to exceed delivery charge); IND. CODE § 24-7-6-2 (1990)
(redelivery charge can be equal to delivery charge); IOWA CODE § 537.3616(2) (1989)
(redelivery charge equal to delivery charge); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336, § 7(a)(2)
(reasonable redelivery fees permitted); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.980(1)(b)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (reasonable costs of redelivery upon reinstatement); 1991
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Termination or pick-up fees. Only fourteen RTO statutes prohibit a
dealer from charging a fee when a customer terminates a lease and causes the
dealer to pick up the leased property. 32 The justification for this fee is to
compensate for the time and effort expended by the dealer retrieving goods
and preparing them for possible re-rental to someone else. At first glance,
it may seem fair to charge a fee to customers who generate these extra costs.
Incorporating the costs into the general pricing structure would result in some
RTO customers (those who rent to the end of the contract) to subsidize those
who rent for shorter periods. Nevertheless, the charge seems unwarranted in
contracts that expressly allow the customer to terminate without penalty. In
light of evidence that up to eighty percent of RTO customers terminate the
agreement at some point,333 termination is an eminently foreseeable event
LA. Acrs 204, § 3357 (A)(2) (same); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1106(a)(2)
(1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.958(2) (West 1989) (redelivery charge cannot
exceed delivery charge); MINN. STAT. § 325F.90(2) (West 1990) (redelivery charge not
to exceed $15 for five items or $30 for more than five items); Mo. REv. STAT. §
407.664(2) (1990) (allows redelivery charges on reinstatement); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-
2108(2)(a) (1989) (same); 1991 Nev. Stat. 196, § 8(1)(B) (reasonable redelivery fees
permitted); OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 1351.05(B) (Anderson 1990) (same); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-44-5(b) (1990) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-714(2) (Law. Co-op. 1989)
(redelivery equal to delivery charge); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 54-6A-7(2)
(reasonable redelivery fees permitted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-607(a)(2) (1990)
(reasonable delivery and redelivery fees); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.23(A) (1990)
(allows redelivery charges on reinstatement); see also ALA. CODE § 8-25-2(d)(3) (1990)
(must disclose other charges for which lessee may be liable; does not prohibit redelivery
fees); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b)(4) (1990) (same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211 ,
para. 1804(g)(4) (1989) (same); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 91(b),(d) (Law. Co-op.
1991) (same); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(7)(e) (McKinney 1991) (same); TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(g)(4) (Vernon 1991) (same); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-
601(2) (1990) (allows initial delivery fee per contract; redelivery charges are specifically
prohibited after "repair or maintenance;" does not mention redelivery upon
reinstatement); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(C)(6) (1990) (does not specifically mention
redelivery, but does not define conditions under which "delivery" charge may be assessed
other than for actual "delivery" of merchandise; otherwise, § 1954(C)(10) prohibits
additional charges other than those specified).
332 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-504(1)(b) (1990); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg.
Sess.) § 4(5); FLA. STAT. § 559.9234(5) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-685(b) (1991);
IND. CODE § 24-7-4-12 (1990); IowA CODE § 537.3611(2) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 367.980(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-
1104(a)(11) (1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.957(c) (West 1989); MINN. STAT.
§ 325 F.91(1)(1)(6) (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-2108(1), 2109 (1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1351.04(D) (Anderson 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-607(a)(1)
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.21(A)(12) (1990).
31 See supra note 170.
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at the outset of every contract. But perhaps more importantly, termination is
a basic right provided in the contract and is the one aspect of RTO
agreements that purportedly sets them apart from retail sales. Assessing a
termination fee essentially constitutes a penalty for exercising the very
contract right that allows RTO agreements to escape regulation under other
credit laws.'M
Security deposits. All states except Minnesota allow an RTO dealer to
collect a security deposit at the start of the transaction. 5  The deposit
... See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16) (1990) ("credit sale" would include
RTO leases if they were not "terminable without penalty at any time by the cbnsumer").
... See MINN. STAT. § 325F.91(3) (1990) (prohibits the retention of RTO security
deposits). Other statutes either expressly authorize security deposits or have provisions
authorizing any charge or fee if properly disclosed. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-601(1)
(1990) (must disclose security deposit and conditions for return); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162
(Reg. Sess.) § 2(a)(3) (must disclose all initial payments); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
7603(a)(6) (1991) (same); IND. CODE § 24-7-3-3(5) (1990) (must disclose if a security
deposit is required and conditions for return); IOWA CODE § 537.3605(3) (1989) (must
disclose if a security deposit is required); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336 § 5(a)(7) (must
disclose all initial payments); 1991 La. Acts 204 § 3355 (same); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
93, §§ 92(a)(3), 91(b) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (must disclose in advertisements if security
deposit is required; must disclose in contract the amount of any payment required at or
before execution); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2110(1) (1989) (must disclose if a security
deposit is required and requirements for return); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(B)(6)
(1990) (must disclose the amount of any required security deposit); R.I. GEN. LAws §
6-44-8(a)(3) (1990) (must disclose in advertisement if security deposit is required); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-2-706(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (if security deposit is required, must
disclose amount and condition for return); see also ALA. CODE § 8-25-2(d)(3) (1990)
(must disclose any other charges); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b)(4) (1990) (same);
FLA. STAT. § 559.9233(4)(d) (1990) (must disclose total of initial payments to be paid
at or before consummation); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-682(a)(2) (1991) (same); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1211h, para. 1802(g)(4) (1989) (must disclose amount and purpose of any other
payment, charge, or fee not included in periodic payments); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
367.977(l)(i) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (must disclose total of initial payments to be
paid at or before consummation or delivery, whichever is later); MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 12-1104(a)(5) (1990) (must disclose total of initial payments to be paid at or
before consummation); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.953(1)(b) (West 1989) (must
disclose any initial payments to be paid at or before consummation or delivery, whichever
is later); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.662(3)(6) (1990) (must disclose amount and purpose of
any other payment, charge, or fee not included in periodic payments); 1991 Nev. Stat.
196 § 4(1)(G) (must disclose all initial charges); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 501(7)(e)
(McKinney 1991) (same); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.02(A)(2) (Anderson 1990)
(must disclose total amount of initial payment to be paid at or before consummation);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-6A-5(7) (1991) (must disclose all initial charges);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-604(5) (1990) (must disclose amount and purpose of any
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creates a fund to reimburse the dealer for damage to leased property or lost
rentals resulting from the lessee's retention of goods beyond the period for
which he has paid. If the customer promptly makes the goods available to the
dealer upon termination of the agreement and the goods are in satisfactory
condition, the deposit would be returned. The deposit thus can be an
effective way of allowing the dealer to receive money from a lessee who has
breached the agreement. If properly disclosed and not abused, requiring a
security deposit as "insurance" against such losses seems fair. Problems arise
when disclosure is incomplete or misleading as, for example, when an
advertisement promises a ten dollar rate for the first week but fails to
mention a required twenty dollar security deposit. Unfairness can also result
if a dealer retains the security deposit without justification after termination
or delays unreasonably in returning the money to the lessee. The former
concern can be addressed by requiring pertinent disclosure of security
deposits in the contract and advertisements. 6 The latter practice can, and
should, be prohibited by statute, perhaps in a state's unfair trade practices
law, but its discouragement in practice is largely left to the marketplace and
the hope that maintaining customer goodwill is more important to the dealer
than retaining security deposits without cause. As an added assurance, an
RTO statute could reasonably mandate a deadline for returning deposits and
impose severe penalties for noncompliance. No state currently imposes such
a deadline.
Property insurance. Under several consumer credit laws, including TILA
and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, a creditor can insist that, as a
condition of entering into the transaction, the buyer must either purchase
property insurance from the seller or provide proof that the collateral is
adequately insured.337 Creditors naturally would like some assurance that,
other payment, charge, or fee not included in periodic payments); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 35.72(g)(4) (Vernon 1991) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.21(A)(7)
(1990) (must disclose total amount of initial payment to be paid at or before
consummation or delivery, whichever is later).
336 Two states expressly require disclosure of security deposits in advertisements.
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93, § 92(a)( 3) (Law. Co-op. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-44-
8(a)(3) (1990). All states that permit security deposits require such disclosure in the RTO
contract. See supra note 335.
"I Under TILA, the creditor can require the consumer to purchase property insurance
from the creditor, but any mandatory insurance premiums so paid must be included in
the disclosed finance charge. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(ii) (1990). TILA does not
prohibit a creditor from requiring proof of insurance as a condition to consummating the
transaction. Id. The U.C.C.C. authorizes a creditor to collect property insurance
premiums if the costs are conspicuously disclosed and if the consumer is allowed to
choose the insurer. U.C.C.C. § 2.501(2)(a) (1974 version); see also id. at § 4.301.
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if the property is destroyed or stolen, a fund to cover the loss exists in
addition to the buyer's promise to reimburse the seller out of his own pocket.
The issue is important to RTO dealers because incidents of theft and damage
may occur at relatively high rates in the neighborhoods where they operate.
The question is whether RTO dealers should be permitted to impose special
fees to cover such losses, or whether the cost should be incorporated into the
basic RTO rates.
Currently most RTO statutes prohibit a dealer from requiring an RTO
customer to purchase property insurance from the dealer,338 but most do
allow imposition of a separate fee if the lessee does not have insurance from
another source.339 This may be misguided. Unlike many more affluent
consumers, low income RTO customers are not likely to own their homes or
carry renter's insurance against loss of personal property, and consequently
in most cases they will be required to pay the extra periodic insurance fee to
cover the risk. If there is no real option for RTO customers to avoid paying
insurance premiums to the dealer, it may make sense to incorporate the fee
into the RTO basic rates. The result would be slightly higher rental rates for
all, but those rates would more accurately reflect the actual cost of the
contract. Most RTO customers would benefit from the more accurate up-
front disclosure, and dealers should suffer no loss in revenue. A viable
alternative would be to allow a dealer to charge for property insurance, but
only if the contract discloses the lessee's right to reject the coverage and
assume personal responsibility for loss or damage to the goods even if he
does not have personal property insurance. No RTO statute currently takes
this approach, which would allow lessees to decide whether the risk is worth
the added fee.
338 See ALA. CODE § 8-25-3(4) (1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(a)(4) (1990);
COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 5-10-504(1)(a) (1990); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 4(1);
FLA. STAT. § 559.9234(4) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-685(a) (1991); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1211h, para. 1802(2)(c)(4) (1989); IND. CODE § 24-7-4-12(1) (1990); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.979(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); 1991 La. Acts 204 §
3356(7); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.957(a) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. §
325F.86(h) (1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.662(2)(4) (1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-
2107(5) (1989); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(3)(d) (McKinney 1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1351.04(A) (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(c)(4) (1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-606(5) (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(c)(4)
(Vernon 1991). But see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 91(g) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (must
disclose any insurance "required of the lessee"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-3(g) (1990)
(same).
"I Oklahoma may be the only exception. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(c)(10) (1990)
prohibits the charging of any fee "other than those specified" in the statute. Property
insurance is not expressly authorized in the act.
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3. Restrictions on Repossession
Repossessing merchandise from lessees who have stopped paying rent is
an unavoidable part of the RTO business. Unfriendly confrontations between
customer and dealer have led to allegations of unfair collection efforts and
have contributed to the poor image of RTO dealers in some
communities.2 Two issues typically arise: (1) whether RTO customers
should have some way of protecting "equity" in goods that are repossessed
after a substantial amount of rent has been paid, and (2) whether certain
types of collection tactics should be prohibited.
With the exception of Massachusetts, all RTO statutes deal with the first
issue by mandating reinstatement rights which allow the lessee to relinquish
possession of rented property and resume payments at a later date without
losing credit for earlier rentals. This right can be valuable to low-income
individuals who may find it difficult to make continuous rental payments for
twelve or eighteen months. The statutes take two approaches, each of which
has some merit. In several states the reinstatement period (usually thirty to
sixty days) is offered only to lessees who make the property available to the
dealer "promptly" after default or within a grace period (two to seven days)
after the last prepaid rental term expires.341 This, of course, benefits
4 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
4 See ALA. CODE § 8-25-4 (1990) (five days if monthly payment; two days if less
than monthly; if merchandise is returned, the period is extended to thirty days after the
return); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-106(a), (d), (e) (1990) (right to reinstatement extended
to thirty days if property is returned other than by judicial process); FLA. STAT. §
559.9235(1) (1990) (right to reinstate if prompt surrender of property and lessee tenders
reinstatement fees within 60 days of expiration of last rental period for which timely
payment is made); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-686(a) (1991) (right to reinstatement if no
more than three periodic payments missed and lessee surrendered the item to lessor); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 1h, para. 1802(e)(2) (1989) (must take required action before the later
of one week or one-halfpayment period); IND. CODE § 24-7-6-1 (1990) (right to reinstate
if (1) prompt surrender of goods after failure to make payment and (2) not more than 60
days after surrender); IOWA CODE § 537.3616(1) (1989) (reinstatement rights if property
is surrendered (when requested by lessor) and not more than 60 days have passed since
the return of the property); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.980(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1991) (lessee must pay all past due rental charges, reasonable costs of pickup,
redelivery, and refurbishing and any applicable late fee within five days of the renewal
date if monthly, within two days if more frequently; if lessee returns the property, extend
period for additional thirty days from the date of return); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
445.958 (West 1989) (if lessee missed not more than three periodic payments and item
surrendered); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.664(1) (1990) (if asserted within three rental terms
of last timely payment, lessor may require payment of unpaid payments, delinquency
charges, reinstatement fee, and redelivery charge); OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.05
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dealers by encouraging prompt return of property after payments have
ceased, because a lessee who retains property without paying rent beyond the
grace period forfeits future reinstatement rights. So long as the lessee is made
aware of the grace period after termination of the agreement, this approach
seems reasonable. The second approach also requires prompt return of
property but provides a graduated reinstatement period depending on how
many payments have been made. A lessee who stops paying near the end of
the RTO contract may have up to 180 days in which to reinstate the
agreement and obtain ownership.' 2 Lessees who terminate after only a few
(Anderson 1990) (right extends to three lease terms after expiration of last lease term
timely paid if lessee surrendered property at lessor request; lessor may require payment
of any unpaid lease payments, delinquency charges, reasonable reinstatement fee, and
redelivery charge; grace period not less than two days for weekly payment period or not
less than five days if monthly; not entitled to more than three monthly grace periods per
year); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(D) (1990) (reinstatement rights when lessee makes
past due payments and returns property within two days of request; right extends for not
less than thirty days after the return); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-5(a) (1990) (right for three
lease terms if lessee surrenders property upon request; may require payment of unpaid
lease payments, late charges, and reasonable reinstatement fees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
2-714(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (right to reinstatement if not more than sixty days in
default, only one periodic payment has been missed, and lessee has surrendered the item
difring the time in which payments were missed; lessor may charge the outstanding
balance of payments and delinquency charges, plus delivery charges); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 35.72(e)(2), () (Vernon 1991) (lessee must take proper action by the later
of one week or one-half the number of days in a regular payment period after due date
of payment; if merchandise is returned, the right to reinstatement must be extended for
thirty days).
342 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-10-701(1) (1990) (60 days; if lessee paid more than
60% of payments required for ownership, extend period for 120 days); 1991 Conn. Acts
91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 7(a) (reinstatement period can be extended depending on
percentage of coqtract completed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 7607(a)(2) (1991) (60 days;
if lessee paid more than 60% of total payments, extend to 180 days); 1991 Kan. Sess.
Laws 336, § 7(b) (within five days of renewal date for monthly payments or two days
if weekly payment, lessee must pay: (1) past due rental charges, (2) reasonable cost of
pick-up and redelivery, and (3) reinstatement fee; if lessee paid less than two-thirds of
ownership amount, the right extends not less than twenty-one days from the return of the
property; if paid more than two-thirds of ownership amount, the right extends not less
than forty-five days from return of property); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1106(a)
(1990) (same); 1991 La. Acts 204, § 3357(B), (C) (same); MINN. STAT. § 325F.90(1)(2)
(1990) (if after failing to make timely payment, lessee surrenders the property within
seven days of request and if lessee paid less than 60% of total payments necessary to
acquire ownership, reinstatement period is 60 days; if lessee paid more than 60 %, period
is 180 days); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2108(2) (1989) (thirty days if lessee pays reasonable
cost of pick-up, redelivery, and refurbishing and late fees within five days of renewal
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weeks may have shorter reinstatement periods. This approach is potentially
difficult to monitor, but if followed it offers an equitable solution that
recognizes the increased value of reinstatement as an RTO customer nears the
end of a contract. Again, so long as the consumer is made aware of his rights
after termination, the approach seems fair.
The second issue-discouraging abuses in the collection process-is
sparingly treated in RTO statutes, 3 perhaps because other state laws of
general applicability may address similar concerns. Minnesota is the only
state to include comprehensive collection protections in its RTO statute.
date for monthly payment or three days for more frequent payments; extended to ninety
days if lessee returned property and 60-80% of ownership already paid; extend to 180
days if more than 80%); 1991 Nev. Stat. 196 § 8(2), (3), (4) (same as Kansas); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(5)(c) (McKinney 1991) (if property returned within the later of
seven days or one-half rental period, thirty days; if lessee paid one-half of payments
required for ownership, sixty days; if three-fourths of payments are paid, 180 days); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-6A-7(3) (same as Kansas); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
607(a)(2) (1990) (lessee must pay past due rental charges and reasonable cost of pick-up,
redelivery, and refurbishing and any applicable late fee within five days of renewal date
for monthly rentals or within two days if more frequent period; reinstatement period is
then extended depending on percentage of payments made); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
207.23(A)-(C) (1990) (can reinstate upon payment of past due rental charges, reasonable
costs of pick-up, and redelivery and applicable late fees, within five days of renewal date
if monthly or two days if more frequently; if property returned, the right extends to
twenty-one days if lessee has paid less than two-thirds of amount to acquire ownership;
if paid two-thirds or more, extend right to forty-five days).
"' Several RTO statutes provide some collection protection to consumers, typically
prohibitions against the lessor's breaching the peace, requiring that the lessee waive
defenses or counterclaims, imposing confession ofjudgment remedies, garnishing wages
or taking a security interest in goods other than the subject of the transaction. See ALA.
CODE § 8-25-3 (1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(a)(1) to (3) (1990); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 5-10-103, 5-10-502 (1990); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 3(a), (b);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 7608 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 559.9234 (1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-684 (1991); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211h, para. 1802(c) (1989); IND. CODE §§ 24-
7-4-5 to 24-7-4-7 (1990); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336, § 6; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
367.979(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); 1991 LA. AcTs 204, § 3356; MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 12-1105 (1990); MICH. COMe. LAWs ANN. § 445.956(b), (c), (e) (West
1989); MINN. STAT. § 325F.91 (1990); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 407.662(2)(2) (1990); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 69-2107 (1989); 1991 Nev. Stat. 196, § 7; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §
501(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1991); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.03(A) (Anderson 1990);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1954(c) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 6-44-4 (1990); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-2-708 to 37-2-710 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 54-
6A-6 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-606(1)-(4) (1990); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 35.72(c) (Vernon 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.22 (1990).
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Modeled after the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), 1 the law limits the frequency and timing of contacts with a
delinquent customer, prohibits contacts with employers and third parties
except in limited circumstances, and permits the customer to cut off further
collection efforts by giving written notice to the dealer.4 5 The FDCPA
provides limited benefits to consumers because it applies only to third party
collection agencies and not to businesses, like RTO companies, that collect
debts owed directly to themselves.' The Minnesota law, one of the most
recent RTO statutes to be enacted, fills a gap in this area and should be a
model for future legislation. Congress' stated reason for limiting the federal
act to third party collectors was that local banks and retailers are not likely
to engage in abusive collection tactics because they are concerned about
protecting their business reputations in the community?4 7 The same
rationale would counsel against regulating the collection efforts of the RTO
industry, whose dealers must also be concerned about their reputations,"8
but RTO dealers have more frequent contact with delinquent customers than
do most other businesses, and the RTO industry has a relatively poor record
in some regions where abuses have occurred. 49 Protections like those in
Minnesota would set reasonable ground rules that many RTO dealers
probably already follow. Those who do not abide by such guidelines should
suffer a penalty.
4. Contract Disclosures
The consumer complaints about the RTO industry discussed in this article
have largely occurred in unregulated environments where opportunities for
deception were abundant. Rational spending decisions often were inhibited
544 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692m (1991).
145 See MINN. STAT. § 325F.92 (West 1990).
346 The FDCPA governs the activities of "debt collectors," defined as persons whose
principal business is the collection of "debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1991).
'47 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUsING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CONSUMER
CREDIT PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No. 187, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1697.
348 See 1990 Not 'Easy, 'But it Did Mean Success, RTO NETWORK NEWS, Jan. 1991,
at 1-2 (improved relationships with consumer groups and media).
341 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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because consumers did not realize the total costs of an RTO transaction."
If consumers are given meaningful disclosures and substantive protections
where overreaching is most common, exploitation of the unwary should
decrease and informed decisions are more likely to be made. With the market
working more efficiently, consumers should be able to assess the economic
consequences of their choices and spend their money according to their
individual preferences.35
RTO contract disclosures should apprise the typical RTO customer of the
overall nature of the transaction, the expected costs of the agreement
including any fees that could be assessed during the contract term,352 and
the customer's rights against the dealer during the lease and after the
relationship has terminated.353 For the most part, the RTO statutes enacted
11 See, e.g., Hawkes Television v. Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit, No. CV 82-
686, slip op. at 4 (Maine Sup. Ct., Oct. 19, 1982), rev'd, 462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983)
(dealer prominently advertised and disclosed weekly rent but not total RTO cost).
"I' See generally Koefele-Kale, supra note 30, at 141; Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening
in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 630, 656 (1979) (discussing the effects of disclosure on the operation of
efficient market). Virtually all disclosure legislation is subject to criticism. Disclosure in
the written contract often has minimal impact on consumer behavior since the consumer
usually makes the purchasing decision before the contract terms are examined. See infra
note 362. Even when a consumer reviews contract disclosures, often the sheer number
of disclosures can be overwhelming, diluting their effect. See infra note 356. Critics have
contended that disclosure laws provide little benefit but satisfy the political demand for
some legislation without producing strong opposition from industry. See Davis, supra
note 134, at 843 n.10; Whitford, supra note 119, at 436. Indeed, the RTO disclosure
legislation enacted to date has been sponsored by RTO dealer associations and has had
relatively little adverse effect on business. See States Enacting Rent-to-Own Laws Still
on the Increase During 1990, PROGRESsivE RENTALS, June-July 1990, at 23, 47 ; Winn,
Rent-to-Own Statutes: A Comparison and Analysis, PRoGRESsIVE RENTALS, Feb. 1986,
at 20, 21.
" The RTO industry believes that the periodic rental rate and duration of the contract
are the terms most closely scrutinized by RTO customers. See Winn, State Rent-to-Own
Statutes Revisted, PRoGREsSIvE RENTALS, June-July 1990, at 30.
"I Disclosure of a consumer's rights upon default will have little impact on the
consumer's decision whether to consummate the transaction. Most consumers do not
expect default and for many it is an unlikely event. Some critics of TILA have therefore
concluded that disclosure of default rights is not useful in the decisionmaking process.
See Koefele-Kale, supra note 30, at 127-28; Landers, supra note 30, at 684. While not
necessarily helpful in the decisionmaking process, disclosure of some default information
to RTO consumers, particularly grace periods for late payments and conditions for
reinstatement rights, can be important. For RTO consumers, the likelihood of default is
high and valuable rights can be lost if the consumer does not comply with contract
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to date serve these functions by requiring conspicuous disclosure of virtually
every aspect of the RTO transaction," which in some states means as
many as seventeen items of required information.355 Disclosure of
reinstatement rights, late fee amounts and grace periods, permissible uses of
security deposits, lessee's responsibility for loss or damage to property and
insurance options, in addition to basic periodic payment, amounts, and total
RTO costs, can aid the consumer in understanding the legal relationship.
Disclosure of too much information, however, can dilute the effectiveness
of all disclosures and inhibit consumer understanding of the most important
aspects of the transaction, particularly among consumers with substandard
educational backgrounds. 56 TILA disclosures were simplified in 1980
conditions. See supra notes 340-49 and accompanying text.
11 Required contract disclosures are set forth in ALA. CODE § 8-25-2(d) (1990); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 4-92-105(b) (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-401 (1990); 1991 Conn.
Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7603 (1991); FLA. STAT. §
559.9233(4)(a)-(n) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-682 (1991); ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
1211h, para. 1802(f)-(g) (1989); IND. CODE § 24-7-3-3 (1988); IOWA CODE § 537.3605
(1989); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336 § 5(a); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.977
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); 1991 La. Acts 204, § 3355; MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 12-1104 (1990); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 91 (Law. Co-op 1991); MIcH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.953 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. § 325F.86 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 407.662(3) (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2104 (1989); 1991 Nev. Stat. 196, § 4(1);
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501(7) (McKinney 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1351.02(A) (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(A), (B), (D)(2) (1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6-44-3 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-702(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-6A-5 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-604(a) (1990);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.72(g) (Vernon 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
207.21 (1990).
Is' See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.02, .04 (Anderson 1990) (requiring the
following disclosures: (1) description of goods, (2) whether new or used, (3) initial
payment, (4) amount and timing of periodic payments, (5) amount of "other charges,"
(6) explanation of risk of loss, (7) explanation of reinstatement rights, (8) service or
maintenance responsibilities, (9) statement explaining how agreement can be terminated,
(10) total cost of obtaining ownership, (11) early purchase options, (12) manufacturer's
warranty coverage after ownership transfers, (13) "cash price" of the goods, (14)
statement that the transaction is regulated under state law, (15) statement that lessee is
not required to purchase insurance from lessor, (16) in home collection fee (must be
separately agreed to), and (17) method of computing and amount of delinquency charges).
356 Following the enactment of TILA in 1968, a consensus emerged that information
overload had a deleterious effect on comprehension of disclosed information. Confronted
with too much information, the typical consumer response is to ignore disclosure entirely.
See T. STICHT, LEARNING & LISTENING IN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION AND THE
AcQuIsrrION OF KNOWLEDGE 285 (Carrol & Fredle eds. 1972); Koefele-Kale, supra note
30, at 128, 128 n.64; Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26
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following findings that consumers typically digest only a few bits of
information in one sitting. 57 RTO disclosure statutes are subject to similar
criticism as they often bombard the consumer with more information than can
reasonably be comprehended.358 Nevertheless, the peculiar circumstances
of an RTO transaction may justify the detailed disclosures. The RTO
transaction embodies a unique variety of rights and obligations not common
to other types of buying arrangements, and the best realistic hope of
apprising consumers of the salient characteristics of the arrangement may be
to set them all out in the contract. At least if the consumer receives a copy
of an agreement laden with information, he or she can refer to the document
later if a dispute arises. Moreover, as the statutes promote uniformity in
disclosed terms and language, consumers are in a better position to shop
comparatively among RTO dealers.
Some relatively painless steps can be taken, however, to improve
consumer understanding. RTO contracts should be drafted in plain language
that a person with below average education can understand.359 Customers
could be required to initial each disclosure, or at least the more important
ones, to increase the likelihood of reading and understanding?6 ° Oral
disclosures of key provisions, such as the periodic rate, total cost, amount of
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 727-28 (1979). This is especially true when the consumer
receives the disclosures under stressful circumstances not suited to careful study. Koefele-
Kale, supra at 129-30, 130 n.68; Landers & Rohner, supra, at 725 (description of typical
setting for contract disclosures). The problems associated with detailed disclosure
schemes occur in leasing transactions as well as credit sales. See Senate RTO Hearing,
supra note 2, at 31 (Statement of Nancy H. Teeters, FRB).
" See Koefele-Kale, supra note 30, at 128-29, 145 (consumers have accurate recall
of two items of information-amount borrowed and monthly payments); Mandell,
Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of the
Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FiN. 1146, 1146-48 (1971); Bettman, Consumer Information
Acquisition and Search Strategies, THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON MARKET BEHAVIOR
(A. Mitchell ed. 1978) (typical consumer can digest 8 "bits" of information before
overload).
358 See supra note 355 (Ohio disclosures); MD. COM. LAv CODE ANN. § 12-1111
(1990) (form RTO agreement containing 13 paragraphs of disclosures, including complex
reinstatement rights and formula for early purchase option).
-" The likelihood of information being understood depends in part on the readability
of the information. Low income, undereducated individuals stand to benefit most from
simple contract disclosures. See Davis, supra note 134, at 846-47, 872; Koefele-Kale,
supra note 30, at 130, 132 (advocating clear writing style and use of familiar language).
30) See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.04(E) (Anderson 1990) (in-home
collection disclosure must be separately signed).
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late fees and grace periods, could be mandated.361 Perhaps most
importantly, certain fundamental information about the cost of an RTO
contract should be made before the contract is signed and during the
shopping activity.362 All but seven of the RTO statutes allow dealers to
make the enumerated disclosures at the time they present the contract to the
customer for signature.3" A dealer is thus able to display an item in the
361 The principal problem with requiring oral disclosures is the difficulty of
enforcement. Businesses could be subject to numerous complaints that oral disclosures
were not given and might find such allegations difficult to refute. Even if the consumer
signed a form acknowledging that the oral disclosures were made, the consumer could
maintain that he did not know what he was signing. See Cole v. Lovett, 672 F. Supp.
947 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1987). Legislatures could
ameliorate these problems by, for example, providing no private remedy for a dealer's
failure to give oral disclosures or providing that the consumer's signature creates a
presumption that disclosures were made. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c) (1991) (consumer's
written acknowledgment of receipt of TILA disclosures creates rebuttable presumption).
2 For the vast majority of consumers, contract disclosure is too late. The "sale" is
usually made, at least in the consumer's mind, before he ever sees a contract. See Jordan
& Warren, supra note 119, at 1320. Dealers in states where price tag disclosures are
mandated report that the disclosures are not unduly burdensome. See PROGRESSIVE
RENTALS, June-July 1988. In addition to price tag disclosures, discussed infra note 363
and accompanying text, 27 states require disclosures in RTO advertisements. The laws
parallel TILA's advertising guidelines, see supra note 299, and require disclosure of
information (e.g., total RTO cost) only if the advertisement refers to a specific item for
lease. The laws vary widely in their scope. See ALA. CODE § 8-25-5 (1990); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 4-92-107 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-1001(2) (1990); 1991 Conn. Acts
91-162, § 11(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7606(a) (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
683(b) (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch., 1211 , para. 1803 (1989); IOWA CODE
§ 537.3615(2) (1989); 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 336 § 10(a); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
967.982(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); 1991 La. Acts 204, § 3360(A); MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1109 (1990); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 92 (Law. Co-op.
1991); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.955(3) (West 1989); MINN. STAT.
§ 325F.88(2)(a) (1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.663 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2112
(1989); 1991 Nev. Stat. 196, § 10(1); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 505 (McKinney 1991);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1351.07 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1954(E)
(1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-44-8 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-704(1) (Law. Co-op.
1991); S.D. CODWIED LAWS ANN. § 54-6A-10(1)-(3) (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
18-610(a) (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.73 (Vernon 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-207.26 (1990).
363 Disclosures on price tags for displayed merchandise are required in 1991 Conn.
Acts 91-162 (Reg. Sess.) § 11(b) (cash price, amount and number of periodic payment;
total cost); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7606(c) (cash price, amount and number of
periodic payments, total cost); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1104 (1990) (number
and amount of payments; total RTO price; new or used); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
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store for, say, ten dollars per week rental and the customer may not learn
that the item is used merchandise, that the total cost of ownership is $800,
or that he must also pay a delivery fee or security deposit, until the contract
is presented for signature. Unlike traditional retail credit sales, in which
merchandise is presumed to be new and the ultimate credit cost of an item
can be estimated from the stated cash price, RTO merchandise is sometimes
used and the approximate ownership price cannot be determined from
observing the periodic rental price without also knowing the length of the
contract, performing some multiplication and noting what other charges are
being assessed. Meaningful price tag disclosure should include, at a
minimum, the number and amount of periodic payments, the total RTO cost
of ownership, including any mandatory fees or security deposits, and a
statement whether the leased property is new or used. Only with this
information can a consumer engage in comparison shopping at other RTO
dealers and, for those with other alternatives, at local retailers offering
similar goods for cash or on credit.
V. CONCLUSION
The RTO industry has become a nationwide alternative to retail credit
sales for a large number of our poorer citizens. Early efforts to characterize
the transaction as an illegal evasion of usury laws and other consumer credit
statutes have largely failed to gain widespread support. While attacks on the
industry continue, the trend appears to favor a realization that RTO offers
something of value to low income consumers who have been previously
unprotected by other laws. The movement toward accepting the transaction
as a legal option for consumers should ultimately benefit RTO customers by
mandating uniform, meaningful disclosures tailored to their concerns and by
eliminating some of the unfair practices and charges that have existed in the
past. Although there may be no effective way to reduce substantially the cost
of an RTO transaction, if legislatures focus on the peculiar circumstances of
the RTO customer, laws can be enacted that allow consumers to make better
informed, and more equitable, purchasing decisions.
445.955(3) (West 1989) (cash price, amount and number of periodic payments); MINN.
STAT. § 325F.88(2)(b) (1990) (cash price, amount of lease payment, total cost); N.Y.
PEs. PROP. LAws § 505(3) (McKinney 1991) (cash price, amount and number of
payments, total cost); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.07(C) (Anderson 1990) (cash price,
amount and number of payments, total cost).
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